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INTRODUCTION
The Rule of Law is a fundamental ideal in American political and
constitutional thought.' Often contrasted with "the rule of men,' 2 the
Rule of Law represents an ideal of constrained governmental power, as
opposed to unfettered discretion.3 Though the parameters for constraint
under the Rule of Law are contested, the Rule of Law is traditionally
understood to encompass the following goals: (1) protecting people from
one another, in the sense of upholding civil order; (2) protecting people
from arbitrary governmental action; and (3) providing people with a ba-
sis for planning their affairs in light of pre-existing legal consequences. 4
The Rule of Law is malleable, in that it can accommodate different
theories of justice. For example, rule utilitarians might describe the
goals of the Rule of Law in relation to economic efficiency or similar
policies oriented toward maximizing wealth or satisfaction. 5 Those who
are deontologically oriented view the Rule of Law as a means of protect-
1 See generally, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 'Rule of Law' as a Concept in Constitu-
tional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3 (1996) ("Respect for the Rule of Law is central to
our political and rhetorical traditions, possibly even to our sense of national identity."); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 149, 149 (1987) (Rule of Law is "an ancient and honorable theme in both
political theory and American constitutional law."); RcHARD A. Bpdsan, JR., JusTacE
ANToNIN SCALIA AND THE CONSERVATIVE REvIvAL 292 (1997) ("All Americans... 'believe
that politics is and should be conducted in accordance with patterns of rights and obligations
established under law."') (citation omitted); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Unenumerated
ConstitutionalRights and the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 615, 615 (1991) ("The
rule of law has long been one of the mainstays of liberal thought"); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 697 (1988) ("It is the proud boast of our democracy that we have a government of
laws and not of men.") (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted).
2 In more modem terms, this might be referred to as the rule of people or individuals.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B. U. L. Rav. 781, 781 n.1
(1989).
3 This aspect of the Rule of Law is often attributed to A.V. Dicey and his work, TiE
LAW OF Tm CONsnTurioN. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 151 ("Speaking of the rule of law,
[Dicey] says: 'It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominancy of regular
law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness,
of prerogative [sic], or even wide discretionary authority on the part of the government."')
(citation omitted); Fallon, supra note 1, at 1 ("Within the Anglo-American tradition, perhaps
the most famous exposition came from a turn-of-the-century British lawyer, A.V. Dicey, who
associated the Rule of Law with rights-based liberalism and judicial review of governmental
action.'). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (referring
to the Founders' struggle to "make certain that men would be governed by law, not the arbi-
trary fiat of the man or men in power").
4 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 7-8.
5 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JusTIcE 48-87 (1981) (discussing
the theory of wealth maximization as founded on law in the context of other utilitarian views);
JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF Jusnca 22 (1971) ('The main idea [of classical utilitarianism] is
that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as
to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed overall for the individuals belonging
to it.").
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ing individual rights. 6 Legal formalists emphasize still another orienta-
tion to the Rule of Law, which emphasizes the internal morality of law as
a value independent of other substantive rights.7 These different ap-
proaches to justice share a common interest in constraining government
discretion, at least in part, through rules.8
6 See, e.g., RAwLS, supra note 5, at 235-43 (considering that the "rights of persons ...
are protected by the principle of the rule of law"); FREDnRCiH A. HAYEK, THE RoAD TO SERF-
DOM 73 (1944):
While every law restricts individual freedom to some extent by altering the means
which people may use in the pursuit of their aims, under the Rule of Law the govern-
ment is prevented from stultifying individual efforts by ad hoc action. Within the
known rules of the game the individual is free to pursue his personal ends and
desires, certain that the powers of government will not be used deliberately to frus-
trate his efforts.
Id.
7 See LoN L. FuLLER, THE MoRALrry OF LAW 33-94 (2d ed. 1969). Fuller identifies
eight aspirational principles for a system of law, which are exemplified in his identification of
"eight distinct routes to disaster" which fail to achieve a legal system:
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue
must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to publicize,
or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe;
(3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but
undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the
threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the
enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the powers
of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the
subject cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence
between the rules as announced and their actual administration.
Id. at 39. Commentators debate whether Fuller's theory is "substantive and natural-law like"
or "a formal, content-neutral analysis of the necessary conditions for rules to be effective in
guiding human conduct." See Fallon, supra note 1, at 38 n. 191. However, for the purpose of
this article, it is treated as a foundational view of formal justice, which is oriented toward
regular and impartial administration of rules. See RAwLS, supra note 5, at 235 (referring to the
"regular and impartial, and in this sense fair, administration of law we may call 'justice as
regularity"', which he deems "a more suggestive phrase than 'formal justice'.").
8 See RAwLS, supra note 5, at 241:
It is clear that, other things equal, the dangers to liberty are less when the law is
impartially and regularly administered in accordance with the principle of legality.
While a coercive mechanism is necessary, it is obviously essential to define pre-
cisely the tendency of its operations. Knowing what things it penalizes and knowing
that these are within their power to do or not to do, citizens can draw up their plans
accordingly. One who complies with the announced rules need never fear an in-
fringement of his liberty.
Id.; FULLER, supra note 7, at 209-10:
Surely the very essence of the Rule of Law is that in acting upon the citizen (by
putting him in jail, for example, or declaring invalid a deed under which he claims
title to property) a government will faithfully apply rules previously declared as to
those to be followed by the citizen and as being determinative of his rights and
duties. If the Rule of Law does not mean this, it means nothing. Applying rules
faithfully implies, in turn, that rules will take the form of general declarations; it
would make little sense, for example, if the government were today to enact a special
law whereby Jones should be put in jail and then tomorrow were 'faithfully' to
follow this 'rule' by actually putting him in jail. Furthermore, if the law is intended
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Discretion to make ad hoc determinations threatens both efficiency-
based and fights-based theories of justice, because no one completely
trusts an unconstrained decisionmaker to implement such theories in a
consistent, principled manner.9 Discretion also threatens the internal mo-
rality of law by undermining the notice and publicity requirement of
rules, which are fundamental elements of a legal system in the formalist
tradition.' 0
Constraining discretion is essential to the Rule of Law, but some
discretion is unavoidable." Some forms of discretion are products of
linguistic indeterminacy and will remain a problem as long as human
beings interpret language differently. 12 The post-modern challenge to
the enterprise of law, as reflected in deconstructionist activity associated
with the Critical Legal Studies movement, expresses an extreme form of
discontent with the constraining power of rules. 13 As a practical matter,
to permit a man to conduct his own affairs subject to an obligation to observe certain
restraints imposed by superior authority, this implies that he will not be told at each
turn what to do; law furnishes a baseline for self-directed action, not a detailed set of
instructions for accomplishing specific objectives.
Id. See also POSNRm, supra note 5, at 74-76 (arguing that wealth maximization provides a
foundation for law similar to that of Rawls, which requires an order from the sovereign that
has these additional elements):
(1) to count as law, a command must be one that can be complied with by those to
whom it is addressed; (2) it must treat equally those who are similarly situated in all
respects relevant to the command; (3) it must be public; (4) there must be a proce-
dure for ascertaining the truth of any facts necessary to the application of the com-
mand according to its terms.
Id. In a later book, Posner criticizes these elements of law, which he associates with formal
justice, as "thin gruel." See RicHARm A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDEN E 332
(1990). He argues for a more pragmatic view, which includes "balancing rule-of-law virtues
against equitable and discretionary case-specific considerations." Id.
9 See PosNER, supra note 8, at 21 ("The idea of judicial discretion-a blank space or
black box, not the solution to the problem of deciding cases when the rules run out but merely
the name of the problem-is, no matter how fancied up, a source of unease to the legal
profession.").
10 See FULLER, supra note 7, at 35 (stating that it is "very unpleasant to have one's case
decided by rules when there was no way of knowing what those rules were.").
11 See JOSEPH RAz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in Tan AUTorr OF LAW 210, 211
(1979) ("The rule of law is a political ideal which a legal system may lack or may possess to a
greater or lesser degree. That much is common ground."); Fallon, supra note 1, at 9 ("[TIhe
extent to which a legal system approaches the Rule-of-Law ideal is itself a matter of degree").
Professor Fuller is also quite clear that the "inner morality of law is condemned to remain
largely a morality of aspiration and not of duty. Its primary appeal must be to a sense of
trusteeship and to the pride of the craftsman." FULLER, supra note 7, at 43.
12 See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. Cm. L.
REv. 779, 779 (1989) ("In a perfect world, elected representatives would draft laws of supreme
clarity and judges would not disturb the indisputable meaning of legal texts. In our fallen
world, however, law requires interpretation.")
13 See WniLAm ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAImc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 196 (1996):
Deconstruction corrodes our belief in the rule of law, as traditionally defined as a
law of rules which are independently binding, universally knowable, and objectively
predictable. If the 'rules' in the rule of law are subject to the sorts of manipulation
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however, rules are capable of communication and constraint.14 Contro-
versy about the degree of constraint achievable through rules, while not
uninteresting, is not the primary focus of this article.
Discretion also arises from the practical impossibility of drafting
rules to speak directly to every situation governed by law. A positivist,
believing that decisionmakers have discretion to fill in "gaps" between
the rules, would argue that discretion is unavoidable in this context.
15
Alternatively, even if one recognizes constraint from legal authority
other than positive law enacted by appropriate social institutions, the pro-
cess of identifying and applying such authority injects considerable un-
certainty into the legal system, which is akin to the uncertainty produced
by discretion. 16
or contextualization suggested by deconstruction, then the formalist sounding nile
seems implausible.
Id. Even adherents to the Critical Legal Studies movement agree that the American legal
system provides some level of determinacy and constrainL See Mark V. Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J 1515, 1538 (1991):
A completely determinate legal system would measure 100 determiniles, while a
completely indeterminate one would measure zero. CLS adherents at present defend
the position that the proper measure of legal systems is probably between five and
fifteen; that is no system is completely indeterminate, but the level of determinacy is
relatively low. Mainstream legal theorists at present defend the position that the
proper measure of well-functioning legal systems like that of the United States is
somewhere between forty and sixty; that is, such systems have a substantial amount
of indeterminacy, but not nearly as much as the CLS position claims.
Id.
14 See John F. Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for Decent Respect of the Tax Code, 71
TuL. L. Rnv. 1501, 1511 (1997):
Although the precise limits of language are difficult to establish, our daily experi-
ence of communication demonstrates that they lie well outside the range of the triv-
ial. Were this not so, every effort at communication would be pointless. Experience
attests to the fact that language works. Whatever theoretical difficulties we may
have in explaining how language functions, discussing the subject would be point-
less unless we were convinced that words are valid instruments of communication,
and for that to be true we must at minimum be able to say with confidence that
certain meanings lie outside the plausible range of significance of a particular set of
words understood in their context.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
15 See PosNmR, supra note 8, at 20:
In the influential positivist view expounded by H.L.A. Hart in his book, Ti CON-
cFPvr OF LAW (1961), the law is the set of rules laid down by legislators, judges, and
other authorized lawgivers. When the rules run out or fail to fit (as they often do),
the judges have discretion to modify, trim, or extend them as may be necessary to
make them cover the case at hand. Alternatively-but it comes to the same thing-
one of the rules that compose the law is a jurisdictional rule authorizing judges to
exercise discretion whenever there is a gap or ambiguity in the substantive rules. In
this view the judge is, as Holmes put it, an interstitial legislator.
Id. (citation in original).
16 See generally RONALD Dwomu , TAKNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1978). Professor
Dworkin challenges the proposition that judges have discretion to decide cases not governed
by a clear rule of law. Instead, Dworkin suggests that the judge has a duty to discover what
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Some discretion, though clearly avoidable, is nevertheless permitted
in our legal system. Rulemakers may consciously choose to omit de-
tailed criteria for decisionmaking from a rule, relying instead on a deci-
sionmaker's judgment on a case-by-case basis. 17 Normative
considerations affect the extent to which rule-based decisionmaking is
adopted in the legal system and emphasized in the legal culture. Several
different considerations affect the extent to which discretion is tolerated,
or even embraced in a legal system. These considerations include: (1)
beliefs about the trustworthiness and capacity of government deci-
sionmakers to make appropriate decisions apart from formal rules, (2)
the importance of protecting individual rights from discretionary choices,
and (3) the economic costs and benefits of rulemaking efforts. 18
Federal tax law is heavily oriented toward rule-based decisionmak-
ing. Tax determinations are rooted in a highly complex system of
rules, 19 and the extensive policy goals and transactional demands on the
current tax system are not conducive to brevity or simplicity.20 The
sheer volume and complexity of tax rules has caused some commentators
to complain of "hyperlexis," 21 and more recently it has led to outcries for
the parties' rights are, and that those rights may compel a particular result. However, he
denies that those rights can be identified through a "mechanical procedure," and he also admits
that disagreement may result.over the identification and weight given to these rights. See id.
As a practical matter, the resulting uncertainty will often be indistinguishable from that pro-
duced by discretion. See also PosNm, supra note 8, at 22:
The irony of Dworkin's project is that the more broadly law is defined, the less
rather than more secure the 'rule of law' becomes. Law loses distinctness-merging
first with morals, and then, when it is recognized that society is morally diverse, with
politics and hence no-law. If law includes a broad swatch of political principles,
then judges can do politics and say with a good conscience that they are doing law.
'Right' and 'wrong' become epithets bestowed on the legal analyst's political friends
and enemies.
Id. at 22-23.
17 See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
19 See James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules and the Decline of Courts in the Law of
Taxation, 99 DicK. L. Rlv. 265 (1995) (referring to "progression of the tax law from one
governed by broad standards to a law dominated by specific rules").
20 See Sheldon S. Cohen, Taming the Tax Code, 68 TAx NoTEs 1495 (1995) (arguing
that a simple tax system is unattainable given the complexity of the current world, and thus
Congress should focus on improving the current income tax system); Deborah L. Paul, The
Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76
N.C. L. REv. 151 (1997) (reaching similar conclusions about the prospects of simplicity).
21 See Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 767
(1977). Professor Manning apparently invented this term, which he defined as a "pathological
condition caused by an overactive law-making gland." Il Several commentators have
adopted this terminology in evaluating our federal tax system. See, e.g., Walter D. Schwidet-
sky, Hyperlexis and the Loophole, 49 Oa.A. L. Ray. 403 (1996); Colliton, supra note 19, at
265 ('The tax law is the most complex body of statutory law that exists in our legal system.");
Gordon D Henderson, Controlling Hyperlexis - the Most Important "Law And... ", 43 TAx
LAW. 177 (1989); Richard M. Lipton, We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us: More Thoughts
on Hyperlexis, 47 TAx LAw. 1 (1993).
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reform and simplification.22 The Internal Revenue Code occupies hun-
dreds of pages of text and is supplemented by thousands of pages of
regulations and other pronouncements designed to provide guidance for
taxpayers, as well as the government actors charged with administering
the tax law.23 Moreover, a substantial body of case law has emerged,
reflecting the further development and refinement of tax rules through
the process of judicial review.
Discretion also plays an important role in tax administration, and
sometimes that discretion is extensive. Section 446(b) of the Code,
which allows the Commissioner to determine whether methods of ac-
counting "clearly reflect income" and impose alternative methods on the
basis of that determination, represents an area where Congress has con-
ferred extensive discretionary authority. As discussed below, the Com-
missioner's "clear reflection" authority originated when few substantive
rules governed methods of accounting. However, this authority has per-
sisted in the midst of detailed substantive rules, sometimes modifying
rules that would otherwise produce what is perceived to be an undesir-
able result.24
Clear reflection authority is kept in check by the process of judicial
review. Hence, the Commissioner is arguably constrained by principles
of tax law that have not been reduced to the status of formal rules. This
approach to constraining discretion injects considerable uncertainty into
the process, raising concerns about efficiency and the protection of tax-
payer rights.25 This approach also tends to overly complicate tax law,
resulting in a situation where specific outcomes are determined by an
elite cadre of lawyers and judges (and perhaps even academics), rather
than by a democratically responsive mechanism that is accessible to the
public.26
Discretion may be an expedient remedy to correct a perceived
"abuse" or "distortion" in measuring taxable income, but it compromises
Rule of Law values. Rule-based constraint in this context is both possi-
ble and desirable for those who believe in the Rule of Law. Rule-based
constraint is likely to enhance efficiency in tax administration and protect
taxpayer rights to a greater degree than a discretionary approach to jus-
22 See ROBERT E. HALL & ALViN RABusmHA, THm FLAT TAX 1-11 (2d ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing the volume and complexity of the current tax law as reasons for a "flat tax" proposal).
Although others challenge whether Hall and Rabushka's approach achieves the goal of reduc-
ing complexity, simplification is undoubtedly among the animating forces behind their
proposal.
23 See Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 779 ("Even laws of legendary specificity, such as the
Internal Revenue Code, have left interstitial questions unaddressed."); Lipton, supra note 21,
at 3-9 (suggesting that clamoring for more guidance is part of the problem).
24 See infra notes 233-42 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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tice. Accordingly, normative judgments involved in choosing to em-
brace discretion-and to compromise Rule of Law values-deserve
careful scrutiny.
Part I examines the role of rules in the concept of the Rule of Law
and looks at the normative trade-offs that accompany rule-based deci-
sionmaking. Part II provides a brief look at Rule of Law values within
the general context of federal tax law, discussing several areas where
current tax law compromises Rule of Law values in order to achieve
other policy goals. Part I examines the clear reflection of income prin-
ciple and analyzes several clear reflection cases in relation to concepts of
rule-based constraint. Part IV provides concluding observations about
effective rule-based constraint on the Commissioner's clear reflection
authority.
I. RULE-BASED CONSTRAINT AND THE RULE OF LAW
The traditional understanding of the Rule of Law involves a funda-
mental tension between providing civil order through government power
while also constraining the scope of that power. Civil order requires
"ruling" through government-imposed constraints, whether to protect cit-
izens from each other in the Hobbesian sense,27 or to enable citizens to
cooperate and advance common interests.28 As for the citizens being
"ruled," the Rule of Law seeks to constrain that ruling power, protecting
them from arbitrary actions with potentially detrimental effects on human
rights or other social and economic values.29
Rules have traditionally played an important role in achieving these
protective functions of the Rule of Law,30 as well as the related function
27 See Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 991, 996 (1994) ("mo escape from Hobbes' state of nature in which freedom
is greatly impaired, a coercive sovereign is necessary to ensure that individuals will not 'break
the rules that all should see are in their interest as long as all obey.'") (citations omitted);
Fallon, supra note 1, at 7 (listing "protect[ion] against anarchy and the Hobbesian war of all
against all" as one of three central purposes of Rule of Law).
28 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 141. Professor Eskridge distinguishes legal process
theory associated with Henry Hart and Albert Sacks with the Hobbesian aspects of nineteenth
century liberalism: "Whereas liberal theory posits mutually suspicious humans who form a
social contract to escape the state of nature, legal process theory posits humans who recognize
their interdependence and cooperate for the advancement of common interests." Id.
29 See Segall, supra note 27, at 997; Fallon, supra note 1, at 7 (protection against "some
kinds of arbitrariness" is one of three central purposes of Rule of Law); cf. BRssaN, supra note
1, at 299 (discussing concept of "ordered liberty" underlying Rule of Law tradition in Ameri-
can Constitutionalism).
30 See Radin, supra note 2, at 706 ("The Rule of Law as it comes down to us in the
liberal tradition is committed to the model of rules, and this means, under the traditional con-
ception of rules, that it is committed to traditional formalism."); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevita-
bility of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAm. L. REv. 533,
534 (1992) (associating formalism with "'rule of law' virtues" of legal certainty, predictabil-
ity, and objectivity) (citation omitted); EsKRiDGE, supra note 13, at 111:
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of facilitating planning by providing reasonably certain and predictable
legal consequences. 31 The function of constraint in rule-based decision-
making and the normative trade-offs that accompany that constraint are
discussed below.
A. RULE-BASED CONSTRAnT: "THE RULE OF LAW AS A LAW OF
RULES" 32
Under the formalist conception of law, "the ideal if not necessary
form of 'law' is that of a 'rule,' conceived as a clear prescription that
exists prior to its application and that determines appropriate conduct or
legal outcomes. '33 Friedrich Hayek concisely describes the Rule of Law
in terms of the essential role of rules:
Stripped of all its technicalities, [the Rule of Law] means
that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed
and announced beforehand-rules which make it possi-
ble to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will
use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to
plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge.34
[S]ome liberals (the 'formalists') view the interpreter's role as relatively mechanical,
reasoning from authoritative sources to reach determinate answers. This determi-
nacy, or at least the pretense, is essential to the rule of law, which enables citizens to
know what statutes govern their conduct and how the statutes will be applied to their
activities.
Id.
31 See Fallon, supra note 1, at 7-8.
32 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175
(1989).
33 Id. at 14. It should be noted that this description of rules focuses on substantive mat-
ters, but says little about jurisdictional issues (i.e., who properly decides). Professor Schauer
has asserted that "a system employing empowering rules but leaving substantive decisionmak-
ing authority largely unconstrained by external legal rules seems both pragmatically plausible
and accepted as 'law' within the world in which we now exist." Frederick Schauer, Rules and
the Rule of Law, 14 HARv. J.L & PUB. PoL'Y 646, 657 (1991). A "largely unconstrained"
system would not completely fail Fuller's eight requirements for a legal system, as rules would
indicate whether one's conduct was within the scope of governmental authority. However,
such a system falls dramatically short of the aspirational ideal in which the content of rules is
clearly known. In other words, there would certainly be room for improvement.
34 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEr, THE RoAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944). Joseph Raz calls this "one
of the clearest and most powerful formulations of the ideal of the rule of law." Raz, supra note
11, at 210. But see KENNm CULP DAVIs, DIscRmONARY JusTICE: A PREMINARY INQUIRY
32-33 (1970), which criticizes Hayek's statement as "an absurdity" to the extent that "all its
actions" is interpreted to include such items as the Executive's powers in connection with
foreign relations or war. However, Hayek's statement is clearly aspirational, and when under-
stood in that sense, its practical failings may be less problematic. Davis would apparently
agree as to the aspirational quality of this statement, although he apparently accepts discretion
at a far greater extent than Hayek. See id. at 33 (Hayek's version of the Rule of Law expresses
"an emotion, an aspiration, an ideal" that is not "based on a down-to-earth analysis of the
practical problems with which modem governments are confronted.").
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Rules may achieve their predictive and constraining power through sev-
eral important attributes, which merit closer examination.
As Hayek suggests, rules must be "fixed and announced before-
hand. '35 This requirement emphasizes that planning in reliance upon a
rule is possible only to the extent that its content is published and under-
stood in advance of its application.3 6 Thus, retroactive legislation is par-
ticularly troubling from a Rule of Law perspective.37
Rules facilitate planning by identifying the relevant criteria for deci-
sionmaking in advance of their application to particular cases, thereby
preventing the decisionmaker from choosing criteria outside the rule.38
In this sense, rules seek to provide "closed" systems that supply the basis
for resolving a question or case without resort to other principles or back-
ground justifications. 39 By closing off the consideration of other criteria,
including potentially disputable criteria involving the purposes behind
the rule, rules can limit the variation in results that might occur with a
discretion-conferring approach.40
35 This presumes the ability to identify relevant rules, to understand their requirements,
and to conform to those requirements, which are commonly recognized as essential elements
of law.. See Radin, supra note 1, at 785-86 (discussing "know-ability" and "perform-ability"
as essential characteristics of law); Fallon, supra note 1, at 8 ("People must be able to under-
stand the law and comply with it.").
36 See PosNER, supra note 5, at 75 (public nature of laws is essential to their effective-
ness in regulating behavior).
37 See Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tax. L. REv. 425,
427 (1982) ("[R]etroactive lawmaking violates what is often called the rule of law, namely, an
entitlement of persons to guide their behavior by impartial rules that are publicly fixed in
advance."). Fuller viewed retroactivity as one of the eight features to be avoided in law, but he
also indicated a willingness to tolerate retroactivity in some circumstances. See FULLER, supra
note 7, at 53:
Like every other human undertaking, the effort to meet the often complex demands
of internal morality of the law may suffer various kinds of shipwreck. It is when
things go wrong that the retroactive statute often becomes indispensable as a curative
measure; though the proper movement of law is forward in time, we sometimes have
to stop and turn about to pick up the pieces.
Id. As discussed infra, taxation may be one of these areas where Fuller is comfortable in
compromising Rule of Law values.
38 See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L. J. 509, 540 (1988) ("[T]he key to
understanding the relationship of ruleness to predictability is the idea of decisional
jurisdiction.").
39 See id. at 535-36 ("Closedness refers to the capacity of a system to decide cases within
the confines of that system.").
40 See id. at 540-41. The constraining effect of rules does not require an interpretational
theory that focuses only on the dictionary meaning of words. Rule-based constraint can toler-
ate contextual references, such as legislative purpose, intent, structure, or other features, in
matters of interpretation, but the such references should not contradict the limits of the text.
See Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1504 (arguing against the use of context to produce interpre-
tations that are "anti-textual", which he defines as "a meaning that Congress could not reason-
ably be expected to express in the text it actually enacted"); Michael Livingston, Practical
Reason, "Purposivism, " and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. Rv. 677, 684
(1996) (noting that "an especially radical purposivism, under which courts may ignore or re-
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Rule-based decisionmaking contrasts with particularistic decision-
making, in which a decisionmaker is free to take into account any criteria
that he deems relevant to the case at hand.41 A positive example of par-
ticularistic decisionmaking is the wise monarch who dispenses justice
without resort to the constraints of formal rules.42 Such unconstrained
decisionmakers are empowered to determine relevant criteria for them-
selves on the basis of currently available information. 43
Rules constrain discretion by channeling the decisionmaking pro-
cess through the prescribed criteria, but they do not necessarily eliminate
discretion. No clear consensus exists on the extent to which discretion
must be constrained in order to achieve "ruleness."44 Frederick Schauer
has suggested that "any specification of mandate narrower than a man-
date to make the best all-things-considered decision is a form of rule,
because it precludes the decisionmaker from considering those factors
that would be included in an all-things-considered mandate but are not
included in the narrower mandate." 45
Others have defined the quality of "ruleness" based on the specific-
ity of criteria provided by a rule in advance of its application, and have
invoked distinctions between "rules" and "standards. '46 So-called "clear
vise even explicit statutory language that is inconsistent with the underlying goals of the stat-
ute" may violate the rule of law).
41 See Scalia, supra note 32, at 1175; KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBEcrvrrY 142
(1992) ("The opposite of regulation by general rules of law is decision by someone based on
circumstances or characteristics that he or she thinks relevant.").
42 See Scalia, supra note 32, at 1175-76 (discussing Louis IX of France and King Solo-
mon as positive examples of discretionary decisionmaking).
43 This does not necessarily mean that the decisionmaker can do as he or she wishes,
without regard to principles of justice recognized in the community. There may be other
sources of constraint besides formal rules. For example, see DwoRKIN, supra note 16, at 33
("The strong sense of discretion [i.e., that an official "is simply not bound by standards set by
the authority in question", id at 32] is not tantamount to license, and does not exclude criti-
cism. Almost any situation in which a person acts ... makes relevant certain standards of
rationality, fairness, and effectiveness."). For example, the monarch may be constrained by
principles of equality and consistency from reaching a result that is inconsistent with prior
decisions in similar cases. However, even a monarch with Herculean powers in the realm of
justice may not reach the same result as any other judge would reach. See id. at 128. Identify-
ing and ascribing weight to principles is a contestable process, and in a legal culture that
emphasizes democratic values, the assessibility of legal outcomes should not be limited to
those with an Herculean aptitude for justice, which is likely to be claimed by lawyers, law
professors, and judges. See infra notes 140-150 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule
of Lenity).
44 See Schauer, supra note 33, at 650-51. ('Where the categories of decision are both
large and opaque, the dimension of ruleness is greatest, and where the categories are narrow
and more transparent to background justifications, the constraints of ruleness are minimized.");
Pierre Schiag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rlv. 379, 382 n.16 (1985) ("The terms
"rules" and "standards" do not have clear and fixed meanings in the scholarly literature.").
45 Schauer, supra note 33, at 653 n.ll.
46 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557,
568-69 (1992) (differentiating between rules and standards based on whether content of law is
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rules," which identify in advance objectively determinable criteria that
essentially dictate a particular result, represent the strongest form of rule-
ness.47 Rules imposing fines for speed limit violations are frequently
offered as examples of clear rules, as they proscribe behavior defined in
advance, i.e., driving a motor vehicle faster than a stated speed, and they
identify a consequence, e.g., a fine of $50.48 A decisionmaker applying
such a rule must determine whether someone driving a motor vehicle has
exceeded the stated speed.49 Once these facts are determined, the deci-
sionmaker's role becomes largely ministerial. The application of policy
judgments to the content of these categories is minimal in the typical
case.
"Standards" present a weaker form of "ruleness," as they allow dis-
cretionary power to consider other relevant, but unspecified, factors in a
particular case.50 For example, a speed limit could be designed as a
"standard" by prohibiting "unreasonable" or "excessive" speed, but leav-
ing the particular speed open to determination based on facts and circum-
stances.51 In this situation, a decisionmaker must give content to the
standard, presumably by considering such factors as road and traffic con-
ditions, which are not specifically identified in the law. Such a standard
might still constrain discretion to impose a consequence based on irrele-
vant factors, such as the color of the driver's vehicle, skin, or clothing,
but it allows the decisionmaker some latitude to consider other factors
besides the driver's speed.
Clear rules provide greater certainty of the law's demands, thereby
enhancing the predictability of legal outcomes, which is one of the core
determined before or after individuals act); Radin, supra note 2, at 795-96; Segall, supra note
27 at 997-99; see also Schlag, supra note 44, at 382-83 (distinguishing rules from standards
based on the determinacy of the "trigger" and the legal consequences of that triggering event):
The paradigm example of a rule has a hard empirical trigger and a hard determinate
response. For instance, the directive that "sounds above 70 decibels shall be pun-
ished by a ten dollar fine," is an example of a rule. A standard, by contrast, has a
soft evaluative trigger and a soft modulated response. The directive that "excessive
loudness shall be enjoinable upon a showing of irreparable harm," is an example of a
standard.
Id.
47 See Segall, supra note 27, at 997-98.
48 See id.
49 See id This assumes a consensus on the meaning of many features of the rule, includ-
ing the meaning of terms such as "person" and "motor vehicle." Cf. H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND PismosoPHY 67 (1983) (discussing different definitions of the term "vehi-
cle" in connection with a statute prohibiting the act of taking a stolen vehicle across state
lines).
50 See Segall, supra note 27, at 997.
51 See id.; see also Schlag, supra note 44, at 383 (comparing "70 decibels" to "excessive
loudness").
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values of the Rule of Law.52 However, predictability is an aspiration that
will not be perfectly realized. For example, Hayek's description of the
Rule of Law, as quoted above, required only that results be "foreseeable
with fair certainty. '53 Hayek recognized that some unpredictability is a
necessary consequence of human limitations in drafting, interpreting, and
applying the law:
Though this ideal can never be perfectly achieved, since
legislators as well as those to whom the administration
of the law is entrusted are fallible men, the essential
point, that the discretion left to the executive organs
wielding coercive power should be reduced as much as
possible, is clear enough.5 4
Even if humans had no limitations and language was perfectly de-
terminate, resource constraints continue to affect the rulemaking prodess,
and those constraints ensure that rules will not identify all relevant crite-
ria for decisionmaking in every situation. Departures from rule-based
decisionmaking are practically inevitable, and the question of how much
departure is acceptable involves normative considerations, which are ex-
plored below.
B. NORMATIVE ASPECTS OF RULE-BASED DECIsiONMAKING
The tendency of rules to suppress the consideration of relevant
facts, or to emphasize facts that may be insignificant or inappropriate for
a decisionmaker in a particular case, suggests the possibility that rules
may produce an unjust result in a particular case.55 The possibility of
52 See Segall, supra note 27, at 998. Predictability may also increase productivity, to the
extent that economic commitments can be made in reliance upon a stable legal structure. See
id; see also Raz, supra note 11, at 214 ('This is the basic intuition from which the doctrine of
the rule of law derives: the law must be capable of guiding the behavior of its subjects.');
Fallon, supra note 1, at 8 ("People must be able to understand the law and comply with it.");
FREDERICK SCHAUR, PLAYING BY TIn RuLEs 137-38 (1991):
Arguments for rule-based decision-making have traditionally focused on the ability
of rules to foster the interrelated virtues of reliance, predictability, and certainty.
According to such arguments, decision-makers who follow rules even when other
results appear preferable enable those affected to predict in advance what the deci-
sions are likely to be. Consequently, those affected by the decisions of others can
plan their activities more successfully under a regime of rules than under more par-
ticularistic decision-making.
Id.
53 See HAYEK, supra note 34, at 72.
54 Id.
55 Cf. ScHutru, supra note 52, at 136 ("Rules have bite when they ignore differences
that are then relevant, consequently treating as alike some cases that are not alike at all. More-
over, rules at times draw distinctions that are in the circumstances irrelevant, so that rules also
at times treat differently cases that are actually alike.). Although a rule could take into account
all of the relevant factors considered by a decisionmaker unconstrained by rules, this is likely
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avoiding substantive injustice that would flow from following rules cre-
ates a powerful temptation to leave some matters in the realm of discre-
tion, which might include granting decisionmakers the authority to create
exceptions to rules.56
Preference for rule-based decisionmaking over particularistic deci-
sionmaking (which may be at least partially constrained by general prin-
ciples of justice or other social norms) thus involves normative choices
and assumptions.57 The importance of flexibility to achieve substantive
justice in particular situations, beliefs about the human capacity to exer-
cise discretion and the constraining power of language, and the willing-
ness to commit resources to rule-making, rule-learning, and rule-
following, are among the considerations that affect this choice.
Rules are inherently conservative mechanisms, in that they reflect
historical determinations of relevant decisionmaking categories that may
be resistant to change. As Professor Schauer explains:
By limiting the ability of decisionmakers to consider
every factor relevant to an event, rules make it more dif-
ficult to adapt to a changing future. Rules force the fu-
ture into the categories of the past .... A decisionmaker
can never exceed the optimal result based on all relevant
factors. Thus, a rule-bound decisionmaker, precluded
from taking into account certain features of the present
case, can never do better but can do worse than a deci-
sionmaker seeking the optimal result for a case through a
rule-free decision. 58
to make the rule quite complex. For a discussion of the comparative complexity in rules and
standards, see Kaplow, supra note 46, at 586-96.
56 See Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. Cm. L. REv. 871, 894-95 (1991). The ex-
ception might take the form of looking to the purpose behind the rule, which is common in
American courts. See id. However, this is really another means of grafting an additional
category into the rule, which further detracts from their predictive power. See id.; see also
Schauer, supra note 33, at 687. Schauer suggests that "rule-revision by judges might be a
necessary pressure-release value from rules the under- or over-inclusion of which would other-
wise produce results of such unjustness or silliness as to exceed the capacity of a society to
tolerate them." Md However, assigning such capacity to judges is a context dependent judg-
ment. See id. at 689.
57 Professor Schlag's list of "virtues" and "vices" for rules and standards, respectively,
reflects some of these normative considerations, to the extent that standards are understood as
permitting more discretion. See Schlag, supra note 44, at 400. The "virtues" of rules-cer-
tainty uniformity, stability, and security-have countervailing "vices"---intransigence, regi-
mentation, rigidity, and closure. See id. Similarly the "virtues" of standards-flexibility,
individualization, open-endedness, dynamism, have countervailing "vices"-manipulability,
disintegration, indeterminacy, and adventurism. See id. Professor Schiag challenges whether
this list accurately reflects the characteristics of rules and standards based in significant part on
his disagreement as to the potential for determinate language apart from context. See iLe at
406-408.
58 Schauer, supra note 38, at 542.
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Thus, although rules may provide certainty and stability, they may
also sacrifice some measure of flexibility in adapting to changed circum-
stances.59 Substantive justice in a particular case may not be achieved
because the decisionmaker constrained by historically determined criteria
in rules cannot make an up-to-the-minute assessment of relevant consid-
erations and values.60 Legislative changes to update those considerations
will, if prospectively effective, occur too late to remedy that injustice in a
particular case.
Professor Schauer's suggestion that a rule-based decisionmaker can
never do better than a decisionmaker unfettered by rules necessarily as-
sumes that both rule-based and particularistic decisionmakers will decide
appropriately, either in interpreting and applying the rule, or in identify-
ing and applying principles of justice. Assumptions about the human
capacity for rule interpretation or for exercising discretion are therefore
important in this calculus of choosing the extent to which a legal system
relies upon rule-based decisionmaking.
To the extent that one doubts the constraining power of rules, al-
lowing more discretion may not seem so troublesome. If language is
inherently indeterminate, so that decisionmakers are not constrained
from imposing their values through the process of interpretation, then
rules unnecessarily burden decisionmakers. In fact, reliance on rule-
based decisionmaking may even be viewed as means to mask the deci-
sionmaker's ulterior policy goals or personal biases.61 However, not
59 Id. Others have attempted to challenge the inherently conservative nature of rules
through "dynamic" theories of statutory interpretation, which take into account current under-
standings of the hypothetical purposes of rules. See, e.g., WmLAm N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DY-
NAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); Alexander Alienikoff, Updating Statutory
Interpretation, 87 Mxcri. L. REv. 20, 47-61 (1988) (arguing that statutes be read as though they
were "enacted yesterday"). For an interesting critique of Eskridge's view, see John C. Nagle,
Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 2209 (1995) (book review).
60 Schauer, supra note 38, at 535:
[I1t is exactly a rule's rigidity, even in the face of applications that would ill serve its
purpose, that renders it a rule. This rigidity derives from the language of the rule's
formulation, which prevents the contemplation of every fact and principle relevant to
a particular application of the rule. To be formalistic in Llewellyn's sense is to be
governed by the rigidity of the rules' formulation; yet, this governance by rigidity is
central to the constraint of regulative rules. Formalism in this sense is therefore
indistinguishable from "rulism," for what makes a regulative rule a rule, and what
distinguishes it from a reason, is precisely the unwillingness to pierce the generaliza-
tion even in cases in which the generalization appears to the decisionmaker to be
inapposite. A rule's acontextual rigidity is what makes it a rule.
Id. (footnote omitted).
61 Deconstructionist theories associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement are
quick to recognize doubts about the human capacity for interpreting texts without injecting
contextual biases. However, once the framework of rules is deconstructed, they typically offer
no positive alternative. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 617 ("Although the realists succeeded in
undermining confidence in the efficacy of rules, they never succeeded in finding an adequate
substitute for the formal requirements of the rule of law.").
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everyone shares this judgment about the malleability of rules and the
trustworthiness of the unconstrained decisionmaker. As Professor
Schauer points out:
It may be a liability to get in the way of wise deci-
sionmakers who sensitively consider all of the relevant
factors as they accurately pursue the good. However, it
may be an asset to restrict misguided, incompetent,
wicked, power-hungry, or simply mistaken deci-
sionmakers whose own sense of the good might diverge
from that of the system they serve. The problem, of
course, is the difficulty in determining which characteri-
zation will fit decisionmakers; we must therefore decide
the extent to which we are willing to disable good deci-
sionmakers in order simultaneously to disable bad
ones.
62
Our political and constitutional traditions have historically ex-
pressed distrust for discretionary power. On a structural level, the sepa-
ration of executive, legislative, and judicial powers clearly anticipates the
potential for the "misguided, incompetent, wicked, power-hungry, and
simply mistaken" to exercise power in our legal system.63 Locating
rulemaking powers primarily in politically accountable branches of gov-
ernment provides some measure of protection from harsh rules; allowing
judicial review of the application of rules and of their content in light of
constitutional constraints provides additional protection for individual
rights.64 Limiting judicial discretion in interpreting and applying rules
preserves their constraining power, as well as their predictive utility.65
However, our legal system also includes a traditional concern about
law viewed from the perspective of the "bad man," or more accurately
the "legal strategist," who seeks to exploit weaknesses in the system
62 Schauer, supra note 38, at 543.
63 Separation of powers is frequently invoked in discussing the Rule of Law as applied to
the legal system in the United States. Justice Brandeis has credited separation of powers as a
principal bulwark against the exercise of arbitrary power
[The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787,
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The pur-
pose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people
from autocracy.
Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S.52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
64 Cf. Schauer, supra note 38, at 541 (noting that expanded grants of decisional jurisdic-
tion "involve decisionmakers in determinations that a system may prefer to have made by
someone else.") See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (expres-
sing concern that "law of the judges" was displacing democratically enacted laws).
65 See Scalia, supra note 32, at 1177.
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without regard for external standards of justice or morality.66 The pre-
dictive value of rules made possible by the textual emphasis of formal-
ism facilitates this behavior, whereas discretionary power to avoid
textual constraints may prevent such exploitation.
Thus, desirability of rule-based decisionmaking depends in part on
which is trusted (or feared) most: government decisionmakers (with the
potential to violate individual rights through discretion) or citizens (with
the potential to exploit weakness in rules to the detriment of the common
good). Within the liberal tradition, concerns about enforcement error and
abuse by Government actors have often trumped concerns about rule ex-
ploitation by individuals. 67 The citizen-favoring approach reaches its
apex in criminal law, where the Government faces high standards of
proof for conviction and the Rule of Lenity traditionally applies for the
benefit of citizens when the construction of criminal statutes are in
doubt.68
However, rule exploitation can also threaten respect for the legal
system, to the extent that significant incongruence develops between
rules and widely held views of substantive justice.69 Developing better
rules can curtail such exploitation, but that process entails costs and de-
lays. The costs of developing and enforcing specific rules must be com-
pared with the costs of more generalized and open provisions tolerating
more discretion. This cost differential must also be taken into account in
assessing the value of rule-based decisionmaking in this model.
Rules are generally more expensive to promulgate than more open
standards because rules impose costs of prescribing and articulating the
specific factors to be considered in advance of their application.70 De-
66 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to pre-
dict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Id. See also Lynn Lopucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90
Nw. U. L. Rnv. 1498, 1547 (1996) ("Like Holmes' bad man, today's legal strategist probes for
weaknesses and exploitable inconsistencies.").
67 See Barnett, supra note 1, at 642 ("For we must never forget that the rule of law is
meant to protect the people from the government, not to protect the government from the
people.").
68 For a discussion of the origins of the Rule of Lenity and an argument that courts have,
and should have, departed from it in favor of a context-specific approach to statutory interpre-
tation, see generally John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REa. 189 (1985).
69 Cf. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine,
30 CoNN. L. REv. 961, 969 (1998) ("[W]hy should we adhere to the law if it is an ass? And if
the law seems to require an unjust or socially unpalatable result, is it not an ass?").
70 See Kaplow, supra note 46, at 569. This cost comparison assumes that the rule pre-
scribed would reflect the same degree of complexity as the standard. See iL at 590-92. For
example, a 55 mile per hour speed limit is significantly less complex than a standard proscrib-
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spite the best intentions, rulemakers are not omniscient. Their limited
knowledge and foresight make it exceedingly difficult to take into ac-
count the complexity that many situations demand. 71 Although investi-
gation and experience may tend to overcome such limitations, the law of
diminishing returns applies: "Further investigation and greater delibera-
tion are almost always possible, but after a point would yield little im-
provement in the quality of the resulting law." 72 Moreover, finality and
closure are also important values, which may offset the requirements of
making, learning, and applying rules.73
Cost savings in applying rules may offset the incremental cost of
promulgating them.74 Assuming an individual will expend resources to
become informed about the content of a rule or a standard, predicting
results under a standard will generally be more costly than applying a
rule. With a standard, the predictor must first give content to the stan-
dard by identifying relevant factors affecting the decision. In the case of
a rule, however, this is unnecessary insofar as the rule has already de-
fined these factors.75
It might be argued that the choice between rules and standards thus
reduces to an empirical calculus of likely economic costs, with a social
ing "excessive," "unreasonable," or "unsafe" speeds, as it fails to take into account the factors
that might be considered by a sensitive decisionmaker in applying the standard.
71 See id. at 569 ('The problem is that the ideal content of the law ... is not immediately
apparent.")
72 Id. at 579. In addition, there are practical limits in describing procedural details. As
Schauer points out:
[A]ny set of norms leaves to the applier of those norms some room for action, and
... the action exercised in that room is not rule-based, at least not based on or
constrained by legal rules. Consequently, it is a mistake to assume that any legal
official is solely in the business of rule-application, for most such officials will be
operating at least in part within an area in which the rules allow that official to
choose among mutually exclusive but equally legally permissible options. In this
sense, law is necessarily at least in part something other than the process of rule
application.
Schauer, supra note 33, at 682-83 (footnote omitted).
73 Cf. Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 HARv. J.L & PuB. PoL'Y 695, 696 (1991) ("[T]o
avoid even worse consequences than our imperfect rules produce, we need to have some final-
ity attached to our decisions.").
74 See Kaplow, supra note 46, at 572. Professor Posner suggests the possibility that rules
could become "so numerous that people subject to them cannot learn them." PosNR, supra
note 8, at 48. He suggests that "[s]tandards that capture lay intuitions about right behavior (for
example, the negligence standard) and that therefore are easy to learn may produce greater
legal certainty than a network of precise but technical, nonintuitive rules covering the same
ground." ld. This is no doubt true, but the comparison is not necessarily helpful. If there is
great consensus as to the content of a standard, it is doubtful that "technical, nonintuitive
rules" will be enacted in its place, in lieu of an attempt to conceptualize and articulate the basis
for that standard.
75 See id at 569-571. The additional cost might include greater factfinding costs, as well
as deliberative costs. See ALFRED C. AmAN, JR. & WnriAm T. MAYTON, ADMiNisTRATivE
LAW 70 (1993).
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objective toward maximizing net benefits available from rules.76 The
frequency with which conduct affected by a rule occurs is an important
variable in this analysis. When similar events occur frequently, the in-
cremental cost of promulgating a rule is likely to be less than the total
incremental costs incurred by many different decisionmakers giving con-
tent to a comparatively indeterminate standard.77 Conversely, an invest-
ment in promulgating rules may not be justified when the regulated
events may occur infrequently (or perhaps never), or when such events
are unpredictable and variable.78 On the side of the rule-followers, the
differential costs of learning and understanding complex rules as opposed
to broader standards also merit consideration.7 9
Assessing the relative costs and benefits is exceedingly difficult, re-
quiring context-specific data that is unlikely to generate precise results.
Moreover, economic efficiency is not always accepted as the paramount
criteria for law or justice, especially by those who emphasize the impor-
tance of individual rights.8 0 The weight accorded to values of stability,
predictability and constraint, including procedural matters concerning
who is the appropriate decisionmaker, will ultimately be important fac-
tors in the decision, as will convictions about the relative importance of
preventing rule exploitation. These and other issues are discussed below
in the context of federal tax law.
II. RULE OF LAW VALUES IN FEDERAL TAX LAW
Federal tax law is highly rule-oriented. Instead of a vague and open
standard such as "each taxpayer should pay his or her fair share of fed-
eral taxes," the Internal Revenue Code attempts to provide relatively de-
terminate parameters for assigning tax burdens to particular transactions
and events.8 ' Although tax law generally invites taxpayers to plan in
reliance upon rules, the current approach to tax administration reserves
significant discretion to the Government in developing and applying
those rules in particular circumstances. Some manifestations of this dis-
76 See Kaplow, supra note 46, at 572.
77 See id at 584-85.
78 See id. at 600.
79 See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.3, at 545 (4th ed. 1992)
("[Wihile standards increase information costs by expanding the scope of inquiry, they reduce
them by enabling lay people to understand the law without the aid of expensive experts.").
80 See id. at 545-46 (noting that there are rights-based concerns with cost-benefit
analyses).
81 An ancient Chinese system of taxation parceled out tax quotas from the emperor suc-
cessively down to lower government officials, with tax liability for each citizen ultimately
determined by the local official's understanding of the constituents' ability to pay. See Pnmui
D. OLvER & FRED W. PEEL, JR., TAX POLIcY 1 (1996). As Oliver and Peel point out: "The
United States, which prides itself on having a 'government of laws' and not a 'government of
men,' obviously prefers a taxing system based on laws of general application." Id.
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cretion, such retroactive rulemaking and dynamic rule-revision power,
cast doubt upon the importance of Rule of Law values in the realm of
taxation.
A. THE VALUE OF "RULENESS" IN TAX LAW
Statutory law governing federal taxation has become increasingly
specific, voluminous, and complex.82 Focusing on the modem income
tax statutes since ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, the
relevant statutory provisions have expanded from sixteen pages to hun-
dreds of pages in the current Internal Revenue Code.83 Much of this
expansion reflects the adoption of relatively specific, closed systems of
rules to replace more general, open provisions which had been left to
interpretation by the courts. 84
The Code is generally effective in providing predictable results for
many transactions commonly affected by the income tax. "Ruleness" in
tax law permits taxpayers to predict their tax obligations, and to plan
their activities accordingly. 85 As some judges have noted, planning in
82 See JoHN F. Wrrr, THE PoLmcs AND DEvELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INcoME TAX
5-6 (1985) ("The statement that there is a general trend toward a constantly more complex tax
code, and that the code has evolved into a multifaceted policy tool, needs little elaboration and
will come as no surprise to those versed in tax policy.").
83 See Colliton, supra note 19, at 265; see also Paul, supra note 19, at 158 n.19 (number
of code sections relating to the income tax increased 578% from 1954-94; words in Code and
regulations increased by 369% and 730%, respectively, over same period).
84 See generally Colliton, supra note 19 (arguing that the expansion of the Code has
resulted in adopting specific, complex rules instead of broad standards, with a corresponding
shift in power away from the courts, which formerly provided content to those standards).
85 See Linda A. Schwartzstein, Smoke and Mirrors: Tax Legislation, Uncertainty and
Entrepreneurship, 6 CoRNmLL J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 61, 76-77 (discussing importance of stability
and certainty to entrepreneurial decisionmaking and activities). Adam Smith included cer-
tainty in ascertaining a citizen's tax obligation among the four basic maxims of taxation, based
in part on concerns about the potential for abuse of discretion:
The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary.
The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be
clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise,
every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of the tax-gathered
[sic], who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contribution, or extort,
by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The uncer-
tainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of
men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt.
The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great
importance that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from
the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of
uncertainty.
ADAM SMrIm, AN INQUIRY INTo r=E NATuRE AND CAusEs OF THE WEAJuT OF NAIONs 777-
78 (The Modem Library 1937) (1776). The other three maxims are: (1) "The subjects of every
state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in
proportion to their respective abilities;" (2) "Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the
manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. . ."; and (3)
'Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the
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reliance on tax rules is expected behavior-even a "right"-with no
moral opprobrium attached:
In our system, avoidance of a tax by remaining outside
the ambit of the law that imposes it is every person's
right. "Over and over again courts have said that there is
nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep
taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty
to pay more than the law demands: taxes are enforced
exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more
in the name of morals is mere cant."86
Courts sometimes emphasize the importance of predictable results by
suggesting that following a settled rule is more important than determin-
ing the correct result in each particular case.87
Despite this support for the importance of knowable, reliable rules,
the Government has also embraced a view of tax law that preserves its
flexibility to raise revenue or reallocate tax burdens in particular circum-
stances. Retroactive legislation, judicially fashioned "anti-abuse" pow-
ers, and dynamic rule-revision powers exercised by the Internal Revenue
Service cast doubt on the importance of Rule of Law values in federal
tax law. Several examples are discussed below.
people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the public treasury of the state."
l&
86 United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992) (Souter, J.) (quot-
ing Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J. dissenting),
cert denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947)). See also Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405
U.S. 394, 399 (1972); McClendon v. Commissioner, 135 F.3d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998);
Yosba v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 1351, 1363 (7th.Cir. 1988); United States v. Dunbar, 669
F.2d 1351, 1363 (10th Cir. 1982); Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Considine, 502 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1973).
87 See Washington Energy Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("[T]he interest that all prospective parties before the court have in uniformity and predictabil-
ity of outcome must be given its due. We thus temper the independence of the analysis in
which we engage by according great weight to the decisions of other circuits on the same
question. Moreover, as courts of appeals have long recognized, the need for uniformity of
decision applies with special force in tax matters."); Pacific First Federal Savings Bank v.
Commissioner, 961 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[Iun the realm of national tax law, 'it is
more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right.") (citation
omitted). Many of the decisions invoking this principle rely on Justice Brandeis' dissenting
opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-07 (1931), which justified
adherence to stare decisis in cases not involving constitutional principles based on the impor-
tance of settled rules, stating in part: "Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most
matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right."
ld. at 406. Professor Posner suggests that this principle has an economic meaning in those
circumstances when an overinclusive rule has been adopted in lieu of a broad, vague standard,
which is efficient when the sanction for violating the rule is mild and the costs of transacting
around the rule are low. See PosNrER, supra note 79 at 544.
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B. RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
Congress has sometimes chosen to compromise Rule of Law values
by enacting tax legislation with a retroactive effective date. The
Supreme Court generally acquiesces in this choice, refusing to recognize
a taxpayer "right" to rely on legislation as enacted if Congress later
chooses to alter the rules assigning tax burdens. Although the Court does
not entirely dismiss the values of notice and reliability, it gives them
limited weight in its constitutional calculus, as evidenced by the recent
decision in United States v. Carlton.88
In Carlton, the Court rejected a due process challenge to a statutory
amendment imposing a retroactive estate tax burden. As originally en-
acted in 1986, section 2057 of the Code allowed an estate tax deduction
for half the value of stock sold to an employee stock ownership plan
(ESOP), without regard to whether the decedent had owned the stock at
the time of death.89 This provision allowed an estate to reduce its estate
tax obligation voluntarily, without any significant reduction in the eco-
nomic value of the estate passing from the decedent. 90 Approximately
one year after enactment, Congress amended section 2057 to cure a puta-
tive mistake in the statute by limiting the deduction to those decedents
who had died owning the applicable stock, and this amendment applied
retroactively to the effective date of the original enactment.91
Carlton, the executor of the estate in controversy, had purchased and
sold stock in reliance on the original statute, before any announcement of
intent to change the statute to take away the tax benefit on which Carlton
had relied.92 The parties stipulated that Carlton engaged in the stock
transaction on behalf of the estate specifically because of the tax benefits
under section 2057. 93 Nevertheless, the Court effectively gave no weight
to the taxpayer's reliance on the statute and rejected Carlton's due pro-
cess challenge to its retroactive amendment:
88 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
89 See id. at 31.
90 Costs in connection with the purchase and sale of stock, along with any price variation
between the purchase and sale, would appear to be the only potential economic detriments to
the estate in connection with this transaction. In the transaction at issue here, Carlton
purchased 1.5 million MCI shares at an average price of $7.47 per share, and then resold them
two days later at an average price of $7.05 per share, for a total loss of $631,000. However,
the estate would have reduced the applicable estate tax by more than $2.5 million as a result of
this transaction. See id. at 28.
91 Section 2057 was enacted on October 22, 1986. See Ud at 28-29. The amendment
was enacted on December 22, 1987. See id. It should be noted that Congress apparently had
second thoughts about this statute, as it was repealed for estates of decedents who died after
December 19, 1989. See id. at 28, n.1.
92 See icL at 29.
93 Id. at 28-29.
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Although Carlton's reliance is uncontested-and the
reading of the original statute on which he relied appears
to have been correct-his reliance alone is insufficient to
establish a constitutional violation. Tax legislation is not
a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the In-
ternal Revenue Code. Justice Stone explained in Welch
v. Henry, 305 U.S., at 146-147, 59 S. Ct., at 125-126:
"Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer
nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a
way of apportioning the cost of government among those
who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits
and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys im-
munity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does
not necessarily infringe due process .... 94
The absence of advance notice of the change was similarly rejected, as
the Court suggested that taxpayers bear the risk of retroactive adjustment
of their liability.95
Thus, despite the fact that the taxpayer correctly interpreted and fol-
lowed the rule contained in section 2057, the Court allowed Congress to
change the results of following that rule after Carlton had acted in reli-
ance upon it.96 The importance of corrective action to reallocate tax bur-
dens apparently outweighed any reliance interest of the taxpayer. As the
Court explained:
First, Congress' purpose in enacting the amendment was
neither illegitimate nor arbitrary. Congress acted to cor-
rect what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the origi-
nal 1986 provision that would have created a significant
and unanticipated revenue loss. There is no plausible
contention that Congress acted with an improper motive,
as by targeting estate representatives such as Carlton af-
ter deliberately inducing them to engage in ESOP trans-
94 Id at 33 (emphasis added) (citation in original).
95 Id (citation omitted).
96 It is interesting to note that the Court did not attempt to interpret the original statute as
precluding Carlton from obtaining the desired benefit. A purposivist interpretive theory might
have been invoked to impose the additional condition of ownership by the decedent, which
Congress later included in the amendment. However, it may not have done so because the
existence of a limiting purpose prior to the amendment was not entirely clear. If Congress
intended to create an incentive to sell stock to ESOPs through providing a "windfall" reduction
of estate tax liability, it is not self-evident why that purpose would be restricted to those who
own stock at death. The Joint Committee Explanation, which was produced after the 1987
amendment, suggests that the purpose of the change with respect to section 2057 was "to
provide relief from estate taxes and to encourage the increased transfer of employer securities
to ESOPs." JoNrr CoMMrrrnE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
Acr OF 1986 844 (1987).
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actions. Congress, of course, might have chosen to
make up the unanticipated revenue loss through general
prospective taxation, but that choice would have bur-
dened equally "innocent" taxpayers. Instead, it decided
to prevent the loss by denying the deduction to those
who had made purely tax-motivated stock transfers. We
cannot say that its decision was unreasonable. 97
Further, the Court emphasized that only a short period of retroactivity
was involved, and that this was consistent with past congressional
practices. 98
Justice O'Connor, writing separately, was careful to point out that
the Court's due process analysis did not disparage the executor's motiva-
tion to reduce the estate's taxes by reliance on the statute as originally
written. "Like all taxpayers, Carlton was entitled to structure the estate's
affairs to comply with the tax laws while minimizing tax liability." 99
However, Justice O'Connor also agreed that retroactivity was rationally
related to the legitimate interest of raising revenue and noted that flexi-
bility in apportioning the government's need for revenue over a modest
prior period did not offend due process. Although "the governmental
interest in revising the tax laws must at some point give way to the tax-
payer's interest in finality and repose," that point was not reached
here.1OO
Justices Scalia and Thomas also filed concurring opinions, based on
their view that the Due Process Clause lacks any substantive compo-
nent. 01 Although they found that this retroactive amendment was "harsh
and oppressive," the Due Process Clause afforded no relief.'02 Thus, an
97 Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32.
98 Id. at 32-33. Compare the recent case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,
118 S.Ct. 213 (1998), where the Court held that the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act,
which imposed a $5 million liability on a coal operator on the basis of employment relation-
ships from more than 35 years before, was unconstitutional. A plurality reached this decision
by reference to the Takings clause, but Justice Kennedy rejected this analysis in favor of a
substantive due process analysis. Like the plurality, Justice Kennedy pointed to a long history
of disfavoring retroactive economic legislation. See id. at 2158-59. However, Kennedy
pointed to Carlton as reflecting the tradition that "the degree of retroactive effect is a signifi-
cant determinant in the constitutionality of a statute." Id. at 2159. He agreed with the majority
that the 35-year span in this case was "unprecedented in scope." Id.
99 Carlton, 512 U.S. at 35.
100 Id. at 37-38.
101 See id. at 28. However, others have found a clear historical link between the legisla-
tive obligation to enact "general" laws, the related prohibition against retroactive rulemaking,
and the due process concept. See Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State
Choice of Law: Due Process, 9 HAST. CoNsT. L.Q. 851, 869-70 (1982). As discussed supra in
footnote 98, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Eastern Enterprises seems to follow this
position.
102 See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39-40:
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aggrieved taxpayer's remedy was with Congress, not the Court, regard-
less of any "harshness" or "oppression" associated with this retroactive
rulemaking.
Although retroactive rulemaking by Congress is subject to demo-
cratic constraints, 10 3 traditional objections to retroactive rulemaking are
rooted in part in concerns about protecting minority rights from the will
of the majority. As Justice Kennedy observed in a later case:
If retroactive laws change the legal consequences of
transactions long closed, the change can destroy the rea-
sonable certainty and security which are the very objects
of property ownership. As a consequence, due process
protection for property must be understood to incorpo-
rate our settled tradition against retroactive laws of great
severity. Groups targeted by retroactive laws, were they
to be denied all protection, would have a justified fear
that a government once formed to protect expectations
now can destroy them. Both stability of investment and
confidence in the constitutional system, then, are secured
by due process restrictions against severe retroactivelegislation. 104
In Carlton, the Court concluded that no rights arise from the Code
itself, thus leaving the estate's property subject to further claims by the
Government. The Court's suggestion that "[t]here is no plausible con-
tention that Congress acted with an improper motive, as by targeting es-
tate representatives such as Carlton after deliberately inducing them to
engage in ESOP transactions"'1 5 rings hollow from Carlton's perspec-
To pass constitutional muster the retroactive aspects of the statute need only be "ra-
tionally related to a legitimate legislative purpose."... Revenue raising is certainly a
legitimate legislative purpose, see U.S. Const., Art. I, s 8, cl. 1, and any law that
retroactively adds a tax, removes a deduction, or increases a rate rationally furthers
that goal. I welcome this recognition that the Due Process Clause does not prevent
retroactive taxes, since I believe that the Due Process Clause guarantees no substan-
tive rights, but only (as it says) process
Ild.
103 See Richard L. Doemberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? Con-
gress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891, 896 (1987) (reviewing JEFFREY
H. BIRNBAUM AND ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOwN AT Gucci GULCH: LAwMAKERs, LOBBY-
ISs, AND THE UNLKuELY TRrUMPH OF TAX REFORM):
Tax reform generally cannot be explained as an altruistic attempt by politicians to
improve the Code. It is, rather, a political decision about whose constituents will pay
how much to the Treasury. And as with other political decisions, individuals and
firms will do what they can to influence the outcome of tax legislation.
If.
104 Eastern Enterprises, 118 S.Ct. at 2159 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105 See supra text accompanying note 98.
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tive, as he did exactly what the rule prescribed. Carlton followed the tax
incentive of section 2057, only to find out later that this incentive was
not meant for the estate he was administering.
To the extent that Congress' decision is justified by reference to the
need to correct a mistake, this proves too much. Section 2057 was not an
obvious scrivener's error, which could arguably have provided construc-
tive notice of the need for future correction. 10 6 Here, the correcting
amendment continued to allow other estates that already owned the
shares in question to take advantage of the significant benefits that Carl-
ton tried to obtain. If the real mistake here was a misapprehension of the
revenue effect, then that concept is too flexible to be a principled basis
for selectively raising taxes on a retroactive basis. In effect, Congress
could justify any modification that raised more revenue as the correction
of a past mistake.
Carlton demonstrates that Rule of Law values such as notice and
reliability will seldom, if ever, rise to a level of constitutional signifi-
cance in tax cases when Congress chooses to retroactively adjust tax lia-
bility. 10 7 By rejecting-a concept of taxpayer "rights" in reliance upon the
Code and a corresponding duty upon the Government to keep its
"promises" reflected in the Code,10 8 the Court ensures that modest peri-
ods of retroactivity are acceptable. Long-standing traditions against ret-
roactive legislation apparently mean little in this context.10 9
106 A current example of a scrivener's error can be found in I.R.C. § 1017(a)(2), which
generally requires basis reduction for excluded income from the discharge of indebtedness if
"under subsection (b)(2)(D) of section 108 ... any portion of such amount is to be applied to
reduce basis." Taken literally, this provision would be meaningless because § 108(b)(2)(D)
refers to a reduction of a capital loss carryover, not basis. However, § 108(b)(2)(E) involves
basis, and it is the only reference that makes sense in this context. This obvious scrivener's
error should not preclude basis reduction under § 1017(a)(2).
107 Despite Justice O'Connor's suggestion that the government's interest in revising the
tax laws must at some point give way to the taxpayer's interest in finality and repose, Justices
Scalia and Thomas suggest that the majority's analysis "guarantees that all retroactive tax laws
will henceforth be valid." Carlton, 512 U.S. at 40.
108 See supra text accompanying note 88.
109 See Comment, The Afternath of United State v. Carlton: Taxpayers Will Have to Pay
for Congress's Mistakes, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 599, 601-02 (1996) ("In Carlton, the Supreme
Court ignored hundreds of years of consistent antipathy to ex post facto lawmaking when it
applied the mere rationality test, which is the least exacting due process standard, to the retro-
active legislation."). See also Eastern Enterprises, 486 U.S. at 770-71 (plurality):
Retroactivity is generally disfavored in the law, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospi-
tal, 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 469-470, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988), in accord-
ance with "fundamental notions of justice" that have been recognized throughout
history, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855, 110
S.Ct. 1570, 1586-1587, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (SCALIA, J., concurring). See also,
e.g., Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 503 (N.Y.1811) ("It is a principle in the
English common law, as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipo-
tent parliament, is not to have a retrospective effect"); H. Broom, Legal Maxims 24
(8th ed. 1911) ("Retrospective laws are, as a rule, of questionable policy, and con-
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C. JUDICIALLY CREATED "ANTI-ABUSE" DocnuNs
Legislative amendments are not the only way to modify the out-
come produced by applying particular Code provisions. Codification of
tax law into an extensive and complex framework of rules has not pre-
vented courts from deviating from statutory text that produces an unde-
sirable result, often on grounds that following the text would violate an
underlying legislative purpose. 110 "Substance over form" and its varia-
tions, including "step transaction" and "business purpose" doctrines, are
prominent examples of judicially-developed interpretive doctrines that
courts use to avoid textual constraints, particularly when the text pro-
duces a result unfavorable to the Government."' Judicial attitudes to-
trary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to
be regulated ought to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of
past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law"). In his Com-
mentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story reasoned, "[r]etro-spective laws are, in-
deed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, neither accord with sound
legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact." 2 J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution § 1398 (5th ed. 1891).
Id. (citations in original). The plurality in Eastern Enterprises identified tax legislation as one
area of law in which "retroactivity is generally tolerated." See id. at 771-72. Lon Fuller men-
tions the pervasive retroactive effects of changes in laws as an instrumental argument for
retroactive taxation, although he does not conclude that it is a sufficient argument to overturn
Rule of Law values. See FuLLER, supra note 7, at 59-60. For example, denying the deductibil-
ity of mortgage interest could reduce the valuation of homes, thereby imposing a burden on
homeowners who purchased in reliance on that deductibility. This burden is distinct from the
prospective effects from denying the interest deduction in future years. From an economic
perspective, debate has focused on the desirability of transition rules to limit the impact of
such changes. For an intriguing argument in favor of transition relief, see Kyle D. Logue, Tax
Transitions, Opportunistic Retroactivity, and The Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94
MicH. L. REv. 1129 (1996) (arguing in part that failing to provide transition relief makes tax
incentives more costly to implement).
11o See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA.
TAx Rnv. 492, 493 (1995):
Max law has a rich history of nonliteral interpretation in order to avoid results that
one person or another has considered to be inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute as a whole. This tradition is illustrated by the common law doctrines vari-
ously named as substance over form, sham transaction, step transaction, business
purpose, and assignment of income.
Id. See also Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1504 (arguing against "antitextual" interpretations of
the Code, which occur in tax with "unusual frequency"); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About
Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 622, 624 (1986)
("Literal interpretations, based on the language of the Code, often conflict with interpretations
based on the structure or policy of the Code.").
1 See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 859, 863-64 (1982).
There has developed a welter of rules and extrastatutory standards that impose par-
ticular scrutiny on transactions with results unfavorable to the Treasury. These stan-
dards are enshrined in celebrated cases . . . that stand as bulwarks against
overreaching by taxpayers. It is from these cases that the basic weapons in the Com-
missioner's arsenal are derived-the business purpose doctrine, the step transaction
doctrine, "substance over form," and others.
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ward the role of purpose in tax law interpretation, particularly in
circumventing rule-based constraints, have important implications for
Rule of Law values.
The interpretive approaches of textualism and purposivism illustrate
two contrasting views of rule-based constraint. Textualism focuses pri-
marily on the enacted text as the basis for interpretation, limiting the
scope of the inquiry into matters of purpose. Professor Zelinsky provides
a useful description of a textualist approach in taxation:
Since the statute as enacted by Congress and the Presi-
dent is... the fundamental source of the tax law, those
who interpret and apply it should respect the statutory
text and should view the text as the primary and initial
basis for resolving tax controversies. Adjudicators
should resort to secondary sources-case law, regula-
tions, administrative authority, notions of tax policy
(even when dressed up as unexpressed statutory pur-
pose)-only after the possibilities of statutory-based so-
lutions have been exhausted. Courts should not lightly
declare the Code ambiguous or its literal command un-
reasonable since any such declaration necessarily dis-
places the statute adopted by the elected officeholders
with ultimate responsibility for the tax law. Since the
Code is a relatively new and continually updated text, it
requires less liberal construction than older texts which,
by definition, could not have been drafted with an under-
standing of contemporary conditions and which often
use words whose connotations have changed with the
passage of time.112
Those adhering to textual-based approaches might disagree as to the
range of materials that courts may consult in interpreting statutes. For
example, textualists may disagree as to whether legislative history is an
Id. See also Geier, supra note 110, at 495:
In the tax world, most see the tension between textualism and purposivism as arising
when a taxpayer wants a textualist approach and the IRS wants to deviate from the
textual, form-conscious approach in favor of a purposive approach. This perception
is exemplified by the hoary substance-over-form doctrine (with its variants, the step
transaction and business purpose doctrines), under which the IRS challenges the tax-
ation of a transaction according to its form in favor of taxation according to the
transaction's underlying substance.
Id.
112 Edward A. Zelinsky, Text, Purpose, Capacity, and Albertson's: A Response to Profes-
sor Geier, 2 FLA. TAx. REv. 717, 730 (1996). Professor Geier's description of textualism is
much more closely associated with "literalism." See i; Deborah A. Geier, Commentary:
Textualism and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. Rnv. 445, 448-49 (1993); Geier, supra note 110, at
511, 514.
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appropriate consideration.113 Textualists, however, emphasize the pri-
macy of text in interpretation and are reluctant to resort to other sources
in order to justify results that the statutory language will not bear." 4
On the other hand, purposive interpretive approaches are more ame-
nable to circumventing the statutory language in order to satisfy other
goals relating to the purpose of the statute. Some purposivists tolerate a
broad range of sources for purpose, including the ultimate policy goals of
particular legislation.115 Others focus more narrowly on the structure of
the Code itself as the source for purpose.' 16 This narrower focus reflects
an attempt to constrain discretion, albeit one which is not limited by the
language of the statute. 117
Gregory v. Helvering"18 is a prominent example from among the
many cases in which a court honored the Commissioner's request to
abandon textual constraints, to the detriment of a taxpayer who relied
upon them." 9 In this familiar tale, Gregory was the sole shareholder of a
113 See Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1509-10. Professor Coverdale's approach rejects so-
called "anti-textual" interpretations of the Code, which he defines as "interpretations which
impose on the text-including not merely a few isolated words of the section or sections under
discussion but all applicable provisions read in the broad context of the Code-a meaning that
Congress could not reasonably be expected to express in the text it actually enacted." Id. at
1503-04. This approach relies on the "primacy of enacted text", but rejects other aspects of
textualist theory, as he would allow the use of legislative history. See id. at 1509. He also
suggests "minimal reasonableness and respect for human rights are such essential characteris-
tics of law that a court should not apply a statute in a way the violates these values in a
fundamental way, even though the statute's text may seem to require doing so." Id. at 1509
n.28. However, his remedy-declaring the statute unconstitutional-would presumably be
different than a remedy of simply reinterpreting the text in a manner that the text itself would
not bear. See id.
114 See id. at 1509-10. Professor Coverdale would allow an anti-textual interpretation
only to prevent an absurd result. See id. at 1505 n.16. See also Livingston, supra note 40, at
680-81 (noting that Hart and Sacks' approach to legislative purpose is limited by the meaning
the statutory word will bear).
115 See Geier, supra note 110, at 514-19 (discussing different approaches to legislative
purpose).
116 See iU at 497. Professor Geier defines "structure" as "the theoretical construct that
overarches the sum total of the entire Internal Revenue Code and is intended to be captured by
it." Id. This includes "such ideas as the same dollars should not be taxed to the same person
more than once or deducted by the same person more than once," and that an income tax is
"trying to reach ... consumption and net increases in wealth." See id
117 Professor Geier believes that her concept of the "structure" of the Code is distinguish-
able from an approach that relies on the "ultimate purpose" of a statute, which might not be
sufficient to "curb strong-willed judges from implementing what they see as the correct policy
for the country." Id. at 514. It is clear that she views constraint as important: "I, too, wish
judges to be constrained from using outcome-based approaches and have thus struggled to
fashion my own set of constraints, outlined both here and elsewhere, within the nomenclature
of purpose." Id. at 516. As discussed infra, however, others question whether this approach is
an effective means of constraint.
118 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
119 For an extended discussion of Gregory and similar cases involving the abandonment
of textual constraints, see Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1529-38. Professor Coverdale charac-
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corporation ("United") which had among its assets highly appreciated
stock in another corporation ("Monitor"). 120 In order to obtain cash from
the disposition of the Monitor stock, Gregory had three basic options:
(1) United could sell the stock and distribute cash to her; (2) United
could distribute the stock in kind to Gregory, who could then sell the
stock for cash; or (3) United could transfer the Monitor shares to a sepa-
rate corporation controlled by Gregory, and then the separate corporation
could liquidate, thereby distributing the shares to Gregory, who could
then sell the stock for cash. 121
If tax effects were ignored, each option would generate similar eco-
nomic results. However, during the year at issue, the form of this trans-
action could generate dramatically different tax consequences, with the
first alternative generating the highest total tax and the third generating
the lowest total tax. 122 Not surprisingly, Gregory chose the third alterna-
tive. The Commissioner challenged this plan, claiming that it was "with-
out substance and must be disregarded,"' 12 3 and the Supreme Court
upheld the Commissioner's determination.
The Court found that the transaction was:
[s]imply an operation having no business or corporate
purpose-a mere device which put on the form of a cor-
porate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real
character, and the sole object and accomplishment of
which was the consummation of a preconceived plan,
not to reorganize a business or any part of a business, but
terizes Gregory as "a defining case in tax law' Id. at 1529. See also Zelenak, supra note 110,
at 667 (citing Gregory as "perhaps the most influential case in the development of the
progovermment interpretive bias").
120 See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467.
121 See Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1529-30.
122 The first alternative would have generated both corporate-level tax on the sale and
personal income tax on the distribution of the cash dividend. The second alternative would
have avoided the corporate-level tax, but it would have generated a personal income tax on the
dividend distributed in kind, which would be measured by reference to the property's fair
market value when distributed. Gregory could then resell the Monitor stock for its fair market
value without tax consequences. The third alternative would have also avoided corporate-level
tax if the reorganization provisions were respected, but it would avoid the personal income tax
on the distribution of the Monitor stock, which would not constitute a taxable dividend. Greg-
ory's sale of the stock would not be tax-free, but it would generate less taxable income than a
dividend because she would be allowed to recover a portion of her basis from the United
Stock, which would be allocated to the Monitor stock after the reorganization and liquidation.
See generally Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1530; MARTIN D. GINSBERG & JACK S. LEVIN,
MERGERS, AcQuisrrlONS, AND BuyoIrs § 603.1, n.6 (1997).
123 See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 467. The Commissioner taxed Gregory as though "United
Corporation had paid her a dividend consisting of the amount realized from the sale of the
Monitor shares." Id.
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to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to [Gregory]
124
Although the Court recognized that the taxpayer's motivation to
avoid taxation "will not alter the result or make unlawful what the statute
allows,"'125 it found that the transaction in this case was not what the
statute meant by "reorganization:"
The whole undertaking, though conducted accord-
ing to the terms of [the applicable statute], was in fact an
elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading
as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule
which excludes from consideration the motive of tax
avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because the
transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of
the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice
above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in
question of all serious purpose. 126
Here, the "plain intent" of the statute was apparently based on something
other than the text of the statute, resting instead upon the court's view of
the economic reality of this transaction and the purpose of the reorgani-
zation provisions.
Corporate-level taxes are now imposed on corporate distributions of
appreciated property, regardless of whether the corporation is liquidat-
ing.12 7 Thus, a rule-based solution has been enacted to address, in part,
the differential tax treatment that presumably gave rise to Gregory's tax
strategy. However, the requirement of a "business purpose" in reorgani-
zation transactions still generates controversy, despite the issuance of
regulations to provide guidance in this area. 128
Gregory is still included in many leading casebooks and treatises on
corporate taxation, presumably because of the judicial approach to tax
law that is embodied in that case. 129 This approach had obviously detri-
124 Id. at 469.
125 Id. at 468-69.
126 IL at 470. It is curious that the Court disavows the significance of motive, and yet
characterizes the form of conveyance as "devious." Although "devious" can be defined in
more neutral terms that refer to an indirect or circuitous nature, it also reflects pejoratively on
the taxpayer. See THE NEw RoGEr's THnsAuRus IN DICrnONARY FoRm (1964) (listing "dis-
honorable, crooked, deceitful, fraudulent (dishonesty)" as synonyms for "devious").
127 See I.R.C. § 311(b) (1997).
128 See generally GINSBERG & LEvrN, supra note 122, at § 609.1-2. The Service will
issue private letter rulings on business purpose aspects of reorganization transactions under
section 355. See Rev. Proc. 96-30, 1996-19 I.R.B. 8 (providing guidelines for such ruling
requests).
129 See Siuai C. THOMPSON, JR., TAXAiON OF BusINEss Errrrs 59-62 (1994); PAUL
McD ANm Er. AL., FEDERAL INcomE TAXATiON OF CoRaoRAnvoNs 535-42 (1997).
476 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:445
mental effects on Mrs. Gregory and her reliance on the applicable rules.
As Professor Coverdale observes:
We do not know what Mrs. Gregory would have done if
the statute had clearly made the sale of the Monitor stock
fully taxable no matter what form it took. She might
have decided to leave the Monitor stock in United and to
obtain the funds she needed in some other way. In
reaching her decision to sell, she should have been able
to rely on the laws enacted by Congress. Even if one
thinks that Mrs. Gregory's use of part of her basis in the
United Stock to avoid recognition of part of the gain on
the disposition of the Monitor stock constituted abusive
tax avoidance, there comes a point where "the harm of
uncertainty becomes greater than the good of avoidance
prevention."' 30
Those who follow in Gregory's footsteps now have notice that con-
cepts of purpose may be invoked to challenge the tax treatment of trans-
actions that comply with the language of the Code.' 3 ' To the extent that
business purpose or other structural principles of the Code can be identi-
fied, they may constrain judicial choices in the "Dworkian" sense, so that
decisions based on structure are, in theory, not entirely outside the Rule
130 Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1538 (citation omitted). As Professor Zelenak points out,
Gregory's effects extend far beyond the reorganization provisions:
The courts and the Service have viewed the 'underlying assumptions and purposes'
of the reorganization provisions as generally requiring nonliteral interpretations in
the government's favor to prevent taxpayers from gaining unintended tax benefits
from the application of these provisions. This understanding of the structures and
policies underlying the reorganization provisions may be correct. Problems have
arisen, however, because nonliteral interpretations of the reorganization provisions
have come to be seen as the prototypical cases of the nonliteral interpretation of the
Code. Because judicial opinions in reorganization cases generally apply progovem-
ment nonliteral interpretations, the assumption seems to have developed-largely
unconsciously perhaps-that progovernment nonliteral interpretations are somehow
more legitimate than protaxpayer nonliteral interpretations.
Zelenak, supra note 110, at 669.
131 See McDANmL, supra note 129, which states in part:
As far as corporate reorganizations are concerned, the business purpose doctrine has
been incorporated into Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(c) and -2(g), but the Gregory decision
and the ramifications of the business purpose doctrine stand primarily as judicial
warnings that some provisions are off limits in some situations. This combination of
the existence of a rule permitting transactions to be disregarded but uncertainty as to
when the rule will be applied has an in terrorem effect that dampens the enthusiasm
of some would-be tax manipulators but prompts others to take a chance where little
is at risk if the scheme fails. But it is difficult to see how the Internal Revenue Code
could be applied successfully without the safeguards afforded by the Gregory doc-
trine and its various facets. It is a technique of statutory interpretation difficult to
apply but essential to our tax system as it now operates.
Id. at 542 (emphasis in original).
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of Law. 132 However, it is questionable whether such structural principles
are separable from routine policy choices.' 33
First, the "structure" of the tax code may reflect multiple purposes,
and identifying which purpose should control in a given case, and
whether that purpose provides an adequate basis for abandoning a textu-
all,-based interpretation, is highly indeterminate.13 4 In theory, a judge
with the wisdom of Dworkin's Hercules might be able to ascertain the
proper structural principle or principles in each case, and to weight them
appropriately in reaching a tax result.' 35 However, taxpayers and their
advisors administering these provisions may not possess that same wis-
dom-and neither will the Revenue Agents seeking to enforce them.
Litigation may ultimately clarify the role of purpose in a particular con-
text, but the immediate effect is to undermine the reliability of rules and
to impose administrative costs on taxpayers chosen to be test cases.
Second, purposive approaches may also mask a policy bias toward
protecting the public fisc, at the expense of particular taxpayers who
132 See Dworkin's views on discretion discussed supra note 43. Professor Geier similarly
argues that a decision which "ignored the literal words of the statute in order to protect the
fundamental structure [of the Code]" was not outside the rule of law. Instead, it is part of the
collaborative effort between Congress and the courts, in which the statute includes that larger
concept of structure. See Geier, supra note 110, at 508.
133 Several commentators have questioned whether purposivism based on "structure" is
an adequate constraint, and have suggested adherents are really "substituting their own policy
preferences for those embodied in the statute and calling that substitution the implementation
of underlying purpose." See generally Zelinsky, supra note 112, at 718-21 (1996) (question-
ing premises of Geier's analysis, including whether "courts can reliably glean from tax provi-
sions an underlying purpose that justifies disregard of statutory text'); Livingston, supra note
40, at 679 (arguing that "[slupporters of purposive interpretation tend to exaggerate the logic
and consistency of the Code, and to overstate the authority of tax scholars as interpreters of
basic tax principles").
134 See Zelinsky, supra note 133, at 718-21(critiquing Professor Geier's approach to
purposivism theories); Livingston, supra note 40, at 702 ("Perhaps the most serious critique of
purposivism is the problem of indeterminacy. According to this critique, since a statute may
have more than one purpose, purposive analysis is unlikely to provide a definitive resolution to
any case."). Professor Livingston questions whether purposivism actually describes the ap-
proach that courts have used to decide cases involving nonliteral interpretations. Instead, he
suggests that purpose "is likely to be a rhetorical device, with courts seizing upon one or
another possible purpose in order to justify a result actually determined by textual, historical,
or contextual interpretive methods." Id.
135 See DwoRKIN, supra note 16, at 105-30. Dworkin "invented" Hercules as an ideal
judge, "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience, and acumen" as a model for ascer-
taining and applying principles to resolve hard cases. Id. at 105. Legislative intention or
purpose is one source of such principles. See id Dworkin contrasts Hercules with Herbert, a
hypothetical judge who believes that "when the positive rules of law are vague or indetermi-
nate, the litigants have no institutional right at all, so that any decision he might reach is a
piece of fresh legislation." Id. at 129. Hercules, on the other hand, believes that his decision is
constrained by such institutional rights, and that belief constrains his pursuit of a result. See
id. Dworkin readily admits that no one has the wisdom of Hercules. See id. at 129-30. More-
over, even some of Hercules' decisions will be controversial. See id. at 117.
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have relied on the statutory text. 136 This bias may also be reflected in
part by the decline of the interpretive rule that requires strict construction
of tax statutes against the government. 137 The strict construction princi-
136 See William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street: The Taxpayer's Ability to Disavow
Form, 70 OR. L. REv. 381, 393-94 (1991) (discussing emergence of values of communal good
and increasing judicial sympathy for taxation); Zelenak, supra note 110, at 666-670 (referring
to "progovernment bias" in the application of nonliteral interpretations of the Code); Cover-
dale, supra note 14, at 1505 ("[S]ome federal judges seem to feel called upon to protect federal
revenues, even at the cost of twisting beyond recognition provisions that Congress has enacted
.... ). Courts have been reluctant to apply purposive approaches in favor of taxpayers. For
example, in Cornelius v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1974), the court rejected the
taxpayer's argument based on the legislative intent in enacting Subchapter S in favor of a
textual approach, stating in part:
Though we could discuss at great length the relative merits and equities of the com-
peting approaches urged upon us by taxpayers and the Commissioner, we must be
mindful that in cases of statutory construction and legislative intent, "it is our judi-
cial function to apply statutes on the basis of what Congress has written, not what
Congress might have written."
lId at 469 (quoting United States v. Great N. Ry., 343 U.S. 562, 575 (1952)). Criticisms of
that statute by "tax sophisticates and commentators" were thought to be "properly addressed to
the Congress and not to the courts." See id. The court defined its own role more modestly,
stating in part "Ours has been the more mundane assignment of contouring the codified cur-
licues of Subchapter S to the Code's synoptic minutiae. Being mere mortals unendowed with
cosmic tax wisdom, we have performed our task as well as our fallible mentalities and compo-
sitions will permit." Id. at 472.
The court also rejected the taxpayer's attempt to recharacterize debt as equity based on the
economic substance, stating in part:
This Court has never hesitated to pierce the paper armor of a taxpayer's characteriza-
tion of a particular transaction in order to reach its true substance .... [W]e have
done so in situations similar to this one to determine whether shareholder advances
to a closely held corporation are to be considered as debts or as contributions to
capital. In each such instance, however, we have done so at the request of the Com-
missioner to prevent a taxpayer from unjustifiably using his own forms and labels as
a shield from the incidence of taxation. A taxpayer's attempt to pierce his own
armor does not merit the same consideration.
Id. at 471 (emphasis added).
Sometimes a purpose-based approach against a taxpayer in a particular case will generate
taxpayer-friendly results in later cases. Professor Zelenak points to Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v.
Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), as an example of "Pyrrhic victory" in obtaining judicial
acceptance of a purposive approach to limit the definition of capital assets subject to capital
gains treatment, which had a reciprocal effect of allowing taxpayers to characterize capital
losses as arguably ordinary. See Zelenak, supra note 110, at 644-47. Professor Zelenak sug-
gests that Corn Products exemplifies the "Law of Moses' Rod": "'Every stick crafted to beat
on the head of a taxpayer will, sooner or later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite
the Commissioner on the hind part."' ld. at 646 (quoting Martin Ginsburg, The National
Office Mission, 27 TAX Nomes 99, 100 (1985)). In Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485
U.S. 212 (1988), the Supreme Court overruled Corn Products in favor of a narrower textual
approach that would have produced the same result in the original case, but which would have
avoided much of the uncertainty in later cases. See generally MARVIN A. C-EneLSTmN, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 330-36 (8th ed. 1997).
137 See Blatt, supra note 136, at 399; Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1522 n.9 (noting the
"long-abandoned complex of doctrines concerning strict construction of the tax laws against
the government The current trend is to construe tax statutes broadly in the government's
favor.").
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ple was applied in early tax cases, such as Old Colony Railroad Co. v.
Commissioner:138 "[When there is] doubt as to [the] connotation of [a]
term, and another meaning might be adopted, the fact of its use in a tax
statute would incline the scale to the construction most favorable to the
taxpayer."'139 Similarly, the principle that "[i]f the words [of a statute]
are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved against the government and in
favor of the taxpayer" was often cited.140
This principle appears to be oriented toward protecting the citizen's
property rights from government claims that are not clearly prescribed in
advance. 141 However, more recent decisions have cast doubt on the con-
tinuing viability of such a rights-oriented approach for interpretation. 142
A Rule of Lenity favoring citizens against the government may still be
138 284 U.S. 552 (1931).
139 Id. at 562.
140 See, e.g., United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923) (income tax); Miller v.
Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 508 (1932) (excise tax).
141 Merriam cites Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917), as support for this proposi-
tion. Although Gould involved construction of the income tax, it traces this principle to earlier
cases involving duties. See ki. (citing American Net and Twine v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468
(1891) (duty on "gilling twine"); Benziger v. United States, 192 U.S. 38 (1904) (duties on
plaster casts)). In the context of duties, the principle arguably reflects a preference for free
trade. In an income tax context, however, strict construction appears rooted in an ideal of
protecting taxpayers' property rights. The Merriam court grounds this principle in English law,
quoting from Lord Cairns in Partington v. Attorney General, L.R. 4 H.L. 100, 122 (Court of
Exchequer, 1869):
If the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed,
however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other
hand, if the crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject-within the
letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law
the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be admissible in any
statutes what is called an equitable construction, certainly such a construction is not
admissible in a taxing statute, where you can simply adhere to the words of the
statute."
Merriam at 188. See also Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U.S. 578, 583 (1902):
It is an old and familiar rule of the English courts, applicable to all forms of taxation,
and particularly to special taxes, that the sovereign is bound to express its intention
to tax in clear and unambiguous language, and that a liberal construction be given to
words of exception confiding the operation of duty, though the rule regarding ex-
emptions from general laws imposing taxes may be different.
Id. (citations omitted).
142 See Wolder v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1974), which states in part "One
also doubts the present day validity of the underlying philosophical premise of Merriam .... "
The principle is nevertheless still invoked from time to time in recent cases. See, e.g., Royal
Carribean Cruises Ltd. v. United States, 95-2 USTC 70,050 (S.D. Fla 1995), which stated in
part:
The United States argues that this principle [of resolving ambiguities in favor of the
taxpayer] is 'outdated' because the rule of law now is to defer to IRS interpretations
of statutes .... Mhe court agrees that IRS interpretations are entitled to deference.
However, that does not change the rule that if no interpretation or legislative history
clarifies an ambiguity in a statute, that ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer.
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applied where criminal penalties are at stake, 143 but taxes are generally
not viewed in the same light as criminal penalties. 144 The immediate
economic effect of paying a criminal fine or a tax may be similar, as the
payer parts with property in both cases. However, a criminal fine is as-
sessed in order to punish wrongdoing, whereas a tax merely apportions
the cost of government among those who presumably benefit therefrom,
albeit usually in a general and attenuated sense. 145 Viewing the Code as
an allocation mechanism that is constantly subject to revision, as the
Id. See also Security Bank Minnesota v. Commissioner, 994 F.2d 432 (8th Cir. 1993), affg
98 T.C. 33 (1992) (applying principle that doubt is to be resolved in favor of the taxpayer to
produce a taxpayer-favorable result when judges differed as to the correct interpretation).
143 For a relatively recent case invoking the Rule of Lenity in the context of constructing
an ambiguous criminal statute, see United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Company, 504
U.S. 505 (1992). Thompson/Center Arms Company ("Thompson") manufactured and sold a
pistol and a kit that the purchaser could use to convert the pistol into a rifle with either a 21-
inch barrel or a 10-inch barrel. See ia- at 507-08. At issue was whether Thompson could be
considered to be manufacturing "short barreled rifles" (i.e., those with a barrel less than 16
inches long), which would subject Thompson to special taxes as well as criminal penalties.
The Court considered the language of the applicable statute and concluded that it was ambigu-
ous as to whether sale of the pistol and kit constituted "making" such a firearm, but the Rule of
Lenity applied in criminal cases was critical in resolving this ambiguity in favor of Thompson:
The key to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that although it is a tax statute
we construe now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that carry no
additional requirement of willfulness. Making a firearm without approval may be
subject to criminal sanction, as is possession of an unregistered firearm and failure to
pay the tax on one. It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of lenity and resolve the
ambiguity in Thompson/Center's favor.
Id. at 517-18 (citations omitted) (plurality opinion). The concurring opinion of Justice Scalia,
who was joined by Justice Thomas, also agreed that the Rule of Lenity should be applied, but
disagreed as to the source of ambiguity. See id. at 519-23. Significantly, a majority of the
justices seized upon the potential for criminal sanctions to apply the Rule of Lenity to con-
struct a tax statute. However, they failed to cite a similar rule of construction applied in many
earlier tax cases-that ambiguities in tax statutes are to be construed in favor of the taxpayer.
144 See MRTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 4.14 (1999) ("Retroactive taxa-
tion is allowed because taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability
which the taxpayer assumes by contract. Instead, it is a method of apportioning the cost of
government among those who enjoy its benefits and who must bear the resulting burdens.").
See also Fuller's discussion of the tension between taxation and criminal law in Thm MoRAL.-
Try oF LAW, supra note 7, at 59-61.
145 See Compania General de Tabacos De Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275
U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
It is true ... that every exaction of money for an act is a discouragement to the
extent of the payment required, but that which in its immediacy is a discouragement
may be part of an encouragement when seen in its organic connection with the
whole. Taxes are what we pay for civilized society .... A penalty on the other hand
is intended altogether to prevent the thing punished.
Id. One court prefaced its judgment in a tax case, apparently with tongue-in-cheek: "If Justice
Holmes was correct that 'taxes are what we pay for civilized society,' then the question in this
case is how much civilization the taxpayer will be required to purchase." Shimberg v. United
States, 577 F.2d 283, 284 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted) (citing Compania, 275 U.S. at
100).
1999] THE RULE OF LAW AND "CLEAR REFLECTION OF INcoME" 481
Court did in Carlton, reflects this policy bias away from rule-based con-
straints as a source of protection for the property rights of taxpayers.
Using a purposive approach to depart from textually-based interpre-
tations also moves tax law further toward an elitist orientation, where the
true meaning of texts are accessible only to a chosen few. 146 Such an
orientation undermines society's ability to comprehend and evaluate
compliance with the Rule of Law by minimizing the possibility of
achieving consensus based on language, and emphasizing instead a secu-
lar faith in a priesthood of tax mystics. 147 Moreover, this orientation
makes it difficult for Congress to legislate, as it too must comprehend the
mystical implications of its chosen language in future tax
administration. 148
Some commentators have suggested that the sophistication of a stat-
ute's "audience" justifies an interpretation affected by purpose, even
though the text of the statute might not bear such an interpretation. 149
This assumes that particular statutes have identifiable audiences who are
represented by a member of the cadre of cognoscenti, who can provide
appropriate notice of legal requirements in advance of their application.
However, we do not have two sets of tax laws-a simple set for non-
146 See Livingston, supra note 40, at 679 (arguing that purposivism tends to "overstate the
authority of tax scholars as interpreters of basic tax principles").
147 This concern also supports the presumption that statutory words should be interpreted
in their ordinary sense. See Hantzis v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 248, 257 (1st Cir. 1981)
(Keeton, J., concurring):
A word used in a statute can mean, among the cognoscenti, whatever authoritative
sources define it to mean. Nevertheless, it is a distinct disadvantage of a body of law
that it can be understood only by those who are expert in its terminology. Moreover,
needless risks of misunderstanding and confusion arise, not only among members of
the public but also among professionals who must interpret and apply a statute in
their day-to-day work, when a word is given an extraordinary meaning that is con-
trary to its everyday usage.
Id. Cf. Dwom N, supra note 16, at 130 ("[Though we, as social critics, know that mistakes
will be made, we do not know when because we are not Hercules either.").
148 Professor Livingston argues that developing purposivist principles in a dynamic
fashion
suggests that scholars, in some cases, may have a standing equal or superior to that
of the legislature (and perhaps the courts) charged with formal responsibility for
making and interpreting law. In this scenario, the legislature would make an initial
decision to adopt the income tax, UCC, or similar law, but in doing so implicitly
would accept principles-largely unknown to itself-that later generations of "ex-
perts" would have the right and responsibility to expound. The legislature could
overrule the experts, but unless it did so in clear and convincing fashion, the inter-
pretation of the experts would hold.
Livingston, supra note 40, at 689. See also Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1556-57 (arguing that
anti-textual interpretations allow courts to circumvent Congressional policymaking authority).
149 See Zelenak, supra note 109, at 664-66 (statutes addressed to specialists should re-
ceive a more contextual interpretation).
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specialists and a more complex set for tax cognoscenti.15 0 Even small
transactions can generate complex tax issues, and tax law must be ap-
plied by taxpayers with varying levels of resources to devote to tax ad-
vice. Both the sophisticated and unsophisticated are affected by the
indeterminacy generated by purposivism, and we should not assume that
the impact of purposivism.is limited to those who "deserve" it. As Pro-
fessor Livingston points out:
It is perhaps unrealistic to expect lay people to under-
stand the tax law without academic assistance. But is it
too much to expect of tax lawyers? Must practitioners
learn not only the law as written, but a series of hidden
purposes that may be hurled at them at any moment,
sometimes in direct contravention of statutory language.
And what of judges-must they learn an entirely differ-
ent set of interpretive presumptions, only to be applied in
tax cases? The notion of tax uniqueness may be appeal-
ing to tax scholars, but has little if any doctrinal sanc-
tion. In its more extreme versions, tax purposivism is
not merely a questionable descriptive theory; it may be
inconsistent with the rule of law.' 5
D. AGENCY DIsCIRTION IN MAKING, INTERPRETING, AND APPLYING
TAx RuLus
The Treasury Department 152 also exercises discretion in making and
applying law to taxpayers.' 5 3 Discretionary powers to engage in retroac-
150 For a proposal that would allow taxpayers to choose between the current system and a
radically simplified tax system, see Stephen Moore, The Alternative Maximum Tax, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 14, 1997, at A20.
151 Livingston, supra note 39, at 711-12.
152 For convenience, the Treasury Department will be referred to generally as "the Treas-
ury." The Internal Revenue Service, a part of the Treasury Department, will be referred to as
"the Service."
153 This discretionary power is rooted in practical considerations, as explained in Bob
Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983):
[E]ver since the inception of the tax code, Congress has seen fit to vest in those
administering the tax laws very broad authority to interpret those laws. In an area as
complex as the tax system, the agency Congress vests with administrative responsi-
bility must be able to exercise its authority to meet changing conditions and new
problems. Indeed as early as 1918, Congress expressly authorized the Commis-
sioner "to make all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the tax
laws. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 1309, 40 Stat. 1057, 1143 (1919). The same
provision, so essential to efficient and fair administration of the tax laws, has ap-
peared in tax codes ever since, see 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1976); and this Court has
long recognized the primary authority of the IRS and its predecessors in construing
the Internal Revenue Code, See, e.g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450
U.S. 156, 169, 101 S.Ct. 1037, 1045, 67 L.Ed.2d 140 (1981); United States v. Cor-
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tive rulemaking and selectively enforce existing rules raise Rule of Law
concerns, which are discussed below.
1. Regulations
Congress has delegated broad authority to the Treasury to "pre-
scribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Code]
.... 154 Regulations promulgated under this general authority are often
referred to as interpretive regulations. 155 In some circumstances, Con-
gress has also granted specific authority to the Treasury to promulgate
regulations that implement statutes that have been purposely left open or
incomplete.156 Such regulations are often referred to as legislative
regulations. 157
Both interpretive and legislative regulations receive deference from
courts considering their validity. 158 Treasury regulations are generally
sustained if they do not conflict with the Code, 59 even though the tax-
rell, 389 U.S. 299, 306-307, 88 S.Ct. 445, 449, 19 L.Ed.2d 537 (1967); Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469-470, 20 S.Ct. 701, 705, 44 L.Ed. 846 (1900).
Congress, the source of IRS authority, can modify IRS rulings it considers improper;
and courts exercise review over IRS actions. In the first instance, however, the re-
sponsibility for construing the Code falls to the IRS. Since Congress cannot be
expected to anticipate every conceivable problem that can arise or to carry out day-
to-day oversight, it relies on the administrators and on the courts to implement the
legislative will. Administrators, like judges, are under oath to do so.
Id. at 596-97 (citations in original). However, as discussed below, the Court does not neces-
sarily defer to agency interpretations that have not been reduced to a formal interpretation. See
infra note 158 and accompanying text.
154 See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1997).
155 See Ellen P. April, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX
Rnv. 51, 56 (1996).
156 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 472(f) (1997) (directing the promulgation of regulations "permitting
the use of suitable published governmental indexes in such manner and circumstances as deter-
mined by the Secretary for purposes of [the LIFO method)").
157 See, April, supra note 155, at 56-57. Professor April notes that in administrative law,
the distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations is based on whether the regula-
tion "creates new law or has a self-executing legal effect." Il at 56. However, in tax law, the
distinction is generally based on the source of authority for the regulation. See id.
158 See id, The extent to which courts generally follow the paradigm of Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 67 U.S. 837 (1984), in reviewing regulations is unclear.
See generally April, supra note 155, at 52; John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regula-
tions and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35 (1995).
159 See Hachette U.S.A., Inc. v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 234, 251 (1995) (regulation
sustained when no evidence of a conflict between the regulations and the language or purpose
of the statute). Deference to interpretations embodied in regulations should be contrasted with
litigating positions, which do not receive the same treatment. See also Bowen v. Georgetown
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988):
We have never applied the principle [of deference to agency interpretation] to
agency litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or
administrative practice. To the contrary, we have declined to give deference to an
agency counsel's interpretation of a statute where the agency itself has articulated no
position on the question, on the ground that "Congress has delegated to the adminis-
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payer's interpretation of the Code may be as good as, or better than, the
Treasury's interpretation. 160 Although the degree of deference is diffi-
cult to gauge, legislative regulations generally receive even greater defer-
ence than interpretive regulations.' 61
The courts' willingness to accord special weight to an agency's in-
terpretation embodied in a regulation has been justified in part by the
agency's perceived competence in policymaking. As one commentator
has observed: "the resolution of ambiguities in statutes is sometimes a
question of policy as much as it is one of law, narrowly understood, and
... agencies are uniquely well situated to make the relevant policy deci-
sions."'162 In part, this competence may be attributed to special expertise
in particular substantive areas, as compared with generalist judges. 163
Applying that expertise over a broad range of experiences may also con-
tribute to greater consistency in application, as compared to results of
independent interpretations in different judicial fora.164
trative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and
enforcing statutory commands." ... Deference to what appears to be nothing more
than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.
Id. (citations omitted).
160 See, e.g., Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co v. Commissioner, 118 S.Ct. 1413, 1418
(1998); Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 116, 134 (1996).
161 See Coverdale, supra note 158, at 63.
162 Cass Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. Rlv. 2071, 2086
(1990). See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretation of Law,
1989 DuE L. J. 511 (1989).
163 See Sunstein, supra note 162, at 2086-90; Coverdale, supra note 158, at 68. See also
Scalia, supra note 162, at 514. The validity of this observation is a specialized court such as
the Tax Court is less clear. Different approaches to deference tend to lead to disuniformity in
results depending on the choice of forum. See, e.g., Linda Galler, Emerging Standards for
Judicial Review of IRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. R-v. 841 (1992).
164 See National Muffler Dealer's Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), which
explains the justification for deference as follows:
We do this because "Congress has delegated to the [Secretary of the Treasury and
his delegate, the] Commissioner [of Internal Revenue], not to the courts, the task of
prescribing 'all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement' of the Internal
Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a)." United States v. Correll, 389 U.S., at 397, 88
S.Ct. at 449. That delegation helps ensure that in 'this area of limitless factual varia-
tions," ibid., like cases will be treated alike. It also helps guarantee that the rules
will be written by "masters of the subject," United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 24
L.Ed. 588, 589 (1878), who will be responsible for putting the rules into effect.
Il at 477 (citations in original). Professor Galler questions whether agency expertise is an
appropriate basis for deference in tax cases, based in significant part because IRS lawyers may
not have more experience or expertise than their private bar counterparts. See Galler, supra
note 163, at 852-56. The fact that policymakers do not always comprehend the effect of their
decisions is cited as further evidence of this questionable assumption. See id. But see Cover-
dale, supra note 158, at 68 n.226 (arguing that the expertise comparison should reflect the
institutional experience and purpose, rather than that of individuals, and that "numerous mem-
bers of the Treasury and IRS staff involved in drafting and reviewing a particular regulation
would generally be expected to be collectively better informed about and more attuned to
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Moreover, the agency has some level of political accountability
through the Executive, whereas sitting federal judges do not. 165 Justice
Scalia has noted that principles of separation of powers may justify def-
erence to government positions when official agency interpretations are
at stake:
When, in a statute to be implemented by an executive
agency, Congress leaves an ambiguity that cannot be re-
solved by text or legislative history, the "traditional tools
of statutory construction," the resolution of that ambigu-
ity necessarily involves policy judgment. Under our
democratic system, policy judgments are not for the
courts but for the political branches; Congress having
left the policy question open, it must be answered by the
Executive. 166
This approach provides an important background rule against which
Congress can legislate, since "Congress now knows that the ambiguities
it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved,
within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a
particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known." 167
When there is no official agency interpretation, however, courts have
refused to accord specific deference to a mere litigating position held by
the Service. 168
Deference to agency interpretations embodied in prospectively ap-
plicable regulations does not present a significant threat to Rule of Law
values. Changing the locus of rulemaking from the Legislative to the
Executive branch may implicate other concerns, 169 but regulations with
technical problems of tax administration than members of the private bar who represent the
taxpayer").
165 See Sunstein, supra note 162, at 2087-88 n.80 (noting that courts are not wholly in-
dependent to the extent that shifts in the judiciary occur as a result of shifts in the administra-
tion). However, Congress may have put the issue in agency hands to escape political
accountability. See Logue, supra note 109, at 1188-89.
166 Scalia, supra note 162, at 515.
167 1& at 517.
168 See, e.g., CSI Hydrostatic Testers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 398, 409 (1994),
aff'd, 23 F.3d 136 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("In short, unless an agency's interpretation of
a statute or regulation is a matter of public record and is an interpretation upon which the
public is entitled to rely when planning their affairs, it will not be accorded any special defer-
ence."). See also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp, 488 U.S. 204 (1988) (litigating position
merits no deference). The extent of deference given to Revenue Rulings is controversial. See
infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
169 For example, challenges to the delegation of rulemaking powers have been rooted in
concerns about the need for democratic responsibility in connection with policy decisions, and
concerns about the judicial capacity for review without adequate guidelines for agency
rulemaking. See generally ALFRED C. AAWN, JR. & WmLAm T. MAroN, AnDMImNsRA-rvn
LAw 16-33 (1993) (discussing parameters of delegation doctrine).
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rule-like characteristics provide taxpayers with notice of their obligations
and facilitate planning. 170 Moreover, they facilitate consistent treatment
of taxpayers by announcing the official agency position to those who
must enforce those rules.
Retroactive rulemaking or rule-revision power in the hands of the
agency enforcing those rules violates concepts of notice and stability that
are deeply embedded in the Rule of Law. It also threatens the perceived
fairness of the tax system to the extent that the Commissioner, who is
charged with enforcing tax laws, may be perceived as using this authority
to affect the outcome of particular cases in which existing rules produce
an undesirable result.171
Prior to the 1996 enactment of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2,172 the
Treasury had extensive authority to issue regulations with retroactive ef-
fects. 173 Although courts sometimes imposed limits on retroactive ef-
fects based on due process grounds, such relief was generally limited to
changes affecting long-standing regulations, where notice and reliance
interests are presumably greatest. 174 The Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 lim-
its, but does not eliminate, the power to promulgate retroactive regula-
170 Although Treasury regulations are exempt from formal requirements of the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, the Treasury nevertheless follows notice and comment procedures in
promulgating regulations, which gives interested taxpayers an opportunity for input into their
formulation. See Coverdale, supra note 158, at 52. Public input does not guarantee a particu-
lar result, but it may increase the perception of democratic legitimacy. See id. at 86.
171 See Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is the Internal Revenue Service
Bound by its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAx LAW. 675, 695-96 (1988) (noting that
retroactive revocation of Rulings and regulations generates "erosion of public confidence in
the administration of the tax law"); Coverdale, supra note 158, at 87 (noting "the importance,
in a system of voluntary compliance, of assuring citizens that the tax collector does not have
the last word on the application of the tax laws.").
172 P.L. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
173 See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1995) ('The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to which
any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied without retroac-
tive effect") Although this provision did not expressly grant authority for retroactive regula-
tions, the implication of such power from this statute is widely understood. See, e.g., Toni
Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax Regulators, 48 Osno
ST. L.J. 773, 813 (1987); Logue, supra note 109, at 1134-35; Cohen & Harrington, supra note
171, at 675-85.
174 See Logue, supra note 109, at 1135 n.2; Cohen & Harrington, supra note 171, at 680-
81. For a recent case upholding a retroactive change in temporary regulations, see Hospital
Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 116 (1996). At issue was the proper method of
computing an exclusion from income for uncollectable accounts under the so-called "nonac-
crual experience method" permitted by I.R.C. § 448(d)(2). The IRS had promulgated tempo-
rary regulations in 1987 that provided a method of computing a bad debt exclusion that
supported the taxpayer's position. However, approximately ten months later, the IRS amended
those regulations to adopt a formula that favored the Government. The court found that the
amended regulations did not contravene the statute, and even though the taxpayer's method
might have been a better interpretation, the amended regulation was upheld as a valid exercise
of agency discretion. See id at 138. "To be valid, [the regulations] need not be the only, or
even the best, construction of section 448(d)(5). Rather, [the regulations] need only be a rea-
sonable interpretation of congressional intent. 'The choice among reasonable interpretations is
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tions. Section 7805(b) of the Code now provides that regulations
generally cannot become effective before the earliest of the following
dates:
(A) The date on which such regulation is filed with the
Federal Register.
(B) In the case of any final regulation, the date on which
any proposed or temporary regulation to which such fi-
nal regulation relates was filed with the Federal Register.
(C) The date on which any notice substantially describ-
ing the expected contents of any temporary, proposed, or
final regulation is issued to the public. 175
Exceptions limit this protection against retroactive rulemaking. For
example, retroactivity is allowed for "regulations filed or issued within
18 months of the enactment of the statutory provision to which the regu-
lation relates."'1 76 This exception seems to recognize the practical reality
of lag times when issuing guidance, and the limited duration seems gen-
erally consistent with the time periods approved in connection with retro-
active tax legislation. 177 The Treasury also retains express authority to
issue retroactive regulations "to prevent abuse."'178 In other circum-
stances, retroactive effective dates may be permitted only with the con-
sent of Congress. 179
In explaining the reasons for changing prior law, the House Ways
and Means Committee report states only that: "The Committee believes
that it is generally inappropriate for Treasury to issue retroactive regula-
tions." 180 While this statement may suggest a reaffirmation of Rule of
for the Commissioner, not the courts."' l at 134 (citations to Chevron and progeny omitted)
(quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1979)).
Although the Treasury had originally adopted a formula that was similar to the formula used
by the taxpayer, the court sustained the amended formula: "Under the circumstances of the
instant case where the Secretary acted quickly-within 10 months of promulgation of the
Original Temporary Regulations-to amend temporary regulations that the concluded errone-
ously interpreted the statute, he was entitled to alter his interpretation of the statute on further
reflection." lId at 135. In contrast, see Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 656
(1994) (invalidating legislative regulations under I.R.C. § 267 which attempted retroactive ap-
plication of more than 5 years).
175 I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1997).
176 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(2) (1997).
177 See also I.R.C. § 7805(e) (1997) (requiring temporary regulations to expire within
three years after issuance). Query what the effect of such expiration will be on existing law if
no final regulations are promulgated. Presumably, temporary regulations will be considered
applicable only during the period of their validity, but not thereafter.
178 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) (1997).
179 See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(6) (1997).
180 H.R. REP. No. 104-506 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143. Cohen and
Harrington point out that the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight provided an
expanded explanation, which included a desire to protect taxpayers "who seek in good faith to
comply with the statutory tax law" from additional taxes, penalties, and interest that may result
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Law values, the toleration of exceptions also reflects the flexibility to
address pragmatic concerns, such as protecting the public fise from
"abuse." The exception for "abuse" is problematic, as "abuse" may
mean nothing more than following the applicable rules and reaching re-
sults that the Government does not desire. 181 The scope of this exception
is unclear, and it remains to be seen whether it will be exercised indepen-
dently of Congress' power to authorize retroactive regulations. 182
2. Other Administrative Guidance
Restrictions on retroactivity in Code section 7805(b) apply only to
regulations, so that the Treasury retains discretionary authority to impose
retroactive changes through other administrative guidance, such as Reve-
nue Rulings. 183 Although the legal status of such guidance is generally
understood to be less significant than regulations, taxpayers nevertheless
rely on such guidance as a probable indication of the Government's en-
forcement position. 184
Section 6110(j)(3) of the Code expressly limits the precedential sta-
tus of written determinations (e.g., private letter rulings and technical
advice memoranda). 85 According to one treatise, the Service views the
issuance of private letter rulings as a public service; it is not legally re-
quired to issue them. 186 The Service can therefore change positions
stated in private letter rulings, and courts generally will not recognize an
expectation of reliance on them by anyone other than the person to whom
the ruling was issued. 187 Although this means that similarly situated tax-
payers may be treated differently, courts rarely accord relief on this basis,
from taling a position that differs from that reflected by subsequently enacted regulations.
Cohen & Harrington, supra note 171, at 697.
181 Cf. Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1506 n.18 (arguing that "loopholes" are not an objec-
tively defined category).
182 Moreover, the restrictions on retroactivity do not apply to "any regulation relating to
internal Treasury Department policies, practices, or procedures." See LR.C. § 7805(b)(5)
(1997). This exception may also put taxpayers at risk, to the extent that procedural require-
ments or practices can affect legal outcomes.
183 See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (1997) ('The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to
which any ruling (including any judicial decision or any administrative decision other than by
regulation) relating to the internal revenue laws shall be applied without retroactive effect.").
184 See Peter J. Meadows & William A. Dobrovir, Who Killed Guidance, TAx NoTEs,
October 14, 1996, at 221-22 (emphasizing importance of IRS interpretations to taxpayers).
185 See I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (1997). However, taxpayers frequently try to circumvent these
rules by using written determinations as evidence of prior government interpretations and prac-
tices. See Mhcak r I. S Az..mr, IRS PRAncrCE AND PROCEDURE 3.03, at 3-48 (2d ed. 1991)
(citing cases).
186 MicHAm. D. RosE & JoHm C. CHommiE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXA-nON 772 (3d ed.
1988).
187 SALrzmAN, supra note 185, 3.03, at 3-48.
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preferring government flexibility to administer the tax system to the
equality concerns of particular taxpayers.188
Revenue Rulings are not subject to section 6110(j)'s restrictions on
precedential status. The Service issues Revenue Rulings with the stated
aim of promoting uniformity in the interpretation of the Code. 189 They
can be cited in judicial proceedings, but the Service specifically cautions
that they "do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department
Regulations."' 190
Recently, commentators have argued over the status of deference, if
any, that courts accord to Revenue Rulings. Professor Galler has argued
that federal courts other than the Tax Court have begun to accord greater
deference to the Government's position in a Revenue Ruling as an inter-
pretation of the Code, which approaches the deference given to regula-
tions. 191 Professor Caron has argued that no such change in deference
has occurred.' 92 Although this dispute is significant in ascertaining the
extent to which courts will bind taxpayers based on adverse Rulings, the
Commissioner retains the power to revoke a ruling, despite taxpayer
reliance. 193
188 For an exception, see International Business Machines v. United States, 343 F.2d 914
(CL Cl. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 1028 (1966), where the government was required to
provide IBM with the same tax treatment given to its major competitor.
189 See Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, § 5:
The purpose of publication of revenue rulings and revenue procedures in the Bulletin
is to promote uniform application of the tax laws by Service employees and to assist
taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary compliance by informing Service person-
nel and the public of National Office interpretations of the internal revenue law,
related statutes, treaties, and regulations, and statements of Service procedures af-
fecting the rights and duties of taxpayers.
Id.
190 See id. at § 7(4) ("Revenue rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the force and
effect of Treasury Department regulations (including Treasury Decisions), but are published to
provide precedents to be used in the disposition of other cases, and may be cited and relied
upon for that purpose."). This different status may be attributable to the fact that Revenue
Rulings are generally issued without the benefit of public comment and review, which typi-
cally occurs prior to the promulgation of regulations. See Bous I. Bimcan & LAWREN E
LoKcKE, 4 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INcoME, EsTATES AND Gn's 110.5.1 (2d ed. 1992);
SALTzhiAN, supra note 184, at [ 3.03.
191 See Galler, supra note 163; Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings:
Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 Omo ST. LJ. 1037 (1995).
192 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased
Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings, 57 Omo ST. L.J. 637 (1996).
193 See generally Cohen & Harrington, supra note 171, at 690:
Cases decided subsequent to [Dixon v. Commissioner, 381 U.S. 68 (1965)] have
generally upheld the authority of the Commissioner to revoke or modify a Revenue
Ruling or acquiescence retroactively to correct a "mistake of law." The result is the
same even where the taxpayer has acted in reliance on an erroneous Revenue Ruling.
However, abuse of discretion may be found where the retroactive withdrawal or
modification has an inordinately harsh effect. Also, abuse of discretion may be
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As noted above, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 apparently leaves
unchanged the Commissioner's power to revoke or modify Revenue Rul-
ings on a retroactive basis. 194 Granting such flexibility to the Service
may be justified in part because of the relatively weak legal status of the
Revenue Ruling. In this context, taxpayers are effectively on notice that
a Revenue Ruling is potentially unreliable.' 95 Moreover, a contrary rule,
which did not allow retroactive corrections of mistakes in law, might
have a chilling effect on the issuance of guidance.' 96
Despite notice of unreliability, retroactive revocation or modifica-
tion of Revenue Rulings is troubling from a Rule of Law perspective. If
Revenue Rulings are intended to affect administration and compliance
efforts, then retroactive modification of their terms creates an environ-
ment of instability, as well as the potential for unequal treatment of those
engaged in similar transactions during the same tax years. As a practical
matter, such treatment is likely to be just as troubling to a taxpayer as a
retroactive statutory change. The erosion of taxpayer confidence in, and
respect for, a tax system that permits the government to change positions
after inducing reliance should be considered in evaluating discretion's
role in the effective enforcement of the tax laws.' 97 Pragmatically, the
Service has exercised considerable constraint in using such authority.' 98
Nevertheless, continued recognition of legal authority to impose retroac-
found where the retroactive withdrawal or modification creates a distinction between
taxpayers that has no rational basis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
194 See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (1997).
195 See Dixon, 381 U.S. at 76 ('The absence of notice does not prove an abuse, since...
petitioners were not justified in relying on the acquiescence as precluding correction of the
underlying mistake of law and the retroactive application of the correct law to their case.
Since no reliance was warranted, no notice was required.").
196 See generally Meadows & Dobrovir, supra note 184.
197 See Cohen & Harrington, supra note 171, at 695-96:
[Tihe resulting inequity and the consequent erosion of public confidence in the ad-
ministration of the tax law may pose a greater threat to effective enforcement than
would occasional estoppel [of the Commissioner] based on mistake of law. The
force of the pragmatic argument is strengthened at a time when it is generally
thought necessary to defuse a growing sense of public frustration with the admiuis-
tration of the tax law.
Id. Cf William H. Caudill, Ninth Circuit Invalidates Anti-Abuse Rule; Is Reg. 1.701-2 Simi-
larly Flawed?, 83 J. TAX'N 380, 381 (1995) ("Unclear, subjective anti-abuse rules tend to
erode the confidence the broad taxpaying public has for the tax laws as a whole.").
198 See Cohen & Harrington, supra note 171, at 700-01 (citing opposition to Taxpayer
Bill of Rights 2 by ABA Tax Section and New York State Bar Association based on belief that
IRS reasonably and appropriately administered retroactive power). In addition, the New York
State Bar Association argued that retroactive regulations served as a significant constraint
against taxpayers who take the most aggressive positions. Id. at 701.
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tive change remains a troubling source for potential erosion of Rule of
Law values.199
3. Enforcement Discretion
Rules of general application ensure that a rulemaker choosing to
impose retroactive changes must contemplate their potential impact on
all affected taxpayers, thus reducing, but not eliminating, the possibility
of changes that are invidiously directed toward particular taxpayers. 200
Discretion in applying rules to particular taxpayers potentially threatens
Rule of Law values associated with planning and reliance upon rules, 20'
as well as related values of equality, consistency, and impersonal
justice.20 2
Judicial review provides protection from enforcement discretion,
but the level of protection varies based on the extent to which the Com-
missioner's discretion is bounded by rule-like proscriptions. When the
Commissioner is applying a rule, courts may determine whether the rule
is applicable, and if so, whether it has been applied correctly-or at least
falls within the boundaries of reasonable interpretation that are consistent
with deferential standards of review.20 3
The Commissioner has recently attempted to circumvent the con-
straining power of rules by promulgating regulations that assert her au-
thority to contravene rule-based limitations when necessary to serve
199 See id, at 699 (quoting testimony from hearings in connection with the Taxpayer Bill
of Rights 2 that "retroactive application of adverse rules and regulations can undermine the
integrity of the tax system and taxpayer confidence in the fairness of the system.").
200 It should be noted that some federal tax provisions, usually found outside the Code,
may be viewed as specifically targeted toward providing special benefits to particular taxpay-
ers. Many transition rules are of this sort. For example, see Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 801(d)(4),
which essentially provides an exception from limitations on the cash method that were other-
wise enacted in I.R.C. § 448 for certain taxpayers:
Each member of an affiliated group of corporations... shall be allowed to use the
cash receipts and disbursement s method of accounting for any trade or business of
providing engineering services with respect to taxable years ending after December
31, 1986, if the common parent of such group:
(A) was incorporated in the State of Delaware in 1970,
(B) was the successor to a corporation that was incorporated in the State of llinois in
1949, and
(C) used a method of accounting for long-term contracts of accounting for a substan-
tial part of its income from the performance of engineering services.
Ld. Although arguably framed in general terms, it is difficult to believe that this provision was
not targeted to a particular taxpayer.
201 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 1, at 151-52 (noting that Dicey and Hayek both feared
the broad discretion given to administrative agencies).
202 See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REy. 651,
681 (1995); Scalia, supra note 32, at 1178.
203 See Scalia, supra note 32, at 1177.
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broader considerations of legislative purpose.204 However, the Code it-
self reflects a longstanding tradition of deferring to the Commissioner's
enforcement discretion, rather than prescribing rule-like boundaries, in
certain areas.205 The Commissioner's authority under section 446 of the
Code to determine whether methods of accounting "clearly reflect in-
come" is a prominent example of delegated discretionary authority with a
controversial history of judicial application. As discussed below, the
prospect of achieving determinacy through clear reflection jurisprudence
is doubtful, but rule-based approaches can reinforce Rule of Law values
in this area.
III. THE COMMISSIONER's "CLEAR REFLECTION"
AUTHORITY
Federal income tax is only assessed against that portion of income
meeting the statutory definition of "taxable income. '20 6 'Taxable in-
come" is, in turn, defined in relation to other provisions in the Code.20 7
The Code does not adopt a single theoretical benchmark for measuring
taxable income, and this lack of consensus is understandable, given that
economic and accounting disciplines tolerate considerable variation in
204 An example of this controversial practice is found in the so-called "partnership anti-
abuse rules" in Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (1997). See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, Controversial
Partnership Anti-Abuse Prop. Regs. Raise Many Questions, 81 J. TAX'N 68 (1994); J.D. Dell,
The Proposed Partnership Anti-Abuse Regulations-Prudent Tax Policy or Partnership Para-
noia?, 21 J. REAL. EST. TAX'N 3 (1994). The final version of these regulations states in part:
The provisions of subchapter K and the regulations thereunder must be applied in a
manner that is consistent with the intent of subchapter K as set forth in paragraph (a)
of this section (intent of subchapter K). Accordingly, if a partnership is formed or
availed of in connection with a transaction a principal purpose of which is to reduce
substantially the present value of the partners' aggregate federal tax liability in a
manner that is inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K, the Commissioner can
recast the transaction for federal tax purposes, as appropriate to achieve tax results
that are consistent with the intent of subchapter K, in light of the applicable statutory
and regulatory provisions and the pertinent facts and circumstances.
Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) (1997). The regulations expressly provide this authority applies
"even though the transaction may fall within the literal words of a particular statutory or regu-
latory provision." 1d. Whether this approach is valid is questionable, as the Ninth Circuit held
that a similar anti-abuse provision under timber depletion regulations was invalid. See gener-
ally Caudill, supra note 197, at 380-81 (discussing RLC Indus. v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 413
(9th Cir. 1995), which upheld a taxpayer challenge to Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3(d)(5)). RLC In-
dustries is discussed infra notes 339-357 and accompanying text.
205 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482 (1997) (discretionary authority to allocate income and deduc-
tions among taxpayers if "necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect
the income"); I.R.C. § 446 (1997) (discretion governing determination of whether accounting
method will "clearly reflect income").
206 See I.R.C. § 1 (1997) (imposing tax on individual "taxable income"); I.R.C. § 11
(1997) (imposing tax on corporate "taxable income").
207 See I.R.C. § 63 (1997) (defining taxable income as gross income minus deductions
allowed by chapter 1 of Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code).
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measuring income. 20 8 Even if there was consensus, tax systems ulti-
mately have a practical orientation, which includes generating revenue in
an administratively feasible and politically palatable manner.209 The cur-
rent tax system also seeks to accomplish numerous other policy goals
apart from raising revenue, which tends to detract from its theoretical
purity.210
The annual accounting concept injects added complexity into the
process of measuring taxable income, as many aspects of income and
expense do not fit neatly into an annual accounting cycle.2 11 Methods of
accounting are used to determine when items of income and expense are
taken into account for tax purposes, and section 446 of the Code gener-
ally allows taxpayers to choose their own methods of accounting, 21 2 sub-
208 For example, among economic measures, the Haig-Simons model is perhaps the most
widely used in defining personal income. The Haig-Simons model defines personal income as
"the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the
change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period
in question." J.B. McCombs, An Historical Review and Analysis of Early United States Tax
Policy Scholarship: Definition of Income and Progressive Rates, 64 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 471
(1990) (quoting H. Simons, PERSONAL INcOME TAXATION 50 (1938)). This approach bears the
disadvantage of considerable indeterminacy. See Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46
TAX L. REV. 45, 46 (1990) ("Despite its wide acceptance, Haig-Simons income remains elu-
sive and ambiguous, since the terms 'consumption' and 'accumulation' are open ended.").
Thuronyi also points out that Haig-Simons is incomplete, as compared with the neoclassical
approach to income, which includes such items as "leisure" and "public goods" in the income
measure. Id. With respect to economic measures of income generally, Thuronyi observes:
[Tihe term 'economic income' ... is commonly employed as if it were a relatively
well-defined or well-understood concept. The fact that some use economic income
as a workable concept while others question its validity suggests the that nature of
the concept is not well understood and has not been fully explored, despite the inor-
dinate volume of literature on the subject." The variability of measures of income
accepted in accounting is also well-established.
Id. See also Thor Power Tool v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 544 (1978) ("Accountants have
long recognized that 'generally accepted actounting principles' are far from being a canonical
set of rules that will ensure identical accounting treatment of identical transactions.") (footnote
omitted).
209 See John S. Nolan, The Merit of an Income Tax Versus A Consumption Tax, 12 AM J.
TAX POL'Y 207, 210 (1995). As Nolan points out, "[t]he U.S. income tax is not, of course, a
'pure' income tax." Political and administrative constraints on Haig-Simons are well recog-
nized. See McComb, supra, note 208. For example, the realization concept generally prevents
the change in market value of assets from being taken into account for tax purposes, and
imputed income from the use of property or from services of family members is outside the tax
base. See generally Chirelstein, supra note 136, at 22-25, 72-74 (discussing imputed income
and realization).
210 As the Second Circuit once observed: "The tax laws are such a hodgepodge of excep-
tions, qualifications, special interests and sometimes logically inconsistent treatment that they
cannot be treated as symmetrical exegesis." Burke v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 768, 772 n.7
(2d Cir. 1976). This view of tax law would appear to be at odds with those who argue for an
interpretive approach based on the "structure" or "purpose' of tax law.
211 See generally SErmmN F. GERmzmAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING 12.01-.02 (2d ed.
1993).
212 See I.R.C. § 446(a) (1997).
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ject to the Commissioner's determination that the chosen method will
"clearly reflect income. '2 13
Those seeking to ascribe meaning to the "clear reflection" concept
as a limitation on the Commissioner's discretionary authority encounter a
conundrum: how can ond know if the "reflection" is "clear" when the
"image" of "income" is not clearly "focused"? As a leading treatise
points out:
The statutory phrase [i.e., "clearly reflect income"] is not
only hopelessly vague but circular to boot, since the "in-
come" that must be clearly reflected by the taxpayer's
accounting method is taxable income, not financial, eco-
nomic, or any other variety of income. In short, income
is clearly reflected by an accounting method if the ulti-
mate result of using the method is taxable income.2 14
Case law reflects the difficulty of the quest to give meaning to this con-
cept. The statutory framework and some illustrative cases are discussed
below.
A. SEMCION 446: DISCRETION GOVERNING AccouNTING METHODS
Section 446 of the Code is the principal locus of the Commis-
sioner's "clear reflection" authority and a key provision governing the
adoption of, and changes in, methods of accounting. The Code does not
provide a comprehensive definition of methods of accounting or the
items of income or expense to which they apply. However, regulations
do make clear that methods include not only the overall approach for
taking into account revenue and expenses (such as the cash method or an
accrual method), but also the specific approach used for particular items
of income or expense. 15 Moreover, the method concept is inextricably
linked with matters of timing, as opposed to characterization, as the fol-
lowing guidance indicates:
A material item is any item that involves the proper time
for the inclusion of the item in income or the taking of
the item as a deduction. In determining whether a tax-
payer's accounting practice for an item involves timing,
generally the relevant question is whether the practice
permanently changes the amount of the taxpayer's life-
time income. If the practice does not permanently affect
the taxpayer's lifetime income, but does or could change
213 See I.R.C. § 446(b) (1997).
214 BnMrrER & LoKEN , supra note 190, at 105.1.4 (footnote omitted).
215 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(1) (1997).
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the taxable year in which income is reported, it involves
timing and is therefore a method of accounting.216
Section 446(a) provides the general rule that "[t]axable income shall
be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of which the
taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books. '217 This
provision imposes the so-called "book conformity" requirement-i.e.,
that taxpayers generally must compute their taxable income in accord-
ance with the method in which they keep their books.218 This provision
also implies two other points, which are important to understanding the
clear reflection requirement.
First, more than one method of accounting is often appropriate.
Regulations provide in part that "no uniform method of accounting can
be prescribed for all taxpayers. Each taxpayer shall adopt such forms
and systems as are, in his judgment, best suited to his needs. 219 Second,
the taxpayer-not the government-is initially empowered to choose
among available methods, which are not otherwise proscribed by law.220
Section 446(a) thus respects taxpayer discretion in choosing methods,
suggesting a practical orientation towards adapting tax accounting meth-
ods to the taxpayer's business and financial accounting environment.
Taxpayers measure various items of income and expense for pur-
poses other than tax reporting, and financial accounting methods are
216 Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-1 C.B. 681. The Service sometimes uses other terms, such as
"submethods of accounting" to refer to more particularized descriptions of accounting meth-
ods. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 98-1, 1998-1 I.R.B. 7 ("If two or more items or sub-methods of
accounting are interrelated, the national office ordinarily will not issue a letter ruling on a
change in accounting method involving only one of the items or sub-methods."); id. at 55
(clarifying that separate user fees apply to "a request for change in accounting method that
involves several unrelated items or submethods of accounting.").
217 I.R.C. § 446(a) (1997).
218 See generally GERTzMAN, supra note 211, at 2.02[l]. As Gertzman explains, the
book conformity requirement "does not prevent a taxpayer from using a nonbook method for
reporting particular items of income or expense if such nonconforming method is otherwise
required or permitted." Id. Gertzman also points out that the permitted use of certain non-
book methods "seems obvious from the fact that many methods of accounting for tax purposes
are not generally acceptable for financial accounting and reporting purposes (e.g., the cash and
installment methods) or were established soleley for tax purposes (e.g., methods of tax depre-
ciation.)." Id. at n.15.
219 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1997). The regulations describe the taxpayer's choices as
including the cash method, an accrual method, other methods specifically prescribed in the
Code or regulations, or a combination of these methods. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1997).
220 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(1) (1997):
A taxpayer filing his first return may adopt any permissible method of accounting in
computing taxable income for the taxable year covered by such return. See section
446(c) and paragraph (c) of this section for permissible methods. Moreover, a tax-
payer may adopt any permissible method of accounting in connection with each
separate and distinct trade or business, the income from which is reported for the
first time.
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designed to be adaptable to the needs of particular industries and even
particular enterprises. 22' Allowing taxpayer choice in these matters
tends to reduce the compliance costs and other indirect economic bur-
dens imposed by the tax system. 222 However, the resulting variation in
accounting methods is also likely to produce different measures of taxa-
ble income for particular tax years. Although such differences may even
out over a longer period of transactions, the effect on a particular year's
tax receipts could be significant. 223
Congress and the Treasury have developed specific rules that limit
taxpayer choices of accounting methods.224 In addition to those specific
rules governing methods of accounting, a taxpayer must also satisfy the
Commissioner's discretionary authority under section 446(b), which
states: "If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the tax-
payer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the compu-
tation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the
opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income. 225 Thus, section
446(b) grants authority to the Commissioner to select a method of ac-
counting if the taxpayer fails to adopt a method.226 In addition, the Com-
221 See DONALD E. Kmso & JERRY J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE AccoUNTING 32-50
(7th ed. 1992).
222 On the general nature and magnitude of these costs, see ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN
RABusHKA, THE FLAT TAX 5-19 (2d ed. 1995).
223 See GERTzMAN, supra note 211, at 1.01[2] (demonstrating different income results
from adopting different tax accounting methods). Gertzman also points out that a timing differ-
ence of one year generates tax benefits that exceed the time value of taxes deferred for one
year, which has resulted in heightened scrutiny of tax accounting methods. See id.
224 See generally I.R.C. §§ 446-475 (1997) and related regulations, which govern meth-
ods of accounting. For additional cost capitalization rules with important implications for
methods of accounting, see I.R.C. § 263A (1997) and related regulations.
225 LR.C. § 446(b) (1997).
226 For an example of a taxpayer who had failed to adopt a method of accounting, see
Schouten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-155. Once a method is adopted, the taxpayer
generally must seek permission to change to another method. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-
•l(e)(2)(i) (1997). If an accounting method is changed, section 481 of the Code generally
permits the Government to recompute and adjust taxable income effects from using that
method, even if those effects pertain to years that are closed by the statute of limitations. The
Service has attempted to retain flexibility in defining when methods are adopted, presumably
to protect its authority over method changes and to retain its authority to impose new methods.
See Notice 98-31, which contains the following language in a proposed Revenue Procedure
governing changes in methods of accounting:
Although a method of accounting may exist ... without a pattern of consistent
treatment of an item, a method of accounting is not adopted in most instances with-
out consistent treatment. The treatment of a material item in the same way in deter-
mining gross income or deductions in two or more consecutively filed tax returns
(without regard to any change in status of the method as permissible or impermissi-
ble) represents consistent treatment of that item for purposes of [Treas. Reg.]
§ 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(a). If a taxpayer treats an item properly in the first return that
reflects the item, however, it is not necessary for the taxpayer to treat the item con-
sistently in two or more consecutive tax returns to have adopted a method of
accounting.
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missioner has authority to determine whether a taxpayer's chosen
method does not "clearly reflect income," and upon making such a deter-
mination, to change the taxpayer's method to another method that "does
clearly reflect income."227
Clear reflection authority casts doubt on whether a taxpayer's cho-
sen method, which is not otherwise proscribed by law, will ultimately be
respected. Treasury Regulations under section 446 assert that compli-
ance with the "clear reflection" requirement is always a matter for the
Commissioner's discretion: "[N]o method of accounting is acceptable
unless, in the opinion of the Commissioner, it clearly reflects income. 228
However, the regulations under section 446 provide only limited gui-
dance as to the appropriate criteria for basing such an opinion. For ex-
ample, the regulations state in part:
A method of accounting which reflects the consistent ap-
plication of generally accepted accounting principles in a
particular trade or business in accordance with accepted
conditions or practices in that trade or business will ordi-
narily be regarded as clearly reflecting income, provided
all items of gross income and expense are treated con-
sistently from year to year.2 29
Elsewhere, the regulations also provide the following guidance for
the recognition of income by accrual-method taxpayers: "The method
used by the taxpayer in determining when income is to be accounted for
will generally be acceptable if it accords with generally accepted ac-
counting principles, is consistently used by the taxpayer from year to
year, and is consistent with the Income Tax Regulations. 23 °
These regulations suggest that consistent application of an account-
ing method that complies with generally accepted accounting' principles
("GAAP") and the applicable Treasury regulations should be acceptable.
However, important "hedging" words are included: "ordinarily" and
"generally." Unfortunately, they provide no guidance as to the circum-
stances in which the Commissioner would take exception to a method
that complies with GAAP and the regulations.
The only other set of regulations under section 446 which affirma-
tively seek to provide additional content to the "clear reflection" concept
I.R.S. Notice 98-31, 1998-22 I.R.B. 681.
227 I.R.C. § 446(b) (1997).
228 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1997).
229 Id (emphasis added).
230 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(C) (1997) (emphasis added). It should be noted that
the word "generally" was added to this regulation in 1992. See T.D. 8408 (April 10, 1992), 57
F.R. 12411, 12419. The preamble to these regulations, which implemented the economic per-
formance rules of I.R.C. § 461(h), did not explain the reason for this change.
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are the regulations governing hedging transactions. 231 These regulations
provide in part:
The method of accounting used by a taxpayer for a hedg-
ing transaction must clearly reflect income. To clearly
reflect income, the method used must reasonably match
the timing of income, deduction, gain, or loss from the
hedging transaction with the timing of income, deduc-
tion, gain, or loss from the item or items being hedged.
Taking gains or losses into account in the period in
which they are realized may clearly reflect income in the
case of certain hedging transactions. For example,
where a hedge and the item being hedged are disposed of
in the same taxable year, taking realized gain or loss into
account on both items in that taxable year may clearly
reflect income. In the case of many transactions, how-
ever, taking gains and losses into account as they are re-
alized does not result in the matching required by this
section.232
These "hedging" regulations also contain appropriate "hedging" lan-
guage. The regulations suggest that the matching requirement in this
context is quite fluid and only the Commissioner has authority to deter-
mine when it is satisfied.
Section 446 is not the only provision that invokes the "clear reflec-
tion" requirement. Section 471(a), which provides the general rule for
inventories, invokes a similar concept:
Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary the use of
inventories is necessary in order clearly to determine the
income of any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by
such taxpayer on such basis as the Secretary may pre-
scribe as conforming as nearly as may be to the best ac-
counting practice in the trade or business and as most
clearly reflecting tie income.233
231 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4 (1997).
232 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-4(b) (1997). Arguably, a matching principle is also inherent in
the capitalization requirement that is one of the "essential features" of taxpayer records. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(ii) (1997). However, as will be discussed below, this matching
principle is quite fluid, and it is not uniformly applied throughout the Code. Many instances of
mismatching are both tolerated and prescribed in the Code, making this a difficult principle to
apply in constraining the Commissioner's discretion.
233 I.R.C. § 471(a) (1997). Note that this provision requires conformity to the "best ac-
counting practice", and it also expands the Commissioner's discretion to determine that
method which "most clearly reflects income." The latter requirement suggests that clear re-
flection authority under section 471 may exceed that under 446. This distinction, however, is
often ignored. See GERTZMAN, supra note 211, 6.04[l][b][ii], at 6-10.
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Section 482 provides in part that the Secretary is empowered to allocate
tax attributes among related taxpayers if "necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income."234 More than forty
other regulations refer to a "clear reflection" concept in some form.235
Thus, the scope of clear reflection authority presents a broad-based prob-
lem in tax law with a significant impact on tax administration.
B. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO "CLEAR REFLECTION" IssUES
Courts evaluating the parameters of the "clear reflection" concept
under section 446 generally defer to the Commissioner's determination
as to "clear reflection" and her prescription of an alternative method.
Nevertheless, the Commissioner's clear reflection authority is not unlim-
ited, as courts sometimes find in the taxpayer's favor. As discussed be-
low, an abuse of discretion standard has emerged as the judicial basis for
evaluating clear reflection authority. The persistence of taxpayer choice
among methods has contributed to the difficulty in applying this stan-
dard, as no single method can be adopted as a benchmark for others. The
constraints on the Commissioner's authority that have emerged lack rule-
like clarity.
1. Abuse of Discretion Standard
The Commissioner's authority under section 446(b) potentially in-
volves two different determinations: (1) whether the taxpayer's chosen
method of accounting clearly reflects income; and (2) if not, assigning an
alternative method that does clearly reflect income. From the face of the
statute, one might argue that only the second determination-assigning
an alternative method of accounting-is a matter clearly left to the "opin-
ion of the Secretary." However, regulations take the position that the
Commissioner's discretion extends to both determinations.2 36 Courts
234 I.R.C. § 482 (1997).
235 A Lmaxs search of the CFR database as of August 20, 1998 produced forty-seven
regulations that contain the following search terms: "Title(26) and proper or properly or clear
or clearly w/s reflect! w/s income". These regulations include the partnership anti-abuse regu-
lation discussed above, which requires, with certain exceptions, that "the tax consequences
under subchapter K to each partner of partnership operations and of transactions between the
partner and the partnership must accurately reflect the partner's economic agreement and
clearly reflect the partner's income (collectively, property reflection of income).' Treas. Reg.
§ 1.701-2(a) (1997). This anti-abuse regulation reiterates that the Commissioner may deter-
mine that: "[t]he methods of accounting used by the partnership or a partner should be adjusted
to reflect clearly the partnership's or the partner's income." Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b)(3)
(1997).
236 See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (1997).
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have generally agreed, applying an abuse of discretion approach in both
situations.237
The Supreme Court has long favored deference to the Commis-
sioner's clear reflection authority. According to the Court, "[t]he Com-
missioner has broad powers in determining whether accounting methods
used by a taxpayer clearly reflect income. '238 Consequently, "[the Com-
missioner's] interpretation of the statute's clear-reflection standard
should not be interfered with unless clearly unlawful" 239 or "plainly arbi-
trary."240 The taxpayer bears a "heavy burden" to show unlawful or arbi-
trary action,241 which exceeds the burden that taxpayers otherwise bear
in tax litigation, i.e., to overcome the presumption of correctness that
237 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Asphalt Products, Inc., 796 F.2d 843, 847 (6th Cir. 1986),
rev'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 117 (1987). The Court of Federal Claims briefly departed
from this approach in Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 138 (1996), and Mulhol-
land v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 320 (1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir.1994) (Table), in
which the Court treated the Commissioner's determination as to whether the taxpayer's
method clearly reflects income as a matter for de novo review. In Dana Corp. v. United States,
38 Fed. Cl. 356, 363 n.3. (1997), the Court later clarified that this approach was not appropri-
ate, as the Commissioner's discretion extends to both determinations. Further, in Connecticut
Yankee Atomic Power Company v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 721 (1997), the Court suggested
that de novo review was limited to those situations in which the Commissioner did not chal-
lenge the taxpayer's selection of a method.
238 United States v. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. 593, 603 (1986) (quoting Commissioner
v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 467, 79 S. Ct. 1270, 1282, 3 L.Ed.2d 1360 (1959)). See also Thor
Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532 (1979); American Automobile Assn. v.
United States, 367 U.S. 687, 697-98 (1961).
239 Thor Power Tool Co., 439 U.S. at 532-33 (quotations omitted). See also United States
v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102 (1966); Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 133-134 (1963);
American Automobile Assn., 367 U.S. at 697-98 (1961); Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 189-90 (1957); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 203 (1934);
Lucas v. Structural Steel Co., 281 U.S. 264, 271 (1930).
240 Thor Power Tool Co., 439 U.S. at 533.
241 Md See also Asphalt Products Co. v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 843, 848 (6th Cir.1986),
aff'g in part and rev'g in part, Akers v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1984-208, rev'd on other
grounds, 482 U.S. 117 (1987) (per curiam), which stated in part:
§ 446 gives the Commissioner discretion with respect to two determinations. The
Commissioner first determines whether the accounting method chosen by a taxpayer
clearly reflects income. If the Commissioner concludes that the taxpayer's chosen
method does not meet this standard, he has the further discretion to require that
computations be made under the method which, in his opinion, does clearly reflect
income. It would be difficult to describe administrative discretion in broader terms.
ld at 847. Asphalt Products also suggests that a taxpayer could sustain its burden by showing
that the alternative method chosen by the Commissioner does not clearly reflect income. See
id. Courts have rejected the Commissioner's change of a taxpayer's accounting method from
an incorrect method to another incorrect method. See Harden v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 418,
421 (10th Cir.1955), rev'g 21 T.C. 781 (1954); Prabel v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1101, 1112
(1988), affd 882 F.2d 820 (3d Cir.1989). See also Southern California Say. & Loan v. Com-
missioner, 95 T.C. 35, 44 (1990) (Wells, J., concurring) ("Section 446(b) authorizes respon-
dent to require accounting changes that produce clearer reflections of income, not greater
distortions of income."); Kroger Co. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1637 (1997).
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attaches to the Commissioner's determinations in Tax Court,242 or to
prove an overpayment of tax in refund litigation.24 3 However, the nature
of proof required to sustain this burden is far from clear.
To the extent that the "income" being "reflected" is "taxable in-
come," and "taxable income" is a product of applying the Code and Reg-
ulations to particular facts, then compliance with the Code and
Regulations should arguably provide a conclusive basis for satisfaction
of the "clear reflection" requirement.244 However, this has not proved
true. Compliance with the Code and Regulations is a relevant factor, but
courts are also willing to take into account other facts and circumstances
in determining whether a taxpayer's method clearly reflects income.245
Moreover, the likelihood of sustaining the taxpayer's method seems to
increase with the particularity of the method described and authorized by
the Code or regulations. As discussed below, however, even this point is
not entirely free from doubt.
2. Taxpayer Choice Among Methods
As noted above, section 446(c) specifically allows taxpayers to
choose among overall accounting methods, including the cash method,
accrual methods, or other hybrid methods.246 Taxpayer choice emerged
early in the modem income tax era, and it has persisted in some form
ever since. The income tax enacted in 1913 originally required the ac-
crual method for income, but cash method accounting for expenses, with
the exception of farmers, who were permitted to use the cash method for
both income and expenses.247 Regulations promulgated in 1914 allowed
242 See, e.g., RLC Indus. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 457, 491 (1992); RECO Indus. v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 912, 920 (1984).
243 See PAULA M. JuNGHANS & JoYcE K. BECKER, FEnERA. TAX LITIGATION 18.02[1]
(2d ed. 1992) (explaining the "double burden of proof' on taxpayers in refund litigation: prov-
ing the Service's assessment is erroneous and that the taxpayer is entitled to a refund).
244 Some courts have made statements to this effect. See, e.g., Fidelity Assoc., Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C.M. 1992-142 ("Respondent may not reject, as not providing a clear reflec-
tion of income, a method of accounting employed by the taxpayer which is specifically author-
ized by the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury regulations and which has been applied on a
consistent basis."); Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 26, 31 (1988) ("Respon-
dent's broad authority to determine whether a taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflects
income is limited, in that he may not reject, as not providing a clear reflection of income, a
method of accounting employed by the taxpayer which is specifically authorized in the Code
or regulations and has been applied on a consistent basis.").
245 Several factors have been considered, including: (1) compliance with GAAP; (2) prin-
ciples of matching income and expenses; (3) industry customs and practices; and (4) compar-
ing results with those under other methods of accounting. See generally RLC Indus. v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 457 (1992); Gm rzMAN, supra note 211, at 2.02[2].
246 See I.R.C. § 446(c) (1997).
247 See Donald Schapiro, Prepayments and Distortion of Income Under Cash Basis Tax
Accounting, 30 TAX L. Rv. 117, 129-31 (1975). There has been some confusion as to the
requirements of the early forms of the income tax. For example, Gertzman indicates that the
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accrual basis deductions for business expenses,248 followed by the Reve-
nue Act of 1916 which expressly allowed both the cash or accrual meth-
ods for all taxpayers, provided that such method clearly reflected
income24 9
The fact that the Code permits variation in accounting methods,
rather than adopting a single model as an ideal for tax purposes, has
magnified the scope and difficulty of clear reflection controversies 50
This problem was aptly described in Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v.
United States:2-'
[The cash and accrual methods] are the two most com-
mon accounting methods and could be said to emblem-
ize the polar nature of the human spirit. The cash
method-simple, plodding, elemental-stands firmly in
the physical realm. It responds only through the physi-
cal senses, recognizing only the tangible flow of cur-
rency. Money is income when this raw beast actually
feels the coins in its primal paw; expenditures are made
only when the beast can see that it has given the coins
away.
1913 Act had originally contemplated the cash method, and that the Revenue Act of 1916 was
the first act that specifically authorized a method other than the cash method. See GaizrMAN,
supra note 211, at 2.02[1][a]; 3.02. Schapiro explains the origin of such a view of the 1913
Act to Law Opinion 1059, 1921 C.B. 147, which erroneously stated that the Revenue Act of
1916 was the first time that any method other than the cash method was allowed. See
Schapiro, supra at 134. As Schapiro points out, the 1913 Act imposed tax on income "arising
or accruing" from all sources. See id. at 139 n.35.
248 Schapiro, supra note 247, at 129 n.36.
249 Id. at 132-42. Schapiro points out that sections 8(g) and 13(d) of the 1916 Act
provided:
[A taxpayer] keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and
disbursements, unless such basis does not clearly reflect his [or its] income, may,
subject to regulations made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the ap-
proval of the Secretary of the Treasury, make his return upon the basis upon which
his accounts are kept, in which case the tax shall be computed upon his [or its]
income.
Id. at 132 n.45 (quoting the act). Although this could be viewed as limiting the clear reflection
requirement to methods other than the cash method, Schapiro points out that the Ways and
Means Committee report made it clear that both cash and accrual methods were subject to the
clear reflection requirement, as that report states in part:
Present law requires that the income tax shall be levied on the accrued basis. As two
systems of bookkeeping are in use in the United States, one based on the cash or
receipt basis and the other on the accrual basis, it was deemed advisable to provided
in the proposed measure that an individual or corporation may make return of in-
come on either the cash or accrued basis, if the basis selected clearly reflects income.
L at 133 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 64-922 (1916)).
250 See Schapiro, supra note 247, at 117-19.
251 743 F.2d 781 (11th Cir. 1984).
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The accrual method, however, moves in a more
ethereal, mystical realm. The visionary prophet, it rec-
ognizes the impact of the future on the present, and with
grave foreboding or ecstatic anticipation, announces the
world to be. When it becomes sure enough of its prophe-
cies, it actually conducts life as if the new age has al-
ready come to pass. Transactions producing income or
deductions spring to life in the eyes of the seer though
nary a dollar has moved.
The Internal Revenue Code, the ultimate arbiter,
stands to the side, shifting its eyes uneasily from the one
being to the other. The Code is possessed of great wis-
dom and tolerance. It knows that man must generally
choose his own way. Therefore, it leaves to the Tax-
payer the original choice of which accounting method to
use ....
Yet the Code also understands that either extreme
possesses inherent weaknesses and can become blinded
to reality. Thus the Code and subsequent Treasury Reg-
ulations empower the Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to cure the blindness.
Section 446(b) of the Code provides that if the method
used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of
taxable income shall be made under such method as, in
the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect
income.252
As the Knight-Ridder court also points out, the Code provides an
inadequate foundation for limiting the Commissioner's clear reflection
authority in this context:
Of course, in deciding whether the Commissioner has
abused his discretion, we immediately face an age-old
philosopher's dilemma: how can we mere mortals know
who sees the truth most vividly? How can we know
whether the primal cash method or the mystical accrual
method sees income more clearly without knowing what
income really is? If it is really cash on hand, then the
cash method is more accurate. If it is really fixed obliga-
tions, then the accrual method is more accurate. By em-
bracing both conceptions, the Code provides no general
baseline against which to assess the accuracy of an ac-
counting method. In effect, we risk being led in circular
252 Id. at 787-88.
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fashion to arbitrarily choose one method as accurately
reflecting income. When another method differs from it,
that other must not clearly reflect income.253
As discussed below, courts have nevertheless struggled to provide a pre-
dictable basis for decisions regarding clear reflection, with only limited
success.
3. Cash Method "Distortion"
Controversies affecting cash method taxpayers sometimes involve
eligibility for the cash method, an issue which can be resolved by refer-
ence to particular Code provisions that restrict the use of the cash
method.254 For example, section 471 and its applicable regulations effec-
tively require accrual method accounting with respect to the purchase
and sale of merchandise inventories. 255 In this context, eligibility for the
cash method turns on the existence of merchandise inventories as an in-
come-producing factor in the taxpayer's business. 256 Thus, the Commis-
sioner's enforcement discretion to require an accrual method is subject to
a rule-like constraint, as the Code and regulations provide an accessible
standard for evaluating whether the taxpayer's method complies with
those provisions.
However, the role of discretion in applying that standard is still con-
troversial. If compliance with the Code or regulations involves a matter
of interpretation, then the proper extent of the deference that should be
accorded to the Commissioner's interpretation is disputed. For example,
if the appropriateness of the cash method turns on the existence of mer-
253 Id. at 788.
254 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 447, 448, 471 (1997).
255 I.R.C. § 471(a) (1997) states:
Whenever in the opinion of the Secretary the use of inventories is necessary in order
clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, inventories shall be taken by such
taxpayer on such basis as the Secretary may prescribe as conforming as nearly as
may be to the best accounting practice in the trade or business and as most clearly
reflecting the income.
Id. Regulations provide in part that "[i]n order to reflect taxable income correctly, inventories
at the beginning and end of each taxable year are necessary in every case in which the produc-
tion, purchase, or sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor." Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1
(1997). Regulations also provide, however, that "the Commissioner may authorize a taxpayer
to continue the use of a method of accounting consistently used by the taxpayer, even though
not specifically authorized by the regulations in this part, if, in the opinion of the Commis-
sioner, income is clearly reflected by the use of such method." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(ii)
(1997). Courts may allow taxpayers with inventories to continue using the cash method if they
can prove that the cash method produces a "substantial identity of results" with the accrual
method. See Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352 (Ist Cir. 1970); Asphalt
Products Inc. v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 843, 849 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds,
482 U.S. 117 (1987); Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367, 377
(1995); Thompson Electric v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2328 (1995).
256 See Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1997).
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chandise inventories, should a court faced with the question of whether
such inventories exist defer to the Commissioner's interpretation of that
term? Recent decisions take the position that definitional questions re-
garding the scope of merchandise inventories are well within the ken of
the judiciary and note that deference to the Commissioner on the exist-
ence of inventory is arguably unnecessary and inappropriate 5 7 How-
ever, some commentators have asserted that an abuse of discretion
standard should apply in this context, arguing that deference to the Com-
missioner's interpretation is appropriate in light of the Commissioner's
perceived expertise in enforcing the tax laws.25 8
When a taxpayer's use of the cash method violates applicable provi-
sions of the Code or Regulations, clear reflection authority is at its apex
because it is supported by the rules that prescribe parameters for taxpayer
behavior. Nevertheless, courts have allowed cash method taxpayers with
inventories to prevail against the Commissioner's clear reflection author-
ity by demonstrating that their noncomplying method produces a "sub-
stantial identity of results" with the Commissioner's preferred method.259
Courts using the "substantial identity of results" approach to uphold
the taxpayer's use of a noncomplying method may effectuate the princi-
ple that "the law cares not for trifles. '260 However, such an approach
may be short-sighted: a limited disparity in current-year income mea-
surement does not ensure against future understatements in tax liability
as a consequence of failing to use the accrual method. Continued use of
noncomplying methods presents a risk of future harm to the public fise,
which given limited resources for monitoring and enforcement, might go
undetected.
The risk may be justified by the desire to avoid wasteful expendi-
tures for accounting systems and personnel, which the taxpayer might
have to absorb if forced to change to an accrual method. From the tax-
payer's perspective, these costs are functionally equivalent to a tax, as
they represent a required commitment of resources to comply with a gov-
257 See, e.g., Hewlett Packard Co. v. United States, 71 F.3d 398, 403 (Fed. Cir. 1995);
Honeywell Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 437 (1992) (concluding that "rotable"
parts were capital assets, not inventory, despite Commissioner's contentions to the contrary).
Cf. RLC Indus. v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding facts and applying
regulations to those facts is judicial function for which Commissioner's discretion is not
appropriate).
258 See W. Eugene Seago, Clear Reflection of Income Under Section 446(b), 62 TAX
NoT-s 355 (1994) (arguing that the same abuse of discretion standard should apply to ques-
tions of law, such as the existence of merchandise inventories).
259 See Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781 (1lth Cir. 1984).
260 See Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231
(1992) ("[T]he venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex ('the law cares not for trifles') is
part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are
adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept." ).
506 CoRNBLL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:445
ernment mandate. However, if additional tax liabilities do not arise in
future years, this required expenditure is wasteful, generating no direct
benefits for either the taxpayer or the government.
The decided cases do not expressly state this justification, but if it is
the animating principle behind the "substantial identity of results" ap-
proach, it raises challenging policy questions. For example, should our
tax system be administered so that compliance with the rules is not re-
quired if the costs outweigh the benefits in each particular case? In other
words, is a cost-benefit analysis an appropriate consideration in deter-
mining whether tax rules must be followed? If so, should that analysis
take into account each taxpayer's cost structures? One might prefer to
grant discretion to override the applicable rules if it means achieving a
pareto superior result.261 However, such a preference presupposes that
discretion would not inject additional costs into other cases, thus off-
seting this benefit.262 Further, it presupposes that discretion will be ad-
ministered fairly and consistently, so as not to benefit some taxpayers
while burdening their competitors. Although the "substantial identity of
results" doctrine may constrain enforcement discretion in a taxpayer-
friendly manner, departing from the applicable rules on a case-by-case
basis still presents prudential concerns.
Other controversies do not involve eligibility for the cash method,
but instead involve so-called "distortions" arising from application of the
cash method.263 Origins of this authority can be traced to Committee
reports from the Revenue Act of 1924, which suggest that discretionary
authority should be used to address "distortion" from prepaid items that
were properly allocable over multiple periods:
The necessity for [the Commissioner's clear reflection
power] arises in cases in which a taxpayer pays in one
year interest or rental payments or other items for a pe-
riod of years. If he is forced to deduct the amount in the
261 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 54-55 (defining a "Pareto superior" change as one which
"makes at least one person better off and no one worse off.").
262 See id. at 55 ('The condition that no one else be affected by a 'voluntary' transaction
can only rarely be fulfilled.").
263 The term "distortion" is in quotations because it reflects a judgment about the results
of a particular accounting method as compared with an "ideal." Unfortunately, the "ideal" is
difficult to define objectively, given the variation permitted in methods of accounting, and
particularly those concessions to tax administration that are tolerated in the cash method. Cf.
Coverdale, supra note 14, at 1506-07 n.18:
I speak of "what courts consider loopholes" because loopholes are not an objec-
tively defined category. The fact that a provision allows a taxpayer to delay or avoid
tax may be an inadvertent result; an expected, although undesired, effect accepted as
the price of achieving some other result; or a desired result. It is often difficult to see
into which category a particular result falls into.
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year in which paid, it may result in a distortion of his
income which will cause him to pay either more or less
taxes than he properly should.264
In Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner,265 the Supreme Court in-
terpreted this legislative history as indicating that clear reflection power
applies to "distortion" in both cash and accrual methods. The court
stated that clear reflection power:
was intended to take care of fixed liabilities payable in
fixed installments over a series of years. For example, a
tenant would not be compelled to accrue, in the first year
of a lease, the rental liability covering the entire term nor
would he be permitted, if he saw fit to pay all the rent in
advance, to deduct the whole payment as an expense of
the current year. But we think it was not intended to
upset the well understood and consistently applied doc-
trine that cash receipts or matured accounts due on the
one hand, and cash payments or accrued definite obliga-
tions on the other, should not be taken out of the annual
accounting system and, for the benefit of the Govern-
ment or the taxpayer, treated on a basis which is neither
a cash basis nor an accrual basis, because so to do
would, in a given instance, work a supposedly more eq-
uitable result to the Government or to the taxpayer.266
Thus, although the Commissioner's clear reflection authority could affect
the manner in which multi-period obligations are taken into account
under the cash or accrual method, neither the Government nor taxpayers
are vested with power to disrupt the annual accounting concept based
solely on equitable considerations, whatever ihey may be.
The boundary between appropriate exercise of clear reflection
power and inappropriate meddling with the annual accounting concept,
as suggested by Security Flour Mills, is controversial. Determining
whether an expenditure should be treated as a currently deductible "ex-
pense" or as a nondeductible change in the form of investment capital
presents an important conceptual question, which is considered by some
commentators to be at the heart of income tax theory.267 However, prac-
tical considerations also weigh heavily in deciding these issues. The
264 H.R. REP. No. 68-179, at 11 (1924); S. REP. No. 68-398, at 10-11.
265 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
266 Id at 285-86.
267 See e.g., Calvin Johnson, The Illegitimate "Earned" Requirement in Tax and Nontax
Accounting, 50 TAx L. REv. 373, 411 n.126 (1995) (distinguishing prepaid expenses from
capital items); Schapiro, supra note 247, at 122-26, 128 (noting "timeless question of distin-
guishing between income and capital").
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cash method's simplicity and clarity provide benefits for taxpayers and
the government, which could be destroyed by a quest for theoretical
purity.268
Courts have sometimes sought to evaluate "distortion" in this con-
text by reference to matching expenses with the period in which they
generate taxable income, a concept with roots in financial accounting. 269
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, concerns about matching
costs and income provided a basis for enacting limitations on eligibility
for the cash method in section 448:
The Congress believed that the cash method of account-
ing frequently fails to reflect accurately the economic re-
sults of a taxpayer's trade or business over a taxable
year. The cash method of accounting recognizes items
of income and expense based on the taxable year in
which funds are received or disbursed. This may result
in the recognition of income and expense items without
regard to the taxable year in which the economic events
giving rise to the items occurred and a potential mis-
matching of income with related expenses. For these
reasons, the cash method generally is not in accord with
generally accepted accounting principles.270
However, the significance of the matching concept as a guiding
principle for clear reflection in connection with the cash method must be
tempered by the practical recognition that mismatching is an inherent
problem in tax law. Courts have recognized that many Code provisions
fail to match income and expenses in the current period, even under an
accrual method.271 Thus, it is difficult to ascertain when, if ever, mis-
matching should result in a failure to clearly reflect income. For exam-
ple, in Van Raden v. Commissioner,272 the court stated in part:
The cash method of accounting will usually result
in some distortion of income because the benefits de-
rived from payments for expenses or materials extend to
varying degrees into more than one annual accounting
268 See GERTzmAN, supra note 211, at 1 3.01[1] ("[Tihe cash method has characteristics
that often make it desirable for tax reporting purposes: (1) It is comparatively simple to use
and easy to audit; (2) it is imbued with certainty as to the actual realization of income and
expense; and (3) it provides for payment of the tax at the time when the taxpayer is most likely
to have the ability to pay.") (footnote omitted).
269 See Schapiro, supra note 247, at 121.
270 JoiNT CoarNu ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF = TAX REFORM Acr
OF 1986 474 (1987).
271 See, e.g., Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 445, 457
(1982); Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 199, 216-17 (1986).
272 71 T.C. 1083 (1979), aff'd, 650 F.2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1981).
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period. If the cash method is consistently utilized and no
attempt is made to unreasonably prepay expenses or
purchase supplies in advance, the distortion is not mate-
rial and over a period of years the distortions will tend to
cancel out each other.
273
As the Van Raden court suggests, some mismatching is to be expected
under the cash method; only "unreasonabl[e]" mismatching should be
corrected. 274
Using an accrual method as a benchmark for matching under the
cash method is inappropriate, given the fact that the Code permits both
methods. Courts have dismissed the possibility that the cash method
may produce significantly lower tax liability than the accrual method as
an insufficient basis for finding that a taxpayer's method fails to clearly
reflect income.275
Regulations provide some guidance in determining what is "unrea-
sonable" through attempting to prescribe the parameters for expenditures
that must be capitalized: "If an expenditure results in the creation of an
asset having a useful life which extends substantially beyond the close of
the taxable year, such an expenditure may not be deductible, or may be
deductible only in part, for the taxable year in which made." 276 This
language, however, is not sufficiently determinate to generate a clear and
273 Id at 1104. See also Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH)
2319 (1996).
274 Cf. Fidelity Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2327 (1992) (apply-
ing "material distortion" standard for mismatching in accrual context). See also GERz ,
supra note 211, at 3.08[5]:
The inherent mismatching of related items of income and expense under the cash
method (as contrasted with the accrual method) is acknowledged and accepted. It is
not a basis for denial of the cash method. Technical accounting precision is simply
not required. Thus, any inherent mismatching, which is due to the normal applica-
tion of the cash method to the transactions of a taxpayer as they occur in the ordinary
course of business should not be a basis for asserting that the cash method fails to
reflect income clearly.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
275 See Ansley-Shepard-Burgess v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367, 377 (1995) (rejecting
"substantial identity of results" requirement in case not involving inventories). See also RLC
Indus. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 457, 494-95 (1992) (Commissioner can't impose method
based solely on maximizing tax); Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2319 (1996) (rejecting the amount of deferral under cash method vs. accrual method as
basis for authority to change method).
276 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a) (1997). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(4)(ii) (1997) ("Ex-
penditures made during the year shall be properly classified as between capital and expense.
For example, expenditures for such items as plant and equipment, which have a useful life
extending substantially beyond the taxable year, shall be charged to a capital account and not
to an expense account."); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1997) (Capital expenditures include
"[the cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, machinery and equipment,
furniture and fixtures, and similar property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxa-
ble year.").
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consistent understanding of which expenditures can be expensed, or ex-
pensed only in part, during the year.277
Some courts have taken a pragmatic approach to resolving interper-
iod expense allocation problems by invoking a "one-year rule" to deter-
mine whether a prepayment can be expensed.278 Although some
disagreement may exist as to the parameters for a "one-year rule,"2 79 a
rule-based solution effectively narrows the Commissioner's clear reflec-
tion authority by reference to a specific time period. Such an approach
allows mismatching of income and expenses, and recognizes that some
taxpayers may "distort" or "manipulate" their incomes through accelerat-
ing or deferring payments under the cash method. However, the tempo-
ral scope of such "distortion" or "manipulation" is clearly limited, thus
reducing the scope of the Commissioner's discretion and the correspond-
ing number of controversies in this area.
Other guidance as to the parameters of "distortion" under the cash
method has identified facts and circumstances that may be troubling to
the Government, but it hardly rises to the level of a rule. For example, in
Revenue Ruling 79-229, the Service listed "some of the factors" consid-
ered in determining whether a material distortion exists, including "the
useful life of resulting assets during and beyond the taxable year paid,"
"the materiality of the expenditure in relation to the taxpayer's income
for the year," "the purpose for paying in advance", "the customary, legit-
imate business practice of the taxpayer," "the amount of the expenditure
in relation to past purchases and the time of year the expenditure was
made," and "whether the taxes paid by a taxpayer consistently deducting
prepaid... costs over a period of years are reasonably comparable to the
taxes that would have been paid had the same taxpayer consistently not
paid in advance.1280
Motivation is an important factor in the analysis contemplated by
the ruling, as it clearly indicates that tax-motivated payments lacking suf-
ficient business justifications are subject to challenge. 281 However, de-
termining tax liability based on taxpayer motivation, rather than
277 For discussion of the need for guidance under analogous provisions in section 263, see
American Bar Association Section of Taxation Committee on Tax Accounting, Report on
Capitalization Issues Raised Under Sections 162 and 263 by Indopco, Inc. v. Commissioner,
50 TAx LAW. 181 (1996) (discussing need for guidance concerning specific application of law
governing capitalization).
278 See GERTzMAN, supra note 211, at 3.05[1][b] (citing cases).
279 See id.
280 See Rev. Rul. 79-229, 1979-2 C.B. 210.
281 See id. Prior to repeal by section 7721(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989, P.L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, section 6621(c) of the Code permitted the Commis-
sioner to impose a penalty on a "tax motivated transaction," which included "any use of an
accounting method specified in regulations prescribed by the Secretary as a use which may
result in a substantial distortion of income for any period."
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objective rules, creates a tension with the basic idea of planning based on
rules fixed and announced beforehand. As discussed above, structuring
transactions to reduce the total tax burden is not wrong in itself,28 2 and
determining when "abuse" occurs is a challenging and indeterminate pro-
cess. 2s 3 As one leading commentator has noted:
[W]here manipulation occurs in the use of the cash
method (e.g., by accelerating deductions or by deferring
the receipt of income), a valid question exists as to
whether the method clearly reflects income. On one
hand, it is not illogical to argue that such manipulation
prevents the method from clearly reflecting income. On
the other hand, it may reasonably be argued that if a tax-
payer runs the business risks associated with deferring
collections or accelerating payment, the cash method
does clearly reflect the income associated with such
transactions as they actually occurred.284
Congress has reduced the number of clear reflection controversies
and the potential amount of tax deferral permitted under th5 cash method
by enacting rules to limit eligibility for the cash method for many large
corporate taxpayers. 285 However, many taxpayers are still eligible for
the cash method and potentially subject to the Commissioner's clear re-
flection power. Rule-based solutions, such as codification of a one-year
rule to constrain the Commissioner's clear reflection authority, deserve
further attention here.
282 See supra section III.A.
283 See generally Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87
Mtcmi. L. REv. 365 (1988). Professor Rosenberg observes in part:
Many have responded to this apparent dilemma by claiming that tax avoidance ought
to be irrelevant to the determination of tax liability. But the fact remains that the
system is subject to abuse and that avoidance-motivated taxpayers do abuse the sys-
tem. Because the system focuses on transactions rather than on income, and because
those transactions themselves are not always defined in a way that correlates with
their underlying purpose, the system is easily subject to manipulation. Taxpayers
can tailor their conduct in ways that increase the distortions in the system, decrease
their share of tax liability, and produce results that are economically either meaning-
less, or worse, undesirable. Unfortunately, purely legislative correction of the mis-
measurements that create the problems is sometimes impossible, and is always too
late. As long as many of the country's best lawyers continue to be so well paid for
finding and maximizing the mismeasurements that lead to abuse, it is likely that the
lawyers and their clients will almost always remain at least a year or two ahead of
legislators' attempts to close down the mines.
Id. at 444 (footnotes omitted).
284 See GEm mAN, supra note 211, at 3.08[5].
285 For example, the enactment of section 448 was expected to generate more than $2.8
billion in additional tax revenue during the tax years 1987-91. See JOINT CoznIrra ON
TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF rHm TAX Rio~m~ AcT OF 1986 480 (1987).
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Prepayment issues are recurring problems for cash method taxpay-
ers, and the "rough justice" of a rule is likely to be preferable to the
uncertainty of a facts and circumstances analysis in this context. Litiga-
tion is an expensive form of policymaking, especially if results are highly
fact-sensitive and thus provide effective guidance in only closely related
cases. Moreover, discretionary justice is unlikely to produce consistency
in taxpayer compliance or government enforcement efforts, which pro-
vides a powerful argument favoring movement toward rule-based deci-
sionmaking in this context. As discussed below, similar considerations
have led to rule-based solutions to timing issues with respect to deduc-
tions for accrual-basis taxpayers.
4. Accrual Method "Distortion"
Unlike the cash method, which links deductions to payments, ac-
crual methods permit taxpayers to take deductions into account in ad-
vance of actual payments. Prior to 1984, neither the Code nor the
Regulations provided any express time limit on the period of deferral
between accrual and ultimate payment. As a general rule, courts did not
impose such limitations either.28 6 Accrual generally depended on the
"all-events test," which required a liability to be taken into account dur-
ing the taxable year in which "all the events have occurred that establish
the fact of the liability, [and] the amount of the liability can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy. 287
In 1984, Congress added the so-called "economic performance" re-
quirement to the all-events test.288 Code section 461(h) and related regu-
lations2 9 currently provide detailed rules to implement the "economic
performance" requirement, which seeks to address the problem of "pre-
mature accruals. ' 290 Prior to the economic performance rules, the Com-
missioner attempted to use clear reflection power to challenge
"distortions" in this context. Clear reflection cases involving tax years
286 See Jonrr CoMMrrrim ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROW-
SIONS OF TE Damcrr REDuCrION Acr OF 1984 259 (1984) ('The courts generally have held
that the length of time between accrual and performance does not affect whether an amount is
properly accruable.").
287 Treas. Reg. § 1A61-1(a)(2)(1997).
288 See I.R.C. § 461(h)(1997). Section 461(h)(1) provides the following general rule:
"[I]n detenning whether an amount has been incurred with respect to any item during any
taxable year, the all events test shall not be treated as met any earlier than when economic
performance with respect to such item occurs." The statute expressly provides several princi-
ples that define economic performance, but leaves the development of other principles to regu-
lations. Section 461(h)(2) suggests that regulations can preempt the statutory provisions,
stating in part: "Except as provided in regulations prescribed by the Secretary, the time when
economic performance occurs shall be determined under the following principles ... 
289 See T.D. 8408, 1992-1 C.B. 155.
290 See Joir Coir-an ON TAxATIoN, GENAUL EPLANATION OF THE REvENuE PRovi-
SIONS OF TmE Dscrr REDucoN Acr OF 1984 258 (1984).
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that predate the economic performance rules are nevertheless instructive
as to the scope of the Commissioner's authority, and particularly the ex-
tent to which courts permit the Commissioner to exercise that authority
despite taxpayer compliance with existing rules.
Ford Motor Company v. Commissioner291 is a noteworthy case that
recognized extensive clear reflection power in connection with deduc-
tions for accrued liabilities. Compliance with the all-events test, as re-
quired by the then-applicable regulations, was insufficient to protect the
taxpayer from the Commissioner's clear reflection authority. By way of
background, the taxpayer, Ford Motor Company ("Ford"), had entered
into settlement agreements with tort claimants in order to resolve product
liability claims. These agreements obligated Ford to make periodic pay-
ments over varying periods of time. Some agreements required pay-
ments over a fixed term of years, while others required payments over a
term that was tied in some manner to the claimant's lifespan.292 In many
cases, Ford expected payments to extend for forty years or more. 293
In order to fund the payment obligations under these agreements,
Ford purchased single premium annuity contracts, which were structured
to provide payouts matching the amounts owed to claimants each year.294
These annuity contracts did not extinguish Ford's liability; Ford re-
mained ultimately responsible to the claimants under the agreements if
payments were not made. Pursuant to the accrual method, Ford had
deducted an amount that included the total current and future payments
under the agreement.295 Ford claimed that this treatment was required for
tax purposes because the liabilities satisfied the "all-events test."296 As
income from the annuity contracts was earned, Ford reported it pursuant
to section 72 of the Code.297
The Commissioner used her clear reflection authority to challenge
Ford's deduction, and both the Tax Court and the Sixth Circuit agreed
291 71 F.3d 209 (6th Cir. 1995), aff'g 102 T.C. 87 (1994).
292 See id. at 211. There were actually three types of agreements: Type I involved peri-
odic payments for a definite period; Type I involved payments for the claimant's lifetime; and
Type III requiring payments for the longer of a definite period or the claimant's lifetime. See
id.
293 See iL
294 See id.
295 Although Ford deducted $10.6 million in connection with its original return for 1980,
which represented only those amounts that had been paid in 1980 plus those amounts due
under fixed period settlement agreements, it later also sought to deduct estimated amounts
based on actuarial estimates for those agreements that were tied to life expectancies. See id. at
211.
296 Id. at 213. It should be noted that the "all-events tes' is not optional. If satisfied, the
taxpayer had no option but to accrue and report the expense for tax purposes in the applicable
year. During the years at issue, no applicable authority allowed a taxpayer to defer a deduction
to a later year.
297 See id.
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that this discretionary challenge was proper in this context. Although
both courts assumed that Ford had satisfied the "all-events test" and thus
complied with the then-applicable regulations, they nevertheless agreed
with the Commissioner's determination that such compliance did not
clearly reflect income in these circumstances. 298 Moreover, they allowed
the Commissioner to put Ford on an alternative method, which Ford
could not otherwise have adopted. According to the Sixth Circuit, "The
Commissioner's discretion to impose an alternate method of accounting
under § 446(b) is not limited to methods that Ford could have adopted on
its own. '299
The Commissioner's clear reflection challenge was based on puta-
tive "distortion" that resulted from failing to take into account the time
value of money in computing the applicable deductions in this case. In
fact, the Commissioner argued that current tax savings generated by the
immediate deduction of the accrued future payments made Ford better
off than if it had never incurred the liabilities.300 Although Ford disputed
this contention,301 the accrual method undeniably bestowed an economic
benefit on Ford (with a corresponding reduction in tax revenues for the
government) as compared with deferring deductions until payments were
made.30 2
Congress had recognized that time-value-of-money problems lurked
within the accrual method, and it had enacted the economic performance
rules of section 461(h) in 1984 to address these concerns.303 However,
the applicable statutes and regulations did not address these concerns
during the years at issue. Thus, the case presented the question of
whether the Commissioner could use her clear reflection power to supply
298 See id.
299 Id. at 217. The Commissioner required Ford to deduct the cost of the annuity con-
tracts currently, and to exclude the future income from the contracts. This approach is decid-
edly contrary to § 72 and to the cash method, which would allow a deduction only when
payments were made. Although the Court suggests that the Commissioner's method was more
beneficial to Ford than the cash method, that conclusion is questionable. In net present value
terms, assuming the discount rate equals the rate of return in the annuity and tax rates are
stable in all applicable periods, the results should be comparable.
300 See Ford Motor Co., 71 F.3d at 214-15.
301 See id. at 215.
302 To illustrate, assume that an accrual basis taxpayer accrues a deduction of $100 for a
liability that will not be paid for one year. Assume further that the applicable tax rate is 50%
and the applicable interest rate is 10%. The accrual basis taxpayer receives a current tax
benefit of $50 (50% of the $100 deduction), while the present value of the tax benefit obtained
by the cash basis taxpayer who deducts the payment next year is only about $45.45 ($5011.10).
The accrual basis taxpayer is thus economically better off than the cash basis taxpayer by
about $4.55. Alternatively, the Treasury is worse off by the same amount because tax receipts
are deferred. Through increasing the deferral period, the tax rate, or the interest rate, the
economic benefit of deferral is also increased versus the cash method.
303 See I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(c), which effectively places accrual method taxpayers on the
cash method for purposes of taking into account payments for tort liabilities.
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limiting principles that were not yet provided in the statute or
regulations.
Any "distortion" here is arguably different than the "distortion"
from accruing and deducting multiperiod payment liabilities, such as
leases, to which clear reflection power had clearly extended.30 4 While
leases provide future benefits in the form of property rights, the settle-
ment agreements relate to liabilities arising from past activities. Ford
obtained no significant future benefit from these agreements that would
be comparable to the future periodic use of leased property. The agree-
ments did not merely convert assets from one form to another, as in the
case of converting cash (or a promise to pay cash in the future) into some
other valuable asset that would not be consumed until a future period.
Invoking time-value-of-money concepts in this context is necessar-
ily a selective activity.30 5 The economic benefit that Ford obtained was
potentially available to any taxpayer deducting an accrued liability in
advance of payment. Although denying a deduction for an accrued lia-
bility based on a lengthy delay between accrual and payment was not
completely unprecedented, 3°6 such authority was not universally ac-
cepted, as other courts had refused to take into account delay in payment
after the all-events test had been satisfied.307 Moreover, courts have gen-
304 See Security Flour Mills v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 287 (1944).
305 As the Tax Court pointed out:
we want to make clear that the mere fact that a deduction which accrues prior to the
time payment is made (the timing factor) does not, by itself, cause the accrual to run
afoul of the clear reflection of income requirement. Inherent in the use of an accrual
method is the fact that a deduction may be allowed in advance of payment. Our
holding in the instant case is not intended to draw a bright line that can be applied
mechanically in other circumstances.
Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 87, 104 (1994). Likewise, Judge Gerber pointed
out in his dissenting opinion in Ford, "[B]usinesses may accrue and pay obligations based on
differing facts and circumstances. It is arbitrary to establish a rule that any particular length of
time, ipso facto, would result in the denial of an otherwise accruable deduction." Id. at 111
(Gerber, J., dissenting).
306 See Mooney Aircraft v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969) (denying deduc-
tion for bonds issued to aircraft purchasers which were redeemable upon retirement of aircraft
based on delay). Judge Gerber, dissenting in Ford, also suggests that the result in Mooney
Aircraft could have also been based on a finding that the all-events test had not been met,
rather than based on clear reflection power. See Ford Motor Co., 102 T.C. at 112 (Gerber, J.,
dissenting). Gertzman refers to Mooney Aircraft as "one of the most troubling" cases in this
area. GERrxMa, supra note 211, at 4.04[4].
307 In United States v. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. 593 (1986), the Supreme Court had
rejected potential delay between accrual and payment as a basis for challenging a casino opera-
tor's accrued deduction for the amount of progressive jackpots for slot machines that had
become fixed and determinable by year end. See id. at 604-05. The Government had also
raised the possibility for tax avoidance under the taxpayer's accrual method, suggesting that "a
casino operator could put extra machines on the floor on the last day of the tax year with
whatever initial jackpots it specifies and with whatever odds it likes, and then, on the tax-
payer's theory, could take a current deduction for the full amount even though payment of the
jackpots might not occur for many years.. . ." l. However, that possibility was insufficient
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erally rejected attempts by taxpayers and the government to invoke time-
value-of-money concepts in interpreting statutes without a clear indica-
tion that Congress intended such concepts to be included.30 8
The result in Ford suggests that the Commissioner has broad au-
thority to depart from the requirements imposed by the existing structure
of rules, adding new requirements when the Government's interest de-
mands. Here, no other method of reporting these expenses was arguably
appropriate for an accrual method taxpayer under the existing statutes
and regulations. 30 9 Not only was the Commissioner empowered to find
that the taxpayer's method did not clearly reflect income, but she was
to upset the taxpayer's method. First, although delay was undoubtedly involved, the Court
found that "none of the components that make up this parade of horribles ... took place here."
Id. at 605. The Court went on to state that "[i]n any event, the Commissioner's ability, under
§ 446(b) of the Code... to correct any such abuse is the complete practical answer to the
Government's concern." Id. at 605. A majority of the Tax Court in Ford interpreted this
reference to clear reflection authority as supporting the invocation of time-value of money
principles in different circumstances. See Ford Motor Co., 102 T.C. at 96. However, the
example considered by the Supreme Court suggests that manipulation, not the time of delay
between accrual and payment, would be the basis for exercising such authority.
Other cases in lower courts have similarly allowed deductions despite considerable delay be-
tween accrual and payment. See Burnham Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 953 (1988), affd,
878 F. 2d 86 (2d Cir. 1989) (allowing deduction for payments extending over 16 years; re-
jecting Mooney Aircraft rationale when payments began immediately after accrual);
GERTZMAN, supra note 211, at 4.04 n.352 (citing cases allowing delays of several years). It
should be noted that in Burnham Corp., the Commissioner had initially attempted to invoke
time value of money principles to require the taxpayer to discount future payments to present
value. See Burnham Corp., 90 T.C. at 959. However, the Commissioner abandoned that posi-
tion, making compliance with the all-events test the issue at trial. In Ford, a majority of the
Tax Court distinguished Burnham based on the Commissioner's concession on that issue,
which was not conceded in Ford However, this distinction fails to adequately explain the
Supreme Court's apparent rejection of time-value-of-money principles in Hughes Properties.
It also fails to explain the Tax Court's rejection of present value principles in other contexts, as
discussed infra note 308.
308 See City of New York v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 481 (1994), aff'd, 70 F.3d 142
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (rejecting taxpayer's use of time value of money principles for purposes of
applying private loan financing test of I.R.C. § 141(c)); Follender v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.
943 (1987) (rejecting Commissioner's use of present value principles to determine "at risk"
amount under § 465). In City of New York, the Tax Court distinguished the Supreme Court's
decision in Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330 (1984), in which the Court recognized
that interest-free demand notes resulted in a taxable gift. Prior to that decision, most courts
had concluded otherwise. In the Tax Court's view, the result in Dickinan was based on a
"detailed analysis of the statutory language and legislative purpose underlying the Federal gift
tax provisions at issue." City of New York, 103 T.C. at 496-97. The Tax Court found that such
a purpose was not evident in connection with section 141. See id. at 497.
309 See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(3)(1997):
The expenses, liabilities, or loss of one year generally cannot be used to reduce the
income of a subsequent year. A taxpayer may not take into account in a return for a
subsequent taxable year liabilities that, under the taxpayer's method of accounting,
should have been taken into account in a prior taxable year.
Id. Under the then-applicable regulations, nonaccrual of a liability for which the all-events test
was satisfied was not an option.
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also allowed to choose a new method for the taxpayer that it could not
have elected for itself.
Exercising clear reflection authority in this case may have corrected
a perceived abuse, but that correction comes at the expense of Rule of
Law values. Ford was essentially singled out for special treatment that
was not prescribed by the applicable rules governing accrual methods.
By the time this matter proceeded through litigation, thereby establishing
the extent of the Commissioner's authority in this context, other taxpay-
ers that took similar positions regarding the deduction of accrued liabili-
ties may have been protected by the statute of limitations, thus ensuring
inconsistent treatment among similarly situated taxpayers. In contrast,
the rules enacted under section 461(h) provided systematic guidance that
was likely to result in consistent treatment among taxpayers, who could
then plan in reliance upon those rules.310
Clear reflection authority recognized in Ford has not necessarily
translated into government victories in each case in which the Commis-
sioner has challenged results produced by following existing rules. This
inconsistency raises a question about when compliance with the regula-
tions is sufficient to protect the taxpayer from clear reflection power.
One approach might simply seek to dismiss Ford as involving extraordi-
nary facts. For example, in one later case, the Tax Court distinguished
Ford as a case involving "gross distortion."'31' However, such a distinc-
tion is unsatisfying. It leaves considerable uncertainty about the nature
and extent of "distortion" that is permitted under any given method of
accounting. One might consider the amount of the accrual, either in ab-
solute terms or in relation to the taxpayer's income, as a basis for finding
a distortion, but the Tax Court has elsewhere rejected disparity in results
as a basis for failing to clearly reflect income. 312 One would expect the
views of taxpayers, revenue agents, and judges to diverge with some fre-
quency as to matters of "gross distortion. '313
The Tax Court's opinion in Ford suggests another source of limita-
tion on clear reflection power, to the extent that it distinguishes between
310 Delays in implementing the economic performance regulations presumably resulted in
some similar problems of inconsistent treatment, when evaluated on a detailed level. The
magnitude of those differences, however, is likely to be less than when no particular rule
existed at all.
311 See General Dynamics Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 632, 651 (1997)
("[W]e are not confronted with the type of 'gross distortion' discussed in [Ford] .... ").
312 See RLC Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 457, 503 (1992) ("Disparity in
amount is not, per se, necessarily indicative of a failure to clearly reflect income.").
313 In fact, Ford neither involves the longest deferral, nor the greatest dollar amount of
disparity. For example, in RLC Industries, discussed infra notes 338-50, the taxpayer's
method produced a greater deduction and a potentially unlimited period of deferral as com-
pared with the Commissioner's method. However, RLC's method was held to clearly reflect
income.
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"specifically authorized" methods and methods that are only "generally
permitted. '3 14 Regulations indicate that the Commissioner may invoke
clear reflection authority if a taxpayer chooses a method that is not "spe-
cifically described" or "specifically authorized" by the Code or
Regulations:
No method of accounting will be regarded as clearly re-
flecting income unless all items of gross profit and de-
ductions are treated with consistency from year to year.
The Commissioner may authorize a taxpayer to adopt or
change to a method of accounting permitted by this
chapter although the method is not specifically described
in the regulations in this part if, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, income is clearly reflected by the use of
such method. Further, the Commissioner may authorize
a taxpayer to continue the use of a method of accounting
consistently used by the taxpayer, even though not spe-
cifically authorized by the regulations in this part, if, in
the opinion of the Commissioner, income is clearly re-
flected by the use of such method.315
This language does not expressly state that clear reflection authority is
limited if a method is "specifically described" or "specifically author-
ized." However, the Tax Court had previously suggested such a limita-
tion, as illustrated by the following statement:
Respondent's broad authority to determine whether a
taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflects income is
limited, in that he [or she] may not reject, as not provid-
ing a clear reflection of income, a method of accounting
employed by the taxpayer which is specifically author-
ized in the Code or regulations and has been applied on a
consistent basis.316
In Ford, the Tax Court took the position that authorization of "an
accrual method" in section 446(c) was insufficient to invoke this limita-
314 Compare Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 87, 99 n.11 (1994) (noting that
"an accrual method" under § 446(c) is not "specifically authorized") with Ford Motor Co., 102
T.C. at 99 ('The statute does not limit the Commissioner's discretion under section 446(b) by
the taxpayer's mere compliance with the methods of accounting generally permitted under
section 446(c) .... ). Later decisions also use this distinction. See Oakcross Vineyards, Ltd.
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 715, 721 (1996) (citing Ford for the proposition that
"mere compliance with a generally permitted method does not foreclose the Commissioner's
exercise of discretion pursuant to section 446(b) .... ); Ansley-Sheppard-Burgess, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 104 T.C. 367, 371 (1995) (to same effect).
315 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(ii)(1997).
316 Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 26, 31 (1988).
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tion on "specifically authorized" methods. The court explained this posi-
tion in a footnote:
The use of the word "an" in section 446(c)(2) suggests
that more than one accrual method of accounting is per-
missible under sec. 446(c). Accordingly, although "an"
accrual method of accounting is authorized generally by
sec. 446(c), no particular method of accrual accounting
is specifically authorized with respect to structured set-
tlements. In this manner, it can be said that respondent
has not denied petitioner the use of a specifically author-
ized accounting method.317
This approach toward interpreting the scope of a "specifically au-
thorized" method appears quite restrictive. If one requires a specific ref-
erence in the Code or regulations to accrual accounting for particular
types of deductions, virtually no expenses would qualify. The all-events
test is oriented toward all types of liabilities, not deductions for specific
categories of expenses. 318 Similarly, the economic performance rules
that were implemented to deal with the timing issue addressed in Ford
are generally not limited to specific types of expenditures. 319
The Tax Court's opinion in Ford treats Orange & Rockland Utili-
ties, Inc. v. Commissioner,320 as the case from which the "principle that a
method specifically sanctioned in the Code or regulations cannot be re-
jected under section 446(b)" was derived. 321 In Orange & Rockland, the
taxpayer was a regulated public utility that had used the "cycle reading
method" to account for accrued revenues. 322 Given the impracticality of
reading all customers' utility meters on the last day of the year, the tax-
payer had no actual measurement of revenue attributable to the period
between the last meter reading date in December and year-end.323 'More-
over, the utility regulators did not permit the taxpayer to bill customers
for utility services until the following month's cycle meter reading
date.324 Thus, the taxpayer had taken the position that the all-events test
317 Ford Motor Co., 102 T.C. at 99 n.1 1 (emphasis in original).
318 On the other hand, this approach could also be viewed as endorsing "the cash method"
as a "specifically authorized" method, as it is delineated by "the"---a definite article. See
GER-ZMAN, supra note 211, 4.01, at S 4-2 (1998 Supp.).
319 See generally GERizmAN, supra note 211, at 4.04[3] ("Although intended to prevent
tax abuse, Section 461(h) applies to all taxpayers using an accrual method of accounting. It is
not limited in scope to particular categories of taxpayers or to particular transactions.").
320 86 T.C. 199 (1986).
321 See Ford Motor Co., 102 T.C. at 98.
322 See Orange & Rockland, 86 T.C. at 200-201.
323 See id. at 202.
324 See id. at 202, 212.
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had not been satisfied with respect to this unbilled revenue,325 thereby
deferring the reporting of this revenue to the following tax year.326
The taxpayer had used this "cycle reading method" consistently for
over 50 years, and it was recognized as a generally accepted accounting
method in the utility industry.327 Neither the Code nor Regulations spe-
cifically referred to the "cycle reading method." However, the then-ap-
plicable regulations stated that: "the method used by the taxpayer in
determining when income is to be accounted for will be acceptable if it
accords with generally accepted accounting principles, is consistently
used by the taxpayer from year to year, and is consistent with the Income
Tax Regulations. ' 328 Moreover, the Service had previously ruled that
the cycle reading method clearly reflected income if the taxpayer also
used that method for financial reporting purposes, and the Tax Court had
previously ruled that such method had clearly reflected income.3 29
The Commissioner's clear reflection challenge in Orange & Rock-
land was based on an assertion that the taxpayer had satisfied the all-
events test with respect to the unbilled revenue, and that therefore its
method (which failed to take the unbilled revenue into account until the
following tax year) was properly characterized as a hybrid method that
was not specifically permitted by the Code.330 The Service took the po-
sition that acceptability of the hybrid method was limited to those cir-
cumstances in which the taxpayer used the same method for tax and
financial reporting services. 331 Here, the taxpayer had changed to a dif-
ferent method for financial reporting purposes, which took into account
estimated unbilled revenue in the current year.332 Consequently, the
Commissioner asserted that the taxpayer's method was not "specifically
permitted" and therefore fell within his broad discretion to determine that
it did not clearly reflect income in these circumstances. 333
Although the Commissioner had lost a prior case raising essentially
the same issue,334 the Commissioner sought to distinguish that case
325 See id. at 212.
326 See id. at 202-03.
327 See id. at 202, 205.
328 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1986). See Orange & Rockland, 86 T.C. at 209 (para-
phrasing this provision). As discussed supra note 230, this provision was amended in 1992 by
inserting the word "generally", so that the regulations now provide: 'The method used by the
taxpayer ... will generally be acceptable if it accords with generally accepted accounting
principles, is consistently used by the taxpayer from year to year, and is consistent with the
Income Tax Regulations." T.D. 8408, 1992-1 C.B. 155, 164 (emphasis added).
329 See Orange & Rockland, 86 T.C. at 205 (citing Rev. Rul. 72-114, 1972-1 C.B. 124).
330 See id. at 208.
331 See id.
332 See id. at 203-04.
333 See id. at 208.
334 See id. at 206 (citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.
445 (1982) as "essentially identical to and indistinguishable from" the instant case).
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based on the fact that he had not sought to treat the taxpayer's method as
a "hybrid method of accounting not specifically permitted under section
446(c)." 335 The Tax Court, however, rejected that argument, finding that
the taxpayer had not satisfied the all-events test, and therefore its method
was a permissible accrual method that complied with the regulations.336
The court stated in part:
We hold that all events which fixed petitioner's right to
receive unbilled December revenue had not occurred as
of December 31 of each year in issue. Consequently, the
cycle meter reading method of accounting is a permissi-
ble method of accrual accounting within the meaning of
section 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii), Income Tax Regs., and respon-
dent abused his discretion by requiring petitioners to
adopt a method of accounting other than the cycle meter
reading method of accounting for tax purposes. Since
we have determined that the cycle meter reading method
is a specifically permitted accrual method of accounting
within section 446(c)(2), respondent's imposition of a
condition of conformity was an abuse of discretion as
respondent's discretion within section 1.446-1(c)(2)(ii),
Income Tax Regs., is relevant only to determine whether
a method of accounting not specifically permitted clearly
reflects income. 337
The court in Orange & Rockland was not entirely clear in explain-
ing why the "cycle meter reading" method was "specifically permitted"
under section 446. This characterization could be based on the finding
that the taxpayer applied an accrual method that was otherwise consistent
with the applicable regulations, rather than a hybrid method.338 How-
ever, such a reading is decidedly inconsistent with the Tax Court's later
decision in Ford, which essentially rejects the possibility that "an accrual
method" can be "specifically permitted":
In [Orange & Rockland], we held that the "cycle meter
reading" method provided in the regulations and used by
the taxpayer was a permissible method under section
446(c)(2). Orange & Rockland dealt with a specific
method of accrual; it did not suggest that any method of
335 See id at 207.
336 See id. at 215.
337 See id. at 215.
338 This is undoubtedly a relevant consideration in determining whether the method is
generally permitted. See id. at 210 ('The issue as to whether the cycle meter reading method
of accounting is a permissible method of accounting must focus upon the determination as to
whether such method is consistent with the regulations.").
522 CORNELL JouRNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 8:445
accrual is to be protected from the Commissioner's scru-
tiny under section 446(b).339
Such a distinction is unsatisfying, as it is not apparent why regulatory
authorization of the "cycle meter reading" method was any more specific
than the "all events test" that arguably justified Ford's application of the
accrual method.
Alternatively, the court may have granted protected status to the
"cycle meter reading" method because the Service had previously ruled
that this method had clearly reflected income; moreover, a court had pre-
viously upheld that method against a clear reflection challenge in an es-
sentially similar case.34° Neither Orange & Rockland nor Ford expressly
states this rationale, although it is arguably more consistent with the re-
strictive view of specifically authorized methods and correspondingly
greater clear reflection power contemplated in Ford.
To the extent that "specifically authorized" methods receive greater
protection from the exercise of clear reflection power, it is important to
understand how this category of methods will be defined. If the courts
take a restrictive view of authorization, then the Commissioner will be
free to impose additional requirements that are not provided in the regu-
lations, thereby expanding her clear reflection authority and minimizing
the protective role of compliance with rules in connection with account-
ing methods. Other significant cases addressing clear reflection issues in
the context of specific authorization issues are discussed in the next
section.
5. Specifically Authorized Methods
Controversies over "specifically authorized" methods have gener-
ally arisen in two different contexts. The first context, touched upon in
Ford, involves determining the extent to which authorities containing
rules of general application, such as the Code, regulations, or revenue
rulings, restrict the Commissioner's clear reflection power. The second
context involves the scope and effect of "authorization" through adminis-
trative approval of a taxpayer's particular method, such as when Revenue
Agents approve a method, or a change in method, on audit.
a. Authorities of General Application
Notwithstanding the results in Ford, other courts have protected tax-
payers from the Commissioner's clear reflection authority if the taxpay-
ers consistently used methods complying with the Code and regulations,
particularly when the Code or regulations contain some specific guidance
339 Ford Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 87, 98 (1994).
340 See Orange & Rockland, 86 T.C. at 206.
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as to the nature or application of that method. Nevertheless, courts still
appear reluctant to impose rule-like constraints on the Commissioner's
clear reflection authority, even in light of specific provisions authorizing
the taxpayer's method.
For example, in RLC Industries v. Commissioner,341 the Tax Court
found that a taxpayer using a single "block" for all its timber holdings
had complied with applicable regulations under section 611 of the Code,
which provided guidelines for the composition of "blocks" for purposes
of computing timber depletion.3 42 Nevertheless, the Commissioner as-
serted her clear reflection power in seeking to require the taxpayer to use
multiple "blocks," which produced significantly higher tax revenues for
the Government. 343
The court was reluctant to embark on a clear reflection analysis in
this case, which it characterized as "a most unusual and somewhat circui-
tous situation.' '344 As the court explained:
The regulations are unambiguous, very broad, and per-
missive. Yet we are asked to decide whether, in spite of
compliance, petitioner's method of reporting clearly re-
flects income. In essence, we are asked by respondent to
decide that the regulation may produce results which do
not clearly reflect income. We suggest that the Secretary
should seek to correct any perceived defects in the regu-
lations under section 611 by appropriate amendment or
modification.345
341 98 T.C. 457 (1992), aff'd, 58 F.3d 413 (9th Cir. 1995).
342 See id. at 487-89.
343 See id at 475-76, 494. During the three years at issue in this case, the taxpayer's
method generated depletion deductions totaling $34,797,000, while the Commissioner's pro-
posed method would allow a deduction of only $7,475,000-a difference of $27,322,000. See
id. This difference can be explained by the fact that the taxpayer's timber holdings had widely
varying cost bases. Under the taxpayer's method, the depletion deduction was computed
based on an average of all such holdings, rather than the comparatively lower cost basis of
particular holdings that were harvested during the years at issue. The Commissioner's method
sought to more closely match the depletion deduction to the actual cost of harvested trees. See
generally id. at 494-95 (discussing the Commissioner's "specific tracing" approach).
344 See id. at 489.
345 Id at 489-90. See also Petroleum Heat and Power Co. v. United States, 405 F.2d
1300, 1306 (Ct. Cl. 1969):
[Taxpayer] acted in complete accord with the regulations, and any dissatisfaction on
the Government's part with plaintiffs treatment of income for the period in question
is attributable to the lack of clarity in and omissions from the Government's own
regulations. A taxpayer cannot be expected to intuit an unexpressed desire of the
Internal Revenue Service that would seemingly contradict written revenue regula-
tions which taxpayer is obliged to follow. The Commissioner is bound by its [sic]
own regulations as much as is the taxpayer.
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The court did not stop at that suggestion and find for the taxpayer.
Instead, the court continued to analyze the application of clear reflection
power:
Although we would feel justified in limiting our opinion
to a finding that petitioner's compliance with the regula-
tion should suffice, we also feel compelled to make in-
quiry into respondent's determination that petitioner's
method does not clearly reflect income. Our compulsion
is driven by pervasive authority ascribed to respondent
regarding the use of accounting methods and the heavier
than usual burden that is placed upon taxpayers to show
that respondent has abused her discretion in these
circumstances. 346
The court thus considered compliance with the regulations as only
"a factor which will be given appropriate weight" in the analysis. 347
Moreover, the court softened the Hallmark Cards holding that that the
Commissioner is not permitted to reject a consistently applied method
that complies with the Code and regulations, 348 substituting instead a
proscription against an arbitrary change: "[i]f a taxpayer's method of
accounting is specifically authorized by the Internal Revenue Code or the
underlying regulations and has been applied on a consistent basis, re-
spondent has not been allowed to arbitrarily require a change or reject the
taxpayer's method. '349
In evaluating whether the Commissioner had arbitrarily required a
change, the court considered and rejected the Commissioner's argument
that the disparity of more than $27 million between the taxpayer's
method (which computed depletion based on the average cost of all the
taxpayer's timber holdings) and the Commissioner's method (which fo-
cused on particular groupings that more closely matched acquisition
costs with cutting), was a sufficient basis for finding that the taxpayer's
method exceeded a "reasonable allowance. ' 350 The court stated in part:
Respondent's focus is upon the disparity between the
method she determined and the one used by petitioner.
That focus, in the setting of this case, is an insufficient
reason for the imposition of a differing method deter-
mined by respondent. The best method is not necessar-
346 RLC Indus., 98 T.C. at 490.
347 ld. at 490. In this case, that "appropriate weight" was supposed to be enhanced be-
cause of the greater deference given to legislative regulations "which have been held to have
the force and effect of law." See id. at 493-94.
348 See Hallmark Cards v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 26, 31 (1988).
349 RLC Indus., 98 T.C. at 491-92.
350 See id. at 494-95, 502.
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ily the one which produces the most tax in a particular
year.351
The court also pointed out that matching is not "an overriding rule
of tax accounting," and found that the regulations were not based on a
requirement of specific matching.3 52 Further, the court noted that the
taxpayer's method was consistent with GAAP and industry practices, a
fact that assisted, but was not dispositive, in the court's clear reflection
analysis.3 53
Based on these factors, the court found that the taxpayer's method
clearly reflected income. However, the court went on to consider still
another argument, which was based on a specific provision in the regula-
tions under section 611 that provided in part: "[fior good and substantial
reasons satisfactory to the district director, or as required by the district
director on audit, the timber or the land accounts may be readjusted by
dividing individual accounts, by combining two or more accounts, or by
dividing and recombining accounts. '354 The court's analysis of this au-
thority was similar to that of the Commissioner's clear reflection power,
as it refused to find that "[the Commissioner] has no authority to disturb
accounting methods that conform with the regulations," but nevertheless
concluded that the Commissioner's interference in this context was an
abuse of discretion.3 55
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Commissioner did not rely on
clear reflection authority, but instead relied upon her authority in section
1.611-3(d)(5) of the regulations, which the Commissioner claimed al-
lowed her to exercise "overriding power" in order "to achieve reasonable
results. '356 The Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the regulation
granting such power was invalid, as it constituted an inappropriate at-
tempt to exercise judicial power, which Congress had not delegated to
the Commissioner. This aspect of the case does not directly involve
clear reflection authority, but it does circumscribe the Commissioner's
discretionary power by ensuring that the Commissioner does not effec-
tively become a judge in her own case through changing results that
would otherwise flow from following regulations. 35 7
351 ld. at 502.
352 See id. at'497.
353 See id. at 498.
354 Il at 500 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3(d)(5)).
355 See id. at 501-02.
356 See RLC Industries v. Commissioner, 58 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1995).
357 Query what effect this approach might have on other attempts to exercise power
through "anti-abuse" rules that are rooted in interpretive regulations. See generally William H.
Caudill, Ninth Circuit Invalidates Anti-Abuse Rule: Is Reg. 1.701-2 Similarly Flawed?, 83 J.
TAx'N 380 (1995).
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More recent cases addressing controversies over specifically author-
ized methods have similarly ruled for the taxpayer, while refraining from
treating taxpayer compliance with regulations as a sufficient basis to re-
sist the Commissioner's clear reflection authority. For example, in Hos-
pital Corporation of America v. Commissioner,358 the Tax Court rejected
the Commissioner's clear reflection challenge to a hospital using a hy-
brid method of accounting. The hospital had used the cash method for
service income, and an accrual method for inventory-related transac-
tions.359 The court found that the hybrid method was specifically author-
ized by the regulations, and it rejected an attempt to limit such method to
taxpayers engaged in more than one business, which was not required in
the regulations. 360
As in RLC Industries, the court went on to discuss other clear re-
flection arguments, despite a finding of specific authorization. The court
rejected the disparity between the taxpayer's method and the Commis-
sioner's method as a sufficient basis for finding that the taxpayer's
method did not clearly reflect income. Here, "any distortion of income
must be examined in light of the business practice or business activities
that give rise to the transaction .... -361 In Hospital Corporation, the
disparity between the hybrid method and an accrual method resulted
from growth in the taxpayer's business, not from a change in business
practices, which the court found did not justify the Commissioner's inter-
vention.362 The court also rejected the Commissioner's attempt to re-
quire the taxpayer to show a "substantial-identity-of-results" with the
Commissioner's preferred accrual method in order to clearly reflect in-
come, reaffirming that the Commissioner cannot require uniform results
in the face of regulations that fail to prescribe uniform methods.3 63
The taxpayer also prevailed against a clear reflection challenge in
General Dynamics Corp. v. Commissioner,364 where the Commissioner
contended that the deferral in connection with the taxpayer's application
of the completed contract method (CCM) was "inherently too long to
clearly reflect income. '365 The court dismissed this argument and con-
cluded that the applicable regulations did not require the contract at issue
to be severed into separate contracts with different completion dates,
358 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2319 (1996).
359 See id. at 2331.
360 See id. at 2333 ("We agree with petitioner's conclusion that the regulations do not
restrict the use of a hybrid method to taxpayers engaged in more than one business."). Cf.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(iv) - 1.446-1(d) (1997).
361 Hospital Corp. of America, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2334.
362 See id. at 2335.
363 See id at 2335-36.
364 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 632 (1997).
365 Id at 642.
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thereby limiting the deferral period.366 The court also stated: "It may be
that use of CCM, per se, does not clearly reflect income, but it is a
method that petitioner was entitled to use for the period under considera-
tion. '367 The court also noted: "In addition, we are not confronted with
the type of 'gross distortion' discussed in Ford Motor Co ..... " 368
The above discussion of clear reflection authorities is not exhaus-
tive,369 but the cited cases illustrate that clear reflection power extends
even to circumstances when the taxpayer has c omplied with regulations
that specifically govern the method at issue. The extent that such author-
ity is actually used to challenge methods that comply with the regulations
is difficult to gauge, as accounting method issues are often settled with-
out a trial, thus leaving no public record.370 However, the above cases
suggest that using clear reflection authority despite taxpayer compliance
with regulations is not unprecedented and probably not uncommon.
On one hand, some aspects of these decisions appear friendly to
Rule of Law values. For example, the court has suggested that the Gov-
ernment should change regulations when it believes their results may not
clearly reflect income. Moreover, the court's clear reflection analysis
also seems to rely heavily on compliance with the regulations as a factor
favoring the taxpayer. The limited significance accorded to matching
and disparities with the Commissioner's method imply that clear reflec-
tion power is unlikely to carry the day in most cases in which a taxpayer
complies with the regulations.
On the other hand, these cases also send a message that compliance
with the applicable rules does not ensure that a taxpayer has satisfied its
tax obligations; clear reflection authority can still require the taxpayer to
change to another method of accounting. Recognizing paramount discre-
tionary authority that trumps taxpayer compliance with the applicable
regulations undermines Rule of Law values and imposes burdens on tax-
366 See id. at 651.
367 Id
368 Id
369 For example, controversies over application of the LIFO method in connection with
so-called "bargain purchase" transactions raises similar problems in evaluating the relationship
of clear reflection power and the election of the LIFO method. See Edward A. Morse, Demys-
tifying LIFO: Towards Simplification of Inflation-Adjusted Inventory Valuation, 2 FLA. TAX
R-v. 567, 601-04 (1995).
370 See I.R.S. Notice 98-31, 1998-22 I.R.B. 10, which proposes a new revenue procedure
governing changes in methods of accounting. The Notice states in part: "[t]he proposed reve-
nue procedure does not alter the authority of Appeals or counsel for the government to resolve
or settle any accounting method issues." For examples of temporary settlements extending
over several years, see Hospital Corp. of America v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2319
(1996). In that case, IRS challenges to the taxpayer's use of the cash method began in 1972,
but negotiated settlements allowed continued use of the cash method for several years, ulti-
mately deferring litigation on this issue until the 1986 tax year. See id. at 2327-28. See infra
notes 416-23 and accompanying text.
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payers. By diminishing the reliability of existing rules, such authority
subjects taxpayers to considerable uncertainty in the determination of
their tax obligations. Such authority also tends to increase compliance
costs, as compliance must be based on an analysis of particular facts and
circumstances other than those identified by the applicable regulations.
b. Prior Approval or Consideration
Taxpayers have also sought to defend against the Commissioner's
clear reflection power based on prior approval or consideration of a
method, such as during a prior period audit. However, courts have gen-
erally refused to constrain the Commissioner's clear reflection power
based on prior activities; the Service is not estopped from changing a
method that fails to clearly reflect income based its current appraisal of
that method.
Thomas v. Commissioner371 illustrates the Tax Court's approach to
prior audit activity affecting a method that failed to clearly reflect in-
come. In Thomas, the Service sought to require a taxpayer to change
from its method of inventory valuation, which essentially involved an
arbitrary writedown to an amount that was neither cost nor market value,
to the lower of cost or market method authorized by the regulations. 372
After finding that the taxpayer's method did not clearly reflect income,
the court addressed the question of whether that method was "specifi-
cally approved" under Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(2)(ii) as a result of prior
consideration and approval of that method on audit.373
In evaluating the "specific approval" issue, the court looked to its
prior decision in Pierce Ditching Co. v. Commissioner,374 which made it
clear that some "positive act" was required, and that such act must go
beyond approval in past audits:
The fact that respondent's agent examined petitioner's
income tax returns [for prior tax years] without propos-
ing any change in method is not, without more, such a
positive act. This is true even if respondent's agent had
371 92 T.C. 206 (1989).
372 See id. at 219-20. The taxpayer was a a publisher whose method immediately charged
off 75 percent of the manufacturing cost of books, and then charged off the balance within two
years and nine months. See id at 218-19. This method accelerated the time at which the
manufacturing costs were taken into account in relation to the sales, with the difference ex-
isting until the last book was sold or disposed of. See id. at 219. The taxpayer had failed to
argue that this method was a lower of cost or market method, and even if it had, the court
would have held that the taxpayer failed to prove that the value was less than cost. See id. at
220 n.ll. The cumulative difference in value between the taxpayer's method and the lower of
cost or market method, authorized by Treas. Reg. §§ 1.471-2(c) and 1.471-4, was more than
$4.6 million. See id. at 220-21.
373 See idU at 221-22.
374 73 T.C. 301 (1979).
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been made aware of, or even approved, petitioner's er-
roneous method.375
Thus, no matter how specific their consideration of the taxpayer's
method, apparently neither Revenue Agents nor the District Director may
constrain the Commissioner's clear reflection power from correcting a
past erroneous determination.
Furthermore, the court stated that even the District Director's spe-
cific approval of the taxpayer's method would not be sufficient:
In the instant case, petitioner's method of accounting
does not clearly reflect income. If under section 1.446-
2(c)(ii), Income Tax Regs., respondent approved this er-
roneous method of accounting, we do not believe that his
'hands are tied and he is required to perpetuate error.'
Klein Chocolate Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. at 147.
To bar respondent from changing an erroneous method
of accounting, which he approved would allow petition-
ers to continue distorting their income in future taxable
years. Section 446(b) and the regulations thereunder are
intended to give respondent broad power to ensure that a
taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflects income.
To hold that respondent is prohibited from requiring a
taxpayer to change from an erroneously approved ac-
counting method to an accounting method which clearly
reflects income would defeat the purpose and importance
of the statutes' requirement, in section 446(b), that the
method of accounting 'clearly reflect income'. See Thor
Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. at 538-43.376
Moreover, the court refused to recognize any detrimental reliance
on part of the taxpayer, which might have formed the basis for estoppel
in other contexts. Although the court noted that the taxpayer's consistent
use of the method and the Commissioner's failure to require changes on
audit are factors that may be considered in evaluating whether a method
does clearly reflect income, they do not prevent the Commissioner from
correcting past errors. 377 Here, where the taxpayer's writedown method
did not clearly reflect income, the court was unsympathetic toward an
equitable claim of estoppel based the "detriment" of paying additional
taxes.378 As the court pointed out, the taxpayer received an interest-free
375 Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
376 Thomas, 92 T.C. at 225 (citations in original).
377 See id. at 225-27. See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 445, 456 (1982) (consideration on audit, coupled with nearly 40 years of no proposed
adjustments, considered as factor in clear reflection analysis).
378 See Thomas, 92 T.C. at 227.
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loan from the government on its deferred tax liabilities, 379 and there was
no legal entitlement to continue that "windfall" indefinitely.380
Although Thomas suggests that a court may take into account prior
approval and consistent application as factors in determining whether a
method clearly reflects income, these factors appeared to have no bearing
on the court's analysis. The method at issue in Thomas did not comply
with the regulations, 381 and it produced results that varied substantially
with a method that did comply with the regulations. 382 Although a tax-
payer's consistent application of a method helps to demonstrate the ab-
sence of manipulation, which is an important aspect of clear reflection
analysis, 383 the independent value of tacit, or even explicit, approval by
the Service is unclear, particularly in light of the court's unwillingness to
constrain the Commissioner from correcting prior errors.
Thomas also does not indicate what, if any, further "positive acts"
besides merely reviewing a method on audit might be sufficient to con-
strain the Commissioner's clear reflection power. Some earlier cases
suggest the possibility that approval of a taxpayer's change in method of
accounting or initial adoption of a method might, in particular circum-
stances, be effective to constrain the Commissioner from proposing an
adjustment to that method.384 However, these cases do not involve cir-
cumstances in which clear reflection of income is seriously in doubt dur-
ing the years at issue; even here it appears that clear reflection power
could be invoked despite prior permission to change to or adopt a new
method.
One of these earlier cases was Maloney v. Hammond,385 in which
the Service challenged the taxpayer's use of an accrual method to ac-
count for certain contracting work. The revenue agent had "felt there
was a distortion of income present" under the taxpayer's method. 38 6
However, due to the agent's belief that a "prohibitive amount of time"
would be required to compute income using "a true accrual basis," he
379 See id. at 219, 227.
380 See id. at 227.
381 As noted above, this inventory was not valued at cost, and the taxpayer did not attempt
to prove that it was valued at market under the lower of cost or market method authorized in
Treas. Reg. § 1.471-2(d) and Treas. Reg. § 1.471-4. See id. at 220 n.11. Moreover, it should
be noted that the Commissioner could have required the taxpayer to show that its method
conforms with the "best accounting practice in the trade or business" under section 471, which
was doubtful in this case. However, the Commissioner had raised only clear reflection power
under section 446(b).
382 See Thomas, 92 T.C. at 219 (noting $4.6 million cumulative difference in inventory
valuation).
383 See, e.g., Klein Chocolate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 142, 147 (1961) (discussing
the importance of consistency).
384 See infra notes 385-415 and accompanying text.
385 176 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1949), affig 80 F. Supp. 212 (D. Ore. 1948).
386 Id. at 781.
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proposed adjustments using a different method, which he believed
"would fairly reflect the income of the years under consideration. '38 7
Although the agent's method was not provided for in either the Code or
regulations, the Commissioner claimed that the authority to impose such
a method was within his clear reflection power.388
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of the
taxpayer, based in part on the fact that the Commissioner had previously
authorized the taxpayer to use the accrual method.389 The Ninth Circuit
also pointed to the fact that the Commissioner had audited the taxpayer's
returns twice during the previous four taxable years, while failing to
challenge the accrual method, as a "circumstance which may be consid-
ered in determining the validity of the Commissioner's subsequent deter-
mination. ' 390 However, the Commissioner's failure to show that the
accrual method had been used incorrectly, or that the books were not
"fairly and honestly kept and maintained," 391 was also undoubtedly im-
portant to the court's analysis. 392
Geometric Stamping Company v. Commissioner,393 involved a tax-
payer that changed its own method of inventory costing beginning in its
1946 tax year from an "absorption" method, which included indirect
costs, to a "direct costing" method, which did not include such costs. 394
387 Id.
388 See id.
389 See id. at 780. By way of background, the taxpayer had previously carried on his
contracting business through a corporation, which used the percentage of completion method.
This corporation was dissolved in 1937. According to the trial court: "[i]n 1938, [the tax-
payer] applied to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for permission to adopt individually
the accrual method of accounting," with the exception of one project which was to be contin-
ued on the percentage of completion method. See Maloney, 80 F. Supp. at 215. The Commis-
sioner granted this permission. Id. However, under present law such permission would not be
required, as the taxpayer could adopt its initial method without consent. See generally
GE!R zAN, supra note 211, at 2.03. It should be noted that in 1942, the taxpayer began to
operate this business in partnership with his son. See Maloney, 80 F. Supp. at 214. Although
the partnership also adopted the accrual method, see id. at 215, neither court addressed why
prior approval to the taxpayer should also be attributed to the partnership.
390 Maloney, 176 F.2d at 782.
391 Id. at 781-82.
392 See id. It should be noted that a "fairly or honestly" standard applied in the Ninth
Circuit to evaluate clear reflection of income. See Osterloh v. Ltzcas, 37 F.2d 277 (9th Cir.
1930). An alternative standard, announced in Caldwell v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 112, 115
(2d Cir. 1943), focuses on whether income is reflected with "as much accuracy as standard
methods of accounting practice permit." For a discussion of these standards and their interre-
lationships, see GERTZMAN, supra note 211, at 2.02[].
393 26 T.C. 301 (1956).
394 See il at 301-02. Under a direct costing method, "direct production costs and varia-
ble indirect production costs are includible in costs allocable to inventory, [but] all fixed indi-
rect production costs are deductible as period expenses." See 1 LEsLmE J. SCHNErDER, FEDERAL
INcoM TAXATION OF INvENTORIEs § 4.0111], at 4-5 (1998). A "full absorption method" in-
cludes all direct production costs and all indirect production costs as inventoriable costs. See
id. According to Schneider, "Historically, there was considerable uncertainty over the proper
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The Service discovered the change on audit, and proposed adjustments to
return the taxpayer to the absorption method.3 95 While negotiations were
pending over proposed adjustments for the 1946-47 years, the revenue
agent issued his report for 1948, which showed an overassessment of
$11,757.38 based on the absorption method.396
Prior to trial, the taxpayer and the Service then settled the dispute
over the 1946-47 tax years, with the Service conceding that the taxpayer
could use the direct costing method as reported in its return. 397 How-
ever, the Service recomputed the overassessment for the 1948 tax year to
only $349.27, based on allowing the direct costing method.398 The tax-
payer did not challenge this determination, but accepted a refund based
on this reduced overassessment for 1948. 399
When the Service again challenged the taxpayer's method in the
1950 tax year, the Tax Court held for the taxpayer based on the Service's
"tacit approval" of the taxpayer's method in 1948. In these circum-
stances, acceptance of the taxpayer's method on audit was deemed to be
"the equivalent and have the effect of a formal request on the part of
petitioner to change its method of reporting and a formal approval by the
Commissioner of that change." 400 Although the Court found that the sig-
nificance of the negotiated settlement in 1946-47 was not "clear cut,"40 1
the acquiescence to the taxpayer's method in 1948 (which incidentally
had the effect of substantially reducing the taxpayer's refund) was effec-
tive to approve the new method.402
Although Geometric Stamping resulted in a taxpayer victory, it can-
not be read as cutting off a clear reflection inquiry when a request for a
change in method is granted. First, the court suggests only that "respon-
dent ought to take account of the extent to which a taxpayer's conduct
conforms to respondent's own requirements." 40 3 This is consistent with
treating prior approval as a factor, but not a determinative factor, in clear
reflection analysis. Second, it is significant that the court found it "note-
worthy that respondent never contests the propriety of the direct costing
method of costing goods that are produced by the taxpayer, although the full absorption
method had generally been preferred by the Service." Id. at 4-6. Currently, extensive and
detailed "uniform capitalization" rules govern inventory costing. See generally I.R.C. § 263A
and regulations thereunder.
395 See Geometric Stamping, 26 T.C. at 302.
396 See id.
397 See id. at 303, 305.
398 See id. at 303.
399 See id.
400 Id. at 304-05.
401 Id. at 305.
402 See id.
403 Id. at 304.
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1
method."''4 4 Apparently, the Commissioner's challenge in this case was
based on a theory either that the taxpayer's change in method was unau-
thorized, or that it did not conform to the method used for the taxpayer's
books.4°5 Thus, if the Commissioner had questioned whether the tax-
payer's method clearly reflected income, it is doubtful that the taxpayer
would have fared as well.406
In Klein Chocolate, Inc. v. Commissioner,a0 7 the Tax Court sought
to determine whether the principle of "tacit approval" recognized in Geo-
metric Stamping should be applied to a taxpayer's adoption of a single
pool in applying the LIFO method to its inventory. The taxpayer had
properly adopted the LIFO method for the 1942 tax year, and it used a
single pool for its inventory items.408 At this time, there were no detailed
regulations governing pooling in LIFO inventories. Detailed regulations
as to "natural business unit" pooling, which the taxpayer alleged sup-
ported its pooling practice, were later promulgated in 1961, but the court
rejected any reference to these regulations for earlier taxable years. 40 9
With regard to the 1942-44 tax years, the court found that the Reve-
nue Agent's report stated that taxpayers use of LIFO had been "thor-
oughly examined" and recommended that the taxpayer's method be
"accepted" for the years at issue.410 Accordingly, those tax years were
closed.411 In the 1946-47 tax years, the Commissioner proposed an ad-
justment to change the taxpayer from a single pool to ten separate pools,
which increased taxable income.412 However, the court rejected this ad-
justment, treating the prior examination and approval of the single pool
as being "as definite and as effective under the statute as if approval had
404 Id. at 305.
405 See id. at 305-06.
406 By the time of trial, the taxpayer was able to show results from ten years of applying
the direct method (i.e., through the 1955 tax year). The direct method produced greater taxa-
ble income in five of the years, but less in the other five. See id. at 305. As the court ob-
served: "[tihe consistency required of taxpayers in reporting their income and the uniformity
shown by petitioner consequently results, as is so often the case, in the long-range conse-
quences being no different under one system than under the other. This is at once the theoreti-
cal reason and the practical demonstration of the superior significance of consistency where
permissible alternatives are involved.' See id. Thus, the court did not consider direct costing
to be an "impermissible" method at this time. However, later decisions reached that conclu-
sion and full absorption costing was eventually required. See generally SCrE MR, supra note
393, at § 4.01.
407 36 T.C. 142 (1961), acq. in result, 1961-2 C.B. 4.
408 See Ud at 146-47. Taxpayers adopt the LIFO method by filing Form 970, and unlike
most changes in methods of accounting, such adoption does not require the Commissioner's
prior approval. See generally SCHNEmDER, supra note 393, at § 10.02[1]; GERTzmAN, supra
note 211, at 7.0311].
409 See Klein Chocolate, 36 T.C. at 148 (citing T.D. 6539, 1961-10 C.B. 167).
410 See id. at 144.
411 See id.
412 See id. at 147.
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been made on application prior to the use of such method of inventory in
any return. 413
The significance of the resulting approval and constraint appears
limited, however, as the court made it clear that this decision did not
mean that "if the consistent and continued use of a method thus approved
is later shown to result in a distortion of income or it is improperly prac-
ticed the respondent's hands are tied and he is required to perpetuate
error."414 Here, the Commissioner had made no such claim, and he was
forced to respect the taxpayer's consistent use of its method.415
Thus, cases such as Maloney v. Hammond, Geometric Stamping,
and Klein Chocolate ultimately offer little protection for taxpayers seek-
ing refuge from the Commissioner's clear reflection power. Even spe-
cific authorization of a method for a particular taxpayer does not ensure
that such method will clearly reflect income. On one hand, it is doubtful
that clear reflection power could be used solely because the Service finds
another method that produces higher taxable income. As the Ninth Cir-
cuit stated in Maloney v. Hammond:
If [the Commissioner's] position is that, having granted
permission to a taxpayer to use a certain method of ac-
counting and the taxpayer having in good faith followed
the allowed method, the Commissioner may subse-
quently determine that some other method would be
more advantageous to the government in the amount of
taxes to be collected and substitute the second method
for the first, we say the Commissioner has no such right.
To do so would be most unfair to the taxpayer.416
On the other hand, taxpayers should not take too much comfort
from this pronouncement. Without adequate development of the parame-
ters of clear reflection of income, it is difficult to ascertain when the
above limitation has been exceeded. Revenue concerns, undoubtedly in-
form the Commissioner's decisions to challenge methods of accounting,
and to the extent that clear reflection power extends to specifically au-
thorized methods, one is hard pressed to find a justification that is not
revenue-based to sustain such a challenge.
Moreover, as noted above, sustaining a clear reflection challenge is
not accomplished without significant cost. A recent case involving clear
413 See id at 147-48.
414 Id. at 147. Thomas specifically notes this point. See supra note 376.
415 See Klein Chocolate, 36 at T.C. 147-48. Although consistency is emphasized in regu-
lations under section 471, it is quite clear that consistent use does not preclude the Commis-
sioner from adjusting a method that does not clearly reflect income. See ScHmamER, supra
note 393, at § 3.04.
416 Maloney v. Hammond, 176 F. 2d 780, 781 (9th Cir. 1949).
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reflection issues illustrates that clear reflection controversies can be
drawn-out affairs. In Hospital Corporation of America,417 the taxpayer
was initially using the cash method for most of its hospitals and subsidi-
aries.418 In its 1972-73 tax year, the Service sought to change the tax-
payer to an accrual method, but a settlement was negotiated to allow the
taxpayer to use a hybrid method.419 The hybrid method was then ac-
cepted in subsequent audit cycles covering the tax years 1974-1978.420
However, in the examination of the 1979-80 tax years, the Service once
again challenged the hybrid method, seeking a change to the accrual
method.421 This issue was resolved at Appeals by permitting the hybrid
method, with some modifications. 422 However, the Service renewed its
clear reflection challenge to the hybrid method in the 1981-1986 tax
years,423 which was ultimately resolved by a judicial determination that
the method clearly reflected income.424
The fact that the accrual method would increase taxable income by
more than $588 million4 25 undoubtedly affected the Commissioner's de-
cision to pursue this issue.426 By 1987, section 448 required the taxpayer
to change to an accrual method, so that the revenue effects from a future
tax year were not at issue.427 These multiple challenges of the same
method throughout an extended period illustrate the costs of using clear
reflection power, as opposed to a clear rule.
Here, Congress ultimately provided a rule-based solution to the per-
ceived problem of deferred tax revenues arising from the cash method,
but disputes in the intervening period consumed significant resources for
rather speculative benefits. As the court pointed out, the cash method
enjoyed "overwhelming acceptance" in the health care industry.428 If the
Service obtained a favorable decision, it is unlikely that the decision
would provide an industry-wide solution nearly ten years after the last
potential open tax year. By this time, many taxpayers in the industry are
likely to have the protection of the statute of limitations. This practice
417 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2319 (1996).
418 See id. at 2326-27.
419 See id. at 2327.
420 See iL at 2328-29.
421 See id. at 2329.
422 See id.
423 See Ud at 2329-30
424 See id. at 2336-37. It should be noted that the Tax Court here did not reach the issue
of whether the Commissioner had changed the taxpayer's method. See id. at 2332. However,
it did consider the Service's acquiescence in the hybrid issue, while "not binding" on the
Commissioner, as "a factor in the [taxpayer's] favor." Id. at 2334 (citing Klein Chocolate and
Geometric Stamping).
425 See Ud
426 See itL (arguing based on "disparity" between methods).
427 See id. at 2332 n.20.
428 See id. at 2330.
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ensures that similarly situated taxpayers will bear unequal burdens, both
in terms of taxes paid and the cost to determine that tax liability.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE RULE OF LAW AND
CLEAR REFLECTION AUTHORITY
The Rule of Law ideal is often compromised in Federal tax law, at
least when the Rule of Law is understood in relation to the protective,
constraining function of rules. Taxpayers must not only contend with
problems of linguistic indeterminacy, which might be viewed as a neces-
sary byproduct of good faith rulemaking efforts, but also with avoidable
forms of discretion. Avoidable discretion is traceable to more radical
forms of purposivism, as well as discretion that is a product of legislative
choice, as exemplified by the Commissioner's clear reflection authority.
Choosing discretion is troublesome under the Rule of Law ideal.
Rather than providing notice of legal obligations in advance of their ap-
plication, discretion-based provisions only provide notice of risk or un-
certainty. Some notice is probably better than none, as the impact of
coercive government power is perhaps not completely unexpected.
However, a discretionary approach may be unsatisfactory if rules could
be fashioned to limit or reduce that uncertainty. Significant normative
judgments are at stake in choosing discretion, and reevaluation of these
judgments is necessary in light of the importance of the Rule of Law in
our legal system.
Congress' grant of discretionary authority to the Commissioner
under section 446(b) has proven troublesome for the certainty and pre-
dictability of tax law, as the phrase "clearly reflect income" does not
provide an adequate textual basis to constrain that authority. In seeking
parameters for constraint, courts have sometimes resorted to principles
that are patently tautological. For example in Hospital Corp., the court
stated that "where a taxpayer's method of accounting does clearly reflect
income, [the Commissioner] cannot require the taxpayer to change to a
different method even if the Commissioner's method more clearly re-
flects income."429 Attempts to identify other principles, such as match-
ing, conformity to GAAP, or compliance with industry practices, have
hardly resulted in rule-like clarity. Moreover, findings of "abuse" or
"distortion" are conclusions, not rationales, and these conclusions must
be made in relation to some benchmark for income, which is sorely lack-
ing apart from parameters derived from the Code and Regulations.
Some commentators have suggested that uncertainty generated by
discretion may be beneficial, to the extent of an in terrorem effect in
429 See, e.g., Ford Motor Company v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 209, 213 (6th Cir. 1995).
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deterring "abusive" transactions. 430 However, this presupposes that tax-
payers can intuitively know when a transaction has somehow crossed the
line into the realm of the "abusive." 431 It also presupposes that Revenue
Agents can appropriately apply discretionary doctrines, thereby avoiding
the imposition of enforcement costs on "innocent" taxpayers. 432
Whatever the merit of deterrent effects of anti-abuse doctrines in
other transactional contexts, an in terrorem effect is not essential to en-
sure that taxpayers adopt appropriate tax accounting methods. Allowing
the Commissioner to exercise dynamic rule-revision power may help
boost tax collections, but rulemaking can also protect the public fisc
without the selective, ad hoc impact of discretionary justice. Broadly-
based discretion threatens the administrability of the tax system, particu-
larly when vague notions of purpose are allowed to override the result of
following otherwise applicable rules.433 The equitable merits of discre-
tion in this context are dubious, given its selective application and the
attendant costs imposed on those targeted by such authority.
Efforts to restore Rule of Law values in this area should begin by
eliminating the Commissioner's authority to challenge methods of ac-
counting that otherwise conform to the requirements of the Code and
regulations. Dynamic rule-revision power is particularly offensive to
Rule of Law values, and both taxpayer rights and goals of efficient tax
administration are threatened when rules are abandoned in favor of a
430 See Daniel Halperin, Are Anti-Abuse Rules Appropriate?, 48 TAX LAW. 807, 809
(1995).
431 See id. at 809:
I believe that sophisticated practitioners are undoubtedly aware when a transaction is
structured to achieve a tax result inconsistent with its economic substance. In fact, it
is often harder to determine whether or not a given transaction will actually achieve
an apparent tax result which seems too good to be true, than it is to discern what
would be required to properly measure income consistent with the intent behind the
rule.
Id. As a basis for this latter statement, Professor Halperin notes: "It has been suggested to me
that this capacity is not widely disseminated, but I wonder if it is any rarer than the ability to
construct the kind of perceived abusive schemes under review." Id. at 809 n.12.
432 See id. at 808. Professor Halperin points out that procedural safeguards for implemen-
tation of the partnership anti-abuse rules limit this risk. A procedural safeguard, such as re-
quiring National Office approval as a prerequisite for clear reflection challenges might limit
the abuse of clear reflection power, although it would not ensure that a purposive approach
was invoked appropriately.
433 See id. at 811:
[W]e sometimes deliberately decide not to attempt to achieve consistency with 'pur-
pose' in every situation. The tax law will always be an uneasy compromise between
efforts to achieve equity and limit efficiency losses at a reasonable level of complex-
ity. In the end, the Code must be administrable. Thus, perhaps primarily with re-
spect to broad-based rules affecting ordinary taxpayers, Congress (or the Service)
must sometimes opt for a bright line in order to achieve this goal. In those situations
we do not want to apply an overriding purpose.
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case-by-case determination of tax liability. Structural principles of tax
law that may be identified and applied by courts hardly provide certainty
and predictability as to when rules should be abandoned. Rule-based
reliance is more likely to ensure that all taxpayers are treated similarly,
and it avoids the costs associated with an attempt to achieve substantive
justice in each case.
When tax accounting rules fail to authorize or prohibit particular
methods of accounting, there may still be room for the Commissioner's
discretion. However, this discretion should be constrained by parameters
that are accessible to taxpayers and Revenue Agents. Generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) would appear to provide a logical bench-
mark for evaluating whether accrual methods that are neither proscribed
nor specifically authorized by the Code or regulations should be deemed
to clearly reflect income.
Current regulations look to compliance with GAAP as a general in-
dicator of clear reflection of income. Section 1.446-1(a)(2) of the regula-
tions states in part: "A method of accounting which reflects the
consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles in a
particular trade or business in accordance with accepted conditions or
practices in that trade or business will ordinarily be regarded as clearly
reflecting income, provided all items of gross income and expense are
treated consistently from year to year."434 Elevating compliance with
GAAP to conclusive status in clear reflection analysis would provide an
objective basis for constraint, thereby restoring Rule of Law values in
this context.
Although the Supreme Court has emphasized that financial account-
ing and tax accounting have competing goals and interests, 435 those dif-
ferences would not necessarily interfere with the use of GAAP for the
limited purpose of providing an external benchmark for constraining dis-
434 Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (emphasis added).
435 See Thor Power Tool Co., 439 U.S. 522 (1978):
The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to manage-
ment, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility
of the accountant is to protect these parties from being misled. The primary goal of
the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable collection of revenue; the major
responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc. Consist-
ently with its goals and responsibilities, financial accounting has as its foundation
the principle of conservatism, with its corollary that "possible errors in measurement
[should] be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement of net in-
come and net assets." In view of the Treasury's markedly different goals and respon-
sibilities understatement of income is not destined to be its guiding light. Given this
diversity, even contrariety, of objectives, any presumptive equivalency between tax
and financial accounting would be unacceptable.
Id. at 542-43 (footnote omitted).
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cretion when the Code or regulations are otherwise silent.436 If Congress
or the Treasury determines that the interests of tax accounting require a
different approach than allowed by GAAP, those interests can be ad-
dressed through rulemaking, which will ensure industry-wide effects in
lieu of particularized decisionmaking. Here, the "rough justice" of a rule
has much to offer as compared with the uncertainty of discretion, which
has flowed from the Commissioner's clear reflection power.
436 It should be noted that Thor Power involved a method that did not comply with the
regulations; allowing GAAP to control in those situations would have created problems that
are quite different from those considered here.

